宗鏡錄 71.7

71.7

答。若前解有法。唯取實法為所緣者。然先德雖多確此義。今略推徵。有三過失。一固違疏文失。假法若非有體者。何以疏主將依圓二性出百法體。以百法通假實故。今言假法無體。豈不相違。二遍計無別失。依圓假法既言無體。與遍計所執無體何別。論云。依圓是有。遍計是無。豈不相違。三有法例不成失。所緣緣體。論云。有法便言唯實。增上緣體。論云。有法。何乃通假。即命根等。豈是實耶。若依今明有法。通取三境假之與實。但名有法。盡作所緣緣。於八識中分別。前五第八性境為所緣緣。揀諸假法。及遍計所執。第七帶質境為所緣緣。唯假非實。及簡遍計所執。第六意識。緣於三境作所緣緣。通於假實。唯簡遍計所執。更立量云。諸假相分是有法。定為能變心親所緣緣。宗因云。法處有無門中影字攝故。同喻如實定果色。遍計所執為異喻。或作量云。帶質獨影是有法。是親所緣緣。宗因云。影之差別故。同喻如性境。

Answer: If the former interpretation takes 'an existent phenomenon' (dharmavat) as solely denoting real phenomena as the object-condition—although many former virtuous ones certainly held to this meaning, when briefly deduced and investigated now, there are three faults. First, the fault of stubbornly contradicting the commentary's text: if nominal phenomena were not possessed of substance, why did the author of the commentary use the two natures of the dependent (paratantra) and the consummate (pariniṣpanna) to delineate the substances of the hundred dharmas? For the hundred dharmas encompass both the nominal and the real. To say now that nominal phenomena are devoid of substance—how could that not be contradictory? Second, the fault of no distinction from the imaginary: since nominal phenomena of the dependent and consummate natures are said to be devoid of substance, what distinction is there between them and the substancelessness of the imaginary? The treatise states, 'The dependent and consummate are existent; the imaginary is non-existent.' How could that not be contradictory? Third, the fault that the analogy of 'an existent phenomenon' fails to hold: regarding the substance of the object-condition, when the treatise states 'an existent phenomenon', one immediately says it is purely real; but regarding the substance of the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya), when the treatise states 'an existent phenomenon', why then does it encompass the nominal? That is to say, are the life-faculty and so forth real? If, according to our present explanation, 'an existent phenomenon' generally takes both the nominal and the real among the three kinds of objects, whatever is named 'an existent phenomenon' completely serves as an object-condition. Distinguishing them within the eight consciousnesses: for the first five and the eighth, nature-objects serve as object-conditions, excluding various nominal phenomena and the imaginary. For the seventh, quality-attached objects serve as object-conditions, being purely nominal and not real, and excluding the imaginary. The sixth consciousness takes all three kinds of objects as object-conditions, encompassing both the nominal and the real, and excluding only the imaginary. Further, a formal inference is established: 'All nominal nimittabhāgas' is the subject (dharmin); 'are definitively the immediate object-conditions of the transforming citta' is the thesis (sādhya); because 'they are subsumed under the term "reflection" (chāyā) within the division of presence and absence of the dharma-āyatana' is the reason (hetu); the positive example is like the real forms produced by samādhi; the negative example is the imaginary. Or one may construct the inference thus: 'Quality-attached and isolated-reflection [objects]' is the subject; 'are immediate object-conditions' is the thesis; because 'they are varieties of reflections' is the reason; the positive example is like nature-objects.