宗鏡錄 36.45

36.45

The question asks: 'Now, the sage's true citta alone shines brilliantly, and every single thing is illuminated by it. Because his responding and meeting are without fixed direction, in movement he meets with phenomena. Because every single thing is illuminated by it, his knowing leaves nothing out. Because in movement he meets with phenomena, his meeting does not miss the opportune moment. Because his meeting does not miss the opportune moment, there is a meeting with that which can be met. Because his knowing leaves nothing out, there must be a knowing of that which can be known. Because there is a knowing of that which can be known, the sage does not know in vain. Because there is a meeting with that which can be met, the sage does not meet in vain. Since he both knows and meets, why is it said that he is without knowing and without meeting? If he merely forgets knowing and relinquishes meeting, that is simply the sage being impartial regarding knowing and meeting in order to fulfill his impartiality. This may be called not claiming ownership of his knowing; how can it be taken as having no knowing whatsoever?'