宗鏡錄 77.17

77.17

答曰。聖智之無者。無知。惑智之無者。知無。其無雖同。所以無者異也。何者。夫聖心虛靜。無知可無。可曰無知。非謂知無。惑智有知。故有知可無。可謂知無。非曰。無知也。故云般若無知。無所不知。無知者。無能所之知。無不知者。真如自性。有遍照法界義。又聖人唯有無心之心。無見之見。非同凡夫有心有見。皆是分別能所相生。故涅槃經云。不可見。了了見。華嚴經頌云。無見即是見。能見一切法。於法若有見。此則無所見。又云。菩薩悉見諸法。而無所見。普知一切。而無所知。則般若無知。無所不知矣。但不落有無之知。能所之見。非是都無知見矣。諸佛皆具五眼三智。四辯六通。三諦理圓。一心具足。若不見空與不空。非空非不空。方與實相相應耳。故楞伽經云。一一相相應。遠離諸見過者。若於諸相。常與實相相應。自然遠離諸過。會第一義。清淨真心。朗然明徹。而無念著。即事即如。唯心直進。即諸佛所知。唯實相矣。離此立見。皆成諸過。無所非明者。若能覺之體。要因所明者。若無所覺之明。則能覺之體。便非是明。故云無所非明。故知覺之與明。互相假立。本無自體。豈成自性圓明之覺。無明又非覺湛明性者。顯妄覺體。無湛明之用。若言但覺於明。何須覺體自明者。則自性非明。便無覺湛之用。故云無明又非覺湛明性。性覺必明。妄為明覺者。釋妄覺託真之相也。何以得知。妄覺初起有覺明。只緣性覺必有真明。所以妄覺託此性明。而起影明之覺。執影像之明。起攀緣之覺。迷真認影。見相二分。自此而生覺明之號。覺非所明。因明立所者。夫一真之覺。體性雖明。不分能所。故覺非所明。由影明起覺。能所斯分。故云因明立所。所既妄立。生汝妄能。無同異中。熾然成異者。此則元因覺明。起照生所。所立。照性遂亡。則是識精元明。能生諸緣。緣所遺者。乃是但隨能緣之相。覆真唯識性。一向能所相生。如風動水。波浪相續。澄湛之性。隱而不現。從此迷妄。生虛空之性。復因虛空。成立世界之形。於真空一心。畢竟無同異中。熾然建立。成諸法究竟之異。皆因情想擾亂。勞發世間之塵。迷妄昏沈引起虛空之界。分世界差別為異。立虛空清淨為同。於分別識中。又立無同無異。皆是有為之法。盡成生滅之緣。未洞本原。終為戲論。

Answer: The absence in holy wisdom is 'absence of knowing' (unknowing), whereas the absence in deluded wisdom is 'knowing absence'. Although their absence is the same, that in which they are absent differs. How so? The holy mind is empty and tranquil; there is no knowing that can be negated, and so it can be called 'absence of knowing', not 'knowing absence'. Deluded wisdom possesses knowing; hence there is knowing that can be negated, and it can be called 'knowing absence', not 'absence of knowing'. Therefore it is said that prajñā has no knowing, yet there is nothing it does not know. 'Absence of knowing' means having no knowing of subject and object. 'Nothing it does not know' means that the self-nature of tathatā has the function of universally illuminating the dharmadhātu. Furthermore, the sage possesses solely a mind of no-mind and seeing of non-seeing; this is not like the ordinary person who possesses mind and possesses seeing, which are all the mutual generation of discriminatory subject and object. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'It cannot be seen, yet it is seen clearly and distinctly.' A verse of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'Non-seeing is indeed seeing, / capable of seeing all dharmas. / If one has seeing regarding dharmas, / this is to see nothing at all.' It also says: 'The bodhisattva sees all dharmas completely, yet has nothing seen; / universally knows everything, yet has nothing known.' Thus prajñā has no knowing, yet there is nothing it does not know. It merely does not fall into the knowing of existence and non-existence, or the seeing of subject and object; it does not mean there is utterly no knowing and seeing. All Buddhas are fully endowed with the five eyes and the three knowledges, the four confidences and the six supernatural knowledges; the principle of the three truths is perfected, fully possessed in the one mind. Only if one sees neither emptiness nor non-emptiness, neither non-emptiness nor not-non-emptiness, does one correspond with the true characteristic. Therefore the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'Each and every characteristic corresponds, far removed from the faults of various views.' If with respect to all characteristics one constantly corresponds with the true characteristic, one is naturally far removed from all faults, meets the ultimate truth, and the pure true mind shines bright and clear without thoughts or attachments; [realizing that] phenomena are immediately tathatā, advancing directly via mind alone, what all Buddhas know is solely the true characteristic. To establish views apart from this is to engender all faults. As for 'there being no object, it is not illumination': if the substance of that which can be aware must depend on an object that is illuminated, then if there is no illumination that is an object of awareness, the substance of that which can be aware is no longer illumination. Thus it says, 'there being no object, it is not illumination.' From this we know that awareness and illumination are mutually postulated; fundamentally lacking a self-substance, how could they constitute the awareness of self-nature that is perfectly luminous? As for 'without illumination, it is again not the luminous nature of calm awareness': this reveals that the substance of deluded awareness lacks the function of calm luminosity. If one were to say that it is merely aware of illumination, why must the substance of awareness be luminous in itself? Then self-nature would not be illumination, and there would be no function of calm awareness. Therefore it says, 'without illumination, it is again not the luminous nature of calm awareness.' As for 'the nature's awareness must be luminous; delusively it is taken as luminous awareness': this explains the characteristic of deluded awareness relying on the real. How is this known? When deluded awareness first arises, it possesses luminous awareness only because the nature's awareness must possess true luminosity; therefore deluded awareness relies on this luminosity of the nature and gives rise to an awareness of reflected luminosity. Grasping the luminosity of the reflected image, it gives rise to an awareness that climbs on conditions. Confusing the real and identifying with the reflection, the two divisions of darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga arise from this, and the designation 'luminous awareness' comes to be. As for 'awareness is not what is illuminated; because of illumination an object is established': the awareness of the one reality, though luminous in substance and nature, does not divide into subject and object; hence 'awareness is not what is illuminated.' Because awareness arises from reflected luminosity, subject and object are divided; hence it says, 'because of illumination an object is established.' As for 'the object having been falsely established, your false capability is born; where there is neither sameness nor difference, difference flaringly arises': originally, relying on luminous awareness, illumination was aroused and the object was born; once the object was established, the illuminating nature was lost. This means that the essential luminosity of consciousness can produce all conditions, but what is abandoned by conditions merely follows the characteristics of the grasping subject and obscures the nature of true vijñaptimātra. Undividedly, subject and object mutually generate each other; like wind stirring water, waves succeed one another, and the calm, clear nature is hidden and does not appear. From this delusion, the nature of space is generated, and further, depending on space, the forms of the world are established. Within the one mind of true emptiness, where there is ultimately neither sameness nor difference, [differences] are flaringly established, becoming the ultimate differences among all dharmas. All of this is due to emotional thoughts being disturbed, laboriously generating the dust of the world; delusion and darkness bring forth the realm of space, distinguishing the variety of the world as difference and establishing the purity of space as sameness. Within discriminatory consciousness, they also establish neither-sameness-nor-difference. These are all conditioned dharmas, all becoming conditions of arising and ceasing. Without penetrating the original source, in the end it is mere conceptual proliferation.