宗鏡錄 47.27

47.27

Answer: This mental factor of contact (sparśa) is definitely real, because it has the nature of one of the four nutriments. Second, regarding attention (manaskāra), the treatise says: 'Attention has as its nature alerting the mind, and its function is directing the mind toward its focal objects.' The commentary explains: 'Attention's alerting of the mind has two capacities: first, causing the mind to arise when it has not yet arisen; second, causing the mind, once arisen, to direct itself toward an object. Therefore it is said to alert; it awakens the seed of the mind that ought to arise and directs it toward an object.' Third, regarding feeling (vedanā), the treatise says: 'Feeling has as its nature the experiencing of agreeable, disagreeable, or neither agreeable nor disagreeable objective characteristics, and its function is giving rise to craving.' Fourth, regarding ideation (saṃjñā), the treatise says: 'Ideation has as its nature grasping characteristics of an object, and its function is establishing various names and conventions. That is, it must determine the delimited characteristics of an object, and only then can it successively give rise to various names and conventions.' The commentary explains: 'Here, "determining" is a synonym for grasping characteristics. That is, making delimitations such as "this is blue, not blue," and taking its characteristic is called determining. Through this grasping of characteristics, names and conventions thereupon arise: "this is blue," and so forth. Because kinds of natures are numerous, they are called "various".' Fifth, regarding volition (cetanā), the treatise says: 'Volition has as its nature causing the mind to engage in action, and its function is driving the mind in wholesome categories and so forth. That is, it can grasp characteristics such as the right causes of objects, and drive one's own mind to produce wholesome [actions] and so forth.' These five sections are subsumed under the omnipresent [mental factors], and therefore definitely associate with the storehouse consciousness. Although these five, contact and the rest, differ in cognitive mode from the maturation consciousness, they share the same time and support, and their focal objects and substances are identical; hence they are said to be associated. The cognitive mode of this consciousness is extremely indistinct; it cannot discriminate disagreeable and agreeable objective characteristics; it is subtle and uniform, and associates solely with equanimity feeling (upekṣā). Furthermore, this associated feeling is strictly maturational; it evolves following past projecting karma, not depending on present conditions; because it evolves by the momentum of wholesome and unwholesome karma, it is exclusively equanimity feeling. The two feelings of suffering and pleasure are arisen from maturation, not true maturation; because they depend on present conditions, they do not associate with this [consciousness]. Furthermore, because this consciousness is ever changeless, sentient beings constantly grasp it as their inner self; if it were associated with the two feelings of suffering and pleasure, there would be changes, so how could it be grasped as a self? Therefore it associates only with equanimity feeling. The commentary states: '"Although these five, contact and the rest, differ in cognitive mode from the maturation consciousness, they share the same time and support, and their focal objects and substances are identical; hence they are said to be associated"—this is called association by virtue of four equalities: namely, equality of substance, equality of locus, equality of time, and equality of support. Here, the darśanabhāga is taken as the cognitive mode, the reflected nimittabhāga is taken as the focal object, and the self-substance is called the substance. "Equality" means similarity. Each substance is singular, and the objective characteristics are similar; therefore the focal objects and substances are all called equal. Because the five characteristics of contact and the rest arise relying on the characteristics of the root consciousness, since the focal objects are similar, they are called equal. Taking consciousness-only as the core thesis, the original substance (vastu) is not taken as the focal object, nor is the reflected image taken as the cognitive mode. "Time" means the kṣaṇa must be the same single lifetime. "Support" means the sense-bases are concurrent without interruption.' Regarding 'associates only with equanimity feeling,' this has five meanings: First, being extremely indistinct is the characteristic of equanimity feeling; for feelings of suffering or pleasure are necessarily distinct. In general there are five feelings: 1. grief, 2. joy, 3. suffering, 4. pleasure, 5. equanimity. Here, grief and joy are included within suffering and pleasure; discriminated according to the threefold gate of feeling, grief and joy are not mentioned. Second, being incapable of discriminating agreeable and disagreeable objective characteristics and taking neutral objects is the characteristic of equanimity feeling; for if it were the other feelings, they would take disagreeable or agreeable objects. Third, by being subtle; for if it were the other feelings, their cognitive modes would necessarily be coarse. Fourth, by being uniform; for if it were the other feelings, they would necessarily be liable to change; this cognitive mode is fixed, and thus constitutes a single kind. Fifth, evolving in continuity; for if it were the other feelings, there would necessarily be interruptions; this is constantly continuous, and thus is solely equanimity feeling. If it could discriminate disagreeable and agreeable objective characteristics, it would not be true maturation; for maturation grasps objects determinately. If it were coarse and fluctuating, like other minds, it could not be the master of maturation; this shows its cognitive mode is difficult to know, differing from the other consciousnesses. By virtue of these five meanings, since it necessarily possesses them, it can receive perfuming and hold seeds in continuity. Another explanation states: This consciousness is extremely indistinct, never possessing wisdom or mindfulness, for the cognitive modes of wisdom and mindfulness are extremely distinct. Its inability to discriminate disagreeable and agreeable objective characteristics shows that it is solely equanimity feeling, not concurrent with suffering or pleasure, and excludes its association with wholesome or defiled [states] and so forth; and its evolving in continuity shows the absence of desire, for desire only arises when there is longing; because this is continuous, there is no desire. By virtue of these five meanings, the second meaning directly reveals the reason it is solely equanimity feeling, while the remaining four meanings exclude the particular-state [mental factors] and so forth; hence it is concurrent only with equanimity feeling.