宗鏡錄 52

English (machine translation) 52

Language: English

52.1

Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.

Regarding the second transforming consciousness, the verses of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra state: / "Next is the second transforming consciousness; / this consciousness is called manas. / Operating dependent on that and taking that as object, / its nature and characteristic are cogitation. / Four kleśas constantly accompany it: / namely, self-delusion and self-view, / together with self-conceit and self-love, / as well as other [factors] such as contact; / it is subsumed under the veiled-unspecified. / It is bound to whatever [realm] one is born into, / and is absent in the arhat, the cessation attainment, / and the supramundane path." / Down to: "It should be known that this manas takes only the darśanabhāga of the ālayavijñāna as its object, and nothing else. Because that [ālayavijñāna] has continued uniformly since beginningless time, seeming to be permanent and seeming to be one, and constantly serves as the support for all dharmas, this [manas] only grasps it as its inner self. Owing to the momentum of the expression 'self', the word 'what belongs to a self' (ātmasattā) is spoken; or else, this [manas] grasps that as the 'self of the self'. Therefore, with respect to a single darśana, two senses are doctrinally explained. If it is explained in this way, it well accords with teaching and reason, because in many places it is only said that there is self-view, and because the graspings of self and what belongs to a self do not arise together. In the stage prior to the transformation of the basis, it takes only the ālayavijñāna as object. Once the basis has been transformed, it also takes tathatā and the other dharmas as objects, because the wisdom of equality (samatājñāna) realizes the ten kinds of equality, and in order to manifest various images of the Buddha for sentient beings according to their distinct cognitive understandings." The commentary explains: "This seventh consciousness takes only the darśanabhāga as its object, and not the remaining nimittabhāga, seeds, caittas, and so forth. That it takes only the darśanabhāga as object means that from beginningless time, it is subtle, uniform, and seems permanent and seems one. It seems permanent because it is uninterrupted; this excludes cognitive objects, because those dharmas such as form are all interrupted. Seeds are also like this: they are either damaged and subdued, or at times permanently severed. By this, the reckoning of other consciousnesses as the self is excluded. It seems one; this excludes caittas, because caittas are multiple dharmas. Why does it not take the other consciousnesses as objects? The term 'self' has the characteristic of function. The darśanabhāga experiences objects, and its characteristic of function is apparent, resembling a self; therefore, it does not take the other consciousnesses as objects. The svasaṃvittibhāga and the like have functions that are subtle and difficult to know."

52.3

Question: Why does it not simply take a single feeling (vedanā) and the like as the self, since they are also permanent and one?

52.4

Answer: The term 'self' denotes the meaning of autonomy and the meaning of being the master of all things, serving as the support for all dharmas. Caittas are not like this and cannot be the self, because only the king of mind is the support. This seventh consciousness constantly grasps it as an inner self; because it is not form and the like, it is not grasped as an outer self. If it takes only the consciousness as object, then it only gives rise to [the idea of] self, and there is no 'what belongs to a self'. Owing to the momentum of the expression 'self', the treatise speaks the words 'what belongs to a self'; it is not that, separate from the self, an additional grasping of what belongs to a self arises. It solely grasps the eighth [consciousness] as the 'self of the self'. The former self of the five aggregates as a provisional entity is the self taken as object by the sixth [consciousness]; the latter self is what is reckoned by the seventh. Or, the former self is the preceding thought-moment and the latter self is the succeeding thought-moment—both being reckoned by the seventh. Or, it is reckoned in a single thought-moment: this very one is [the self]—this is reckoned solely by the seventh. Or, the former is the substance and the latter is the function of the consciousness. Upon a single self-view, it is also doctrinally spoken of with the two expressions 'self' and 'what belongs to it'; in reality there is only one self-view. As for 'in many places it is only said that there is self-view': the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states: 'Because of this manas, self-view, conceit, and so forth are constantly associated together.' The Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra states: 'Because of this mental faculty (manendriya), it is constantly associated with self-view, self-conceit, and so forth.' As for 'because the graspings of self and what belongs to a self do not arise together': their mental modes (ākāra) and cognitive objects are both distinct; therefore they cannot arise simultaneously, for there is no such state of affairs. If it is in the stage where the basis has already been transformed, with wholesome mental states and so forth, it is permissible; however, because they are not grasping, this cannot serve as a parallel. In the two graspings of person and dharma, their object is one. If one has not yet aroused the antidote to sever its grasping of a self, this is called the state prior to the transformation of the basis, wherein it takes only the ālayavijñāna as object. From the first bhūmi onward, once the basis has been transformed and one enters the uncontaminated mind, it also takes tathatā and all other dharmas as objects. The non-learners and others of the two vehicles take only the maturation consciousness (vipākavijñāna) as object. As for 'realizing the ten kinds of equality': the Buddhabhūmisūtra states: 'First, sovereign delight and affection for all marks; second, experiencing the dependent origination of all things; third, being far removed from distinct marks and non-marks; fourth, vastly rescuing with great loving-kindness; fifth, great compassion that is non-dependent; sixth, manifesting according to what sentient beings delight in; seventh, the teachings of self-love for all sentient beings; eighth, the world and tranquility being entirely of one single taste; ninth, the worldly dharmas of suffering and pleasure being of one single taste; tenth, the ultimate culmination of cultivating and planting immeasurable merits.' That is, one knows the distinct inclinations and cognitive understandings of sentient beings in the ten bhūmis, and can give rise to the image of the enjoyment body (saṃbhogakāya). The treatise states: 'In the stage prior to the transformation of the basis, it constantly and closely cogitates upon the characteristic of the grasped self; in the stage after the basis has been transformed, it also closely cogitates upon the characteristic of non-self.' This is because the seventh, manas, takes cogitation as its own nature. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'Cogitation is manas'—that is, the svasaṃvittibhāga. The discernment of the previous eighth consciousness is its mental mode (ākāra). Now, since it is called manas, we know that this is precisely the mental mode of the seventh, which is the darśanabhāga. Its essential nature is difficult to know, so it is made apparent through its mental mode. In reality, cogitation is merely its mental mode, while its substance is subsumed under the consciousness aggregate. Prior to the first bhūmi, the learners of the two vehicles constantly and closely cogitate upon the characteristic of a self, knowing it to be the contaminated manas; in the stage after the basis has been transformed, because it also closely cogitates upon the characteristic of non-self, it is likewise named manas.

52.5

The treatise asks: "As the World-Honoured One spoke of supramundane manas, how is it established?"

52.6

Answer: There are two senses. First, a name does not necessarily correspond to reality; that uncontaminated seventh [consciousness] is not named manas, because names are provisional. Second, because it can closely cogitate upon the characteristic of non-self, it is likewise named manas. This shows that it extends to the uncontaminated; thus we know that this name is not exclusively contaminated. The treatise states: "From beginningless time up to the point where the basis has not yet been transformed, this manas spontaneously and constantly takes the ālayavijñāna as object and is associated with the four fundamental kleśas. Self-delusion refers to avidyā: being ignorant of the characteristic of the self and deluded about the principle of non-self, it is therefore named self-delusion. Self-view refers to the grasping of a self: falsely reckoning non-self dharmas to be a self, it is therefore named self-view. Self-conceit refers to haughtiness: relying on the grasped self, it causes the mind to hold itself high, and is therefore named self-conceit. Self-love refers to self-rāga: deeply generating attachment to the grasped self, it is therefore named self-love." Down to: "These four constantly arise, agitating and defiling the inner mind, causing the outer transforming consciousnesses to be constantly defiled. By this, sentient beings transmigrate in saṃsāra and cannot escape; therefore they are named kleśas." The commentary explains: "The reason why this seventh manas, aside from the four delusions, is not associated with other caittas is: first, because it is constant; second, because it grasps inwardly; third, because it arises toward a uniform object. Therefore, it does not attend to things and race outward, but solely and spontaneously grasps inwardly in a uniform manner. Among the five feelings, this seventh consciousness is associated only with the feeling of equanimity (upekṣāvedanā). The treatise states: 'From beginningless time, this [manas] spontaneously and uniformly takes the internal as object and grasps it as a self, constantly without alteration; therefore, it is not associated with shifting feelings.'"

52.7

It is also asked: Under what nature are the caittas of manas subsumed?

52.8

The treatise answers, saying: "The four kleśas and so forth associated with this manas are defiled dharmas; because they obstruct the noble path and conceal the true mind, they are called 'veiled' (nivṛta); being neither wholesome nor unwholesome, they are called 'unspecified' (avyākṛta). Once the basis has been transformed, it is exclusively of a wholesome nature." A verse from the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: / "Manas takes the ālayavijñāna as object, / like a lodestone attracting iron. / Just as a snake has two heads, / each performing its own activity, / the defiled manas is also like this: / it grasps the ālayavijñāna, / capable of performing the activities of a self / and multiplying what belongs to a self. / Again, together with the manovijñāna, / acting as a cause, it undergoes successive changes. / It generates the touch of warmth in the body, / moves it, and performs various karmas; / food, drink, and clothing / are used in accordance with the objects; / leaping, jumping, singing, or dancing, / it engages in various amusements on its own. / Sustaining the bodies of all sentient beings / is entirely through the power of the manas. / Like a circle of fire or dangling hairs, / or a city of gandharvas, / failing to understand that they are only one's own mind, / one falsely gives rise to various conceptual discriminations. / The forms of the body and the receptacle world / are like the motion of a swinging swing: / powerless and unsolid; / discrimination is also like this. / Discrimination has no support; / it merely operates within its own cognitive realm. / For instance, like an image in a mirror, / when consciousness-seeds stir, it is seen. / Foolish common people are deluded by this, / but the wise are not. / O benevolent lord, you should know / that these three are all manifestations of consciousness. / The place where one is far removed from this / is precisely the thoroughly established nature (pariniṣpanna)."

52.9

Question: How many varieties does this manas have?

52.10

Answer: Broadly speaking, there are three kinds. The treatise states: "First, that associated with the view of a personal self (pudgalātmadṛṣṭi); second, that associated with the view of a dharma-self (dharmātmadṛṣṭi); third, that associated with the wisdom of equality (samatājñāna). The first extends to the continuities of all ordinary beings, the learners of the two vehicles, and a class of bodhisattvas prior to the seventh bhūmi in states of contaminated mind; taking the ālayavijñāna as object, they give rise to the view of a personal self. The second extends to the continuities of all ordinary beings, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, and to all bodhisattvas in states where the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not present before them; taking the maturation consciousness (vipākavijñāna) as object, they give rise to the view of a dharma-self. The third extends to the continuities of all tathāgatas, and to bodhisattvas in the path of seeing and throughout the path of practice in states where the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is present before them; taking the immaculate maturation consciousness and so forth as object, they give rise to the wisdom of equality."

52.11

Question: Since the two graspings of person and dharma arise together, why are their stages differentiated as earlier and later?

52.12

Answer: The grasping of a person necessarily arises dependent on the grasping of dharmas; furthermore, the dharma-self is pervasive, while the personal self is restricted. The treatise states: "At the stage when the view of a personal self arises, that view of a dharma-self must also be present before one. Grasping of a self necessarily arises dependent on grasping of dharmas, just as one must be deluded about a tree stump or the like before calling it a person or the like." The commentary explains: "This now demonstrates that the initial stage necessarily entails the subsequent stage, because the initial is shorter. At the stage of the personal self, there is necessarily the dharma-self, because the personal self must arise dependent on the dharma-self. The personal self has functions such as being a master or an agent, whereas the dharma-self has its own intrinsic nature and superior functions; thus the dharma-self is pervasive, while the personal self is restricted."

52.13

Question: How is it that this seventh consciousness, apart from the eye and other consciousnesses, has an independent substance of its own? In what scriptural passages does this appear?

52.14

Answer: The treatise says: Because sacred teachings and correct reasoning are valid authorities. That is to say, the Bhagavān, across diverse sūtras, spoke of the three distinct meanings of citta, manas, and vijñāna. Accumulating and originating is called citta; pondering is called manas; and discerning is called vijñāna. These are the three distinct meanings. Although these three meanings apply generally across the eight consciousnesses, they are designated according to what is preeminent: The eighth is called citta because it accumulates the seeds of all dharmas and originates all dharmas; the seventh is called manas because, taking the ālayavijñāna and so forth as its object, it constantly and deliberately ponders them as a self and so forth; and the remaining six are called vijñāna because they discern and function with respect to the six distinct objects in a manner that is coarse, moving, and intermittent. As a verse in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'The ālayavijñāna is called citta; / that whose nature is pondering is called manas; / that which can discern the characteristics of objects / is that which is designated as vijñāna.' The commentary explains: Although they apply generally across the eight consciousnesses such that all are called citta, manas, and vijñāna, they are designated according to what is preeminent: The eighth is called citta because it is perfumed by and accumulates the seeds of all dharmas through all active manifestations, with active manifestations as the basis and the seed consciousness as the cause, being able to generate all dharmas; this is 'originating all dharmas.' As for the seventh being called manas, in the causal stage when it is defiled, it takes only the self as its object; when undefiled, it takes the eighth [consciousness] and tathatā as objects; and in the fruitional stage it is allowed to take all dharmas as objects. The remaining six consciousnesses are called vijñāna because, with respect to the six distinct objects, their substances are coarse and moving and they are intermittent dharmas, discerning and functioning [accordingly]. What is easily discerned is called 'coarse'; what alters and shifts is called 'moving'; and what is not continuous is called 'intermittent.' Each possessing these preeminent [traits], each separately receives its name. Furthermore, the treatise says: That is to say, a sūtra states that unshared avidyā operates subtly and constantly, concealing and obscuring the real. If this [seventh] consciousness did not exist, that [avidyā] could not exist. This means that all beings who are presently born constantly produce the unshared avidyā that misapprehends principle in all divisions [of mind], concealing the real truth and obstructing the eye of supreme wisdom. As a verse says: 'When the mind of true meaning is about to arise, / it constantly serves as an obstruction; / accompanying all divisions, / it is called unshared avidyā.' Therefore the sūtras say that the class of ordinary beings constantly abides in a long night, blinded by avidyā, their minds entangled in stupor and intoxication, never awakening. If in the stage of ordinary beings there were a time when this avidyā temporarily did not arise, that would contradict the meaning of the sūtra. To say that in the stage of ordinary beings the avidyā that misapprehends principle sometimes operates and sometimes does not operate is unreasonable. This cannot be established on the basis of the six consciousnesses, for these [six] are intermittent, whereas that [avidyā] constantly takes [its object]. If one accepts that manas exists, then there is no such fault. The commentary explains: As the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra states, there are four avidyās: first, manifest; second, seed; third, associated; fourth, unassociated. Or they are divided into two: shared and unshared, and so forth. What is now spoken of as unshared means that it operates subtly and constantly, its mode of activity being difficult to know; it conceals the principle of non-self and obscures undefiled wisdom, which is called 'concealing and obscuring the real.' 'Real' has two aspects: first, the principle of non-self; second, the undefiled view. 'Truth' (artha) has two meanings: first, the meaning of object, because it is the object of the darśanabhāga; second, the meaning of principle, because tathatā is precisely principle.

52.15

Question: Defiled manas is constantly associated with the four afflictions. How can it be said to be 'unshared avidyā'?

52.16

Answer: The treatise says: One should explain that among the four, avidyā is the primary lord; though the three arise together with it, it is still called unshared. From the beginningless limit, it is constantly stuporous and deluded within, never examining itself, because delusion is predominant; up to the statement that the avidyā associated with the seventh constantly operates from beginningless time, obstructing the wisdom of the true meaning; such preeminent function is not present in the other consciousnesses and exists only in this consciousness, hence it is called unshared. Furthermore, unshared avidyā is of two kinds overall: first, constantly operating unshared [avidyā], which is absent in the other consciousnesses; second, independently operating unshared [avidyā], which does not exist in this [seventh] consciousness. The commentary explains: 'Primary lord' has the meaning of autonomy, and the meaning of being the causal support; because it serves as the support for those [other afflictions], it is called unshared. Why is avidyā called unshared? 'From the beginningless limit' reveals that it constantly arises throughout the long night. 'Constantly stuporous and deluded within' clarifies that at all times it fails to understand the principle of emptiness. 'Never examining itself' displays that it constantly grasps at a self without ever turning back. This meaning overall reveals the autonomous sense of delusion as the primary lord. First, 'constantly operating unshared [avidyā]' is that which accompanies this [seventh] consciousness; what is discussed here is absent in the other consciousnesses. Second, 'independently operating unshared [avidyā]' is called 'independently operating' because it arises in association with anger and so forth, or it is an avidyā that does not arise together with the others and solely deludes concerning the principle of truth; this does not exist in this [seventh] consciousness. Furthermore, regarding unshared avidyā: because avidyā is the primary lord, it is called unshared, for being the lord has the meaning of unshared, and unshared is precisely the meaning of being singular and solitary. That is to say, avidyā has the meaning of darkness; the avidyā accompanying the seventh operates constantly without interruption, which has the meaning of perpetual darkness. Because of perpetual darkness, it is called the 'long night.' Only this avidyā is the substance of the long night; other dharmas all lack the meaning of the long night. Only this one uniquely possesses it, hence it is called unshared. Apart from this, among the other dharmas there is a category that has the meaning of long continuity but lacks the meaning of darkness; or there is a category that, although having the meaning of darkness, lacks the meaning of long continuity. One should formulate a fourfold proposition to distinguish them: First, there are those that are 'long' but not 'night,' such as the three afflictions of rāga and so forth accompanying the seventh, and the mental factors associated with the two wisdoms of wonderful observation and equality. Second, there are those that are 'night' but not 'long,' such as the avidyā associated with the first six consciousnesses. Third, there is that which is both 'long' and 'night,' which is precisely the avidyā accompanying the seventh. Fourth, there are those that are neither 'long' nor 'night,' which are, excluding avidyā in the first six consciousnesses, the remaining rāga and so forth, the wholesome [mental factors] and so forth in the causal stage, and, in the fruitional stage, the mental factors associated with the two wisdoms of observing [and investigating] and accomplishing actions. Now, in accordance with this, this avidyā accompanying the seventh not only is unshared with the other consciousnesses, but furthermore is unshared with the three afflictions of rāga and so forth of its own grouping. That is to say, although it arises together with rāga and so forth of the same grouping, rāga and so forth lack the meaning of the darkness of the long night: rāga and so forth have the meaning of defiled attachment and so forth, whereas this has the meaning of perpetual darkness; being unlike them, it is called unshared. Here, it is called unshared on account of the seventh's constant delusion and darkness; in the six consciousnesses, there is no meaning of constancy, but only the meaning of arising independently, which is called unshared.

52.17

Question: In its association with constantly operating unshared avidyā, how many meanings are there?

52.18

Answer: There are four meanings. An ancient worthy said: First, being the master: the avidyā of the first six consciousnesses is a guest because it is intermittent, whereas the avidyā of the seventh is the master because it is uninterrupted. Second, constantly operating: in the stage of outflows, it constantly produces active manifestations without interruption, hence it is called constantly operating. Third, unshared: it is not like the solitary [avidyā] of the sixth consciousness that is called unshared; the unshared of the sixth is merely called unshared because it does not arise together with the other nine afflictions, whereas if the seventh is called unshared, it is because its obstruction of undefiled dharmas is preeminent, and also because it operates constantly without interruption. Fourth, when the first six consciousnesses range across the minds of the three moral natures, the avidyā of this [seventh] consciousness always produces active manifestations: that is, when the first six consciousnesses are minds of wholesome nature, their inability to forget characteristics in giving and so forth is entirely due to this constantly operating unshared avidyā of the seventh internally grasping at a self, causing the six consciousnesses and so forth, when practicing giving, to be unable to realize that the three wheels are empty in substance. Furthermore, because there is unshared avidyā, it is constantly able to serve as an obstruction, preventing that undefiled wisdom which ought to arise from arising. Because this avidyā coexists with the seventh consciousness and is not abandoned up to the present, it is called 'co-operating.' Furthermore, a sūtra says: 'Conditioned by the eye and form, eye consciousness arises; ... up to: Conditioned by manas and dharmas, manovijñāna arises.' If this [seventh] consciousness did not exist, that manas would not exist. The eye faculty and the object of form serve as two conditions able to engender and lead to the eye consciousness; up to: the manas faculty and the object of dharmas serve as two conditions able to engender and produce the manovijñāna. If the seventh consciousness did not exist, the sixth consciousness would have only the single object of dharmas as condition and would lack a supporting faculty condition. Since there is a coexistent faculty, one clearly knows that it is precisely the seventh consciousness that serves as the coexistent faculty for the sixth consciousness. The Hīnayāna says: 'Our school takes the physical heart-flesh as the support for the sixth consciousness; why is it necessary to separately posit the existence of a seventh consciousness?' The author of the treatise refutes this, saying: One also cannot say that the sixth depends on form, because the sixth must exist depending on manas, and manas is said not to be form. Furthermore, it is said that the sixth has three conceptualizations: conceptualization by recollection, conceptualization by calculation, and intrinsic conceptualization. If one conceded that the sixth abided depending on form, it would then be identical to the first five consciousnesses and would lack the two kinds of conceptualization—recollection and calculation. In defense, they say: 'In our school, for the five consciousnesses, the faculty comes first and the consciousness comes later; thus, the five faculties of the previous moment engender the five consciousnesses of the subsequent moment.' The author of the treatise refutes this, saying: Wherever there is a faculty, just as a leaf arises depending on a seed, sprout and seed are simultaneous; a shadow is produced by relying on a body, and shadow and body exist together. When consciousness arises depending on a faculty, in principle they must be simultaneous; there is no such thing as a faculty of the previous moment engendering a consciousness of the subsequent moment. Since the five consciousnesses have coexistent faculties, this is used to prove that the sixth must also have a coexistent faculty, which is precisely the seventh consciousness. To cite reasoning as proof: what is said in the teachings to possess pondering is precisely the seventh consciousness. The Hīnayāna says: 'It is merely the immediately preceding [moment of the] sixth that is named the pondering manas; why is it necessary to separately state that the seventh is the pondering manas?' The author of the treatise refutes this, saying: Take, for instance, when the sixth manovijñāna is present: the mind of the immediately preceding moment has already ceased and lacks substance; how could it have the function of pondering to be named manas? Take, for instance, the sixth consciousness: when it resides in the present, although it has pondering, it is constantly named vijñāna and not named manas; it must wait until it is in the past before it is named manas. One must have faith that there is a seventh consciousness, which possesses constant and deliberate pondering, before it can be named manas. 'Manas' has the meaning of support. As for the immediately preceding manas, it only metaphorically receives the name of manas by depending on this seventh, because [the seventh] possesses the function of coexistent support and pondering. Furthermore, the seventh consciousness is accompanied by the four afflictions, hence it is called defiled; it constantly and deliberately ponders, hence it is named manas. It constantly possesses the constantly operating unshared avidyā, hence it is called defiled. This is precisely the veiled [morally indeterminate] nature, which has the meaning of veiling the real conditions and obscuring the pure, wonderful wisdom. As for 'constantly and deliberately pondering,' this distinguishes it from the eighth and the first six consciousnesses: 'constantly' means without interruption; 'deliberately' means decisively grasping at self and dharmas.

52.19

Question: The eighth is also uninterrupted, and the sixth is decisive and has pondering; why are they not named manas?

52.20

Answer: There is a fourfold proposition: First, constant but not deliberate: the eighth is constantly uninterrupted, but does not deliberately ponder self and dharmas. Second, deliberate but not constant: this is the sixth; although it deliberately ponders, it is not constant, and therefore is not named manas. The first five are neither: neither constant nor deliberate. The seventh subsumes both, being both constant and deliberate; therefore, it alone is named manas.

52.21

Question: What dharma does the seventh ponder?

52.22

Answer: It grasps at the darśanabhāga of the eighth, pondering it as possessing self and dharmas. The non-learners of the two vehicles are free of the grasping at self; because they ponder the grasping at the dharma-self, [the seventh] is named manas. In the Buddha-fruit, both graspings at self and dharmas are absent; it constantly and deliberately ponders the principle of non-self, so the seventh in the Buddha-fruit is also named manas.

52.23

Question: Does the seventh's own substance possess pondering, or is volition among the omnipresent [mental factors] associated with the seventh named the pondering manas, or not?

52.24

Answer: If one takes the pondering of mental factors, then all eight consciousnesses possess it; why would volition belong uniquely to the seventh?

52.25

Question: If one takes only the substance itself as possessing pondering, then what is the use of volition among the mental factors?

52.26

Answer: It possesses two meanings: first, it has associated pondering; second, it also has pondering in its own substance. Here we take the substance itself as possessing pondering to be named manas.

52.27

Question: Mental factors and the primary mind are of the same kind in constantly and deliberately pondering, grasping at the eighth as a self. Why are mental factors not said to be manas?

52.28

Answer: To say 'manas' carries the meaning of support. Although mental factors constantly and deliberately ponder, they are not the master, but are inferior dharmas; because they are not what is supported upon, they are not named manas. Second, the consciousness of the substance itself possesses pondering, and serves as the support for the remaining seven consciousnesses; taking only the primary mind, it is precisely named manas.

52.29

Question: If one says that the substance itself possessing pondering is named manas, then the seventh has four divisions: which division is named the pondering manas?

52.30

Answer: There are two explanations. First, the darśanabhāga is called 'cogitation' (manana), while the two internal parts are not called 'cogitation' but are called only 'manas'. The darśanabhāga is not called 'manas'; it has cogitation because it is function: it cogitates self and non-self. The two internal parts cannot cogitate self and non-self; they are called only 'manas' because they are substance. Second, the darśanabhāga is the characteristic of cogitation—'characteristic' meaning substantial characteristic and outward appearance—while the two internal parts are the nature of cogitation. Thus, both internal and external are called 'manas', and all three parts are cogitation, excluding only the nimittabhāga. The nimittabhāga is the object cogitated.

52.31

Question: How is it known that the three internal and external parts are altogether cogitation?

52.32

Answer: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Cogitation is its nature and characteristic.' The two internal parts are substance and are called the nature of cogitation; the external darśanabhāga is the characteristic of cogitation and is function. Being equally cogitation, all three parts are called 'manas'. That is, the nimittabhāga is not taken to be called 'cogitation', because it lacks the function of being an apprehending subject.

52.33

Question: Since the darśanabhāga conditions and grasps the self and phenomena, it cogitates a self and therefore receives the name 'cogitation'. The svasaṃvittibhāga does not condition the nimittabhāga of the self; how can the svasaṃvittibhāga also be called 'cogitation'?

52.34

Answer: Because the svasaṃvittibhāga verifies that darśanabhāga's cogitation of the grasping of self, it is also called 'cogitation'.

52.35

Question: The darśanabhāga's cogitation of a self is subsumed under non-pramāṇa (apramāṇa). Since the svasaṃvittibhāga verifies that darśanabhāga's cogitation of a self, is the svasaṃvittibhāga also a non-pramāṇa?

52.36

Answer: The darśanabhāga cogitates a self, and because the darśanabhāga falsely grasps, it is called a non-pramāṇa. The svasaṃvittibhāga internally verifies the darśanabhāga's false grasping; therefore, the substance of the svasaṃvittibhāga is direct perception (pratyakṣa). Thus, both substance and function are cogitation. Consequently, the two internal parts are also called 'manas' and also called 'vijñāna'; the darśanabhāga is also called 'manas' and also called 'vijñāna' because it is the function of manas. Cogitation is function, and manas is substance; cogitation is itself manas, which is an appositional compound (karmadhāraya).

52.37

Question: The seventh consciousness conditions only the eighth's darśanabhāga as self; why does it not take the nimittabhāga and the two internal parts, and so forth?

52.38

Answer: The nimittabhāga is intermittent and, furthermore, is an external condition. The functions of the two internal parts are sunken, hidden, and difficult to know; hence it does not grasp them. Seeds have no function; hence it does not grasp them as self. It is because the darśanabhāga's function is manifest.

52.39

Question: How are the three pramāṇas and the nominal and real distinguished regarding the seventh consciousness?

52.40

Answer: In the ancient explanation distinguishing the three pramāṇas, the seventh's darśanabhāga is non-pramāṇa, because the object does not correspond to the mind. That eighth's darśanabhāga is fundamentally not a self; now the seventh falsely grasps it as a self, which does not correspond to the original substance (bimbamātra). Furthermore, it cannot directly reach and condition the eighth's darśanabhāga, but transforms a nimittabhāga to condition. The nimittabhāga is fundamentally not a self; the seventh again grasps it as a self, which does not correspond to the nimittabhāga either. Thus there is a twofold failure to correspond to the object; hence we know it is non-pramāṇa. In distinguishing the nominal and the real: the seventh cannot reach and condition the other's original substance, the eighth's darśanabhāga, but conditions only the intermediate nominal nimittabhāga of a self; hence the object is nominal, not real.

52.41

Question: Is the intermediate nimittabhāga definitely nominal, or does it also extend to the real?

52.42

Answer: The seventh's intermediate nimittabhāga is nominal and is not produced from real seeds; it merely arises from both ends. This nimittabhāga nevertheless extends across two moral natures: if one half arises from the original substance, it is of the non-obscured nature and belongs to the original substance; if one half arises from its own apprehending seventh darśanabhāga, it is the same as the darśanabhāga and is of the obscured nature. Merely through mental dharmas flaring up from both ends, a single nimittabhāga is formed. When it is said now that the object is nominal, it is spoken of only in reference to the nimittabhāga of self that accords with the deluded mind.

52.43

Question: If it is said that the seventh's subjective nimittabhāga is merely nominal, arising from both ends and extending across two natures, then in the nimittabhāga of self conditioned by the seventh, one half should be obscured and one half non-obscured, one half should be self and one half non-self.

52.44

Answer: The nimittabhāga of non-obscured nature arisen on that eighth's darśanabhāga and the parikalpita-nimittabhāga of the apprehending seventh's deluded mind are fused together intimately in one place. If the seventh merely grasps for itself the falsely arisen, parikalpita, nominal nimittabhāga of obscured nature as its internal self, then even though they are fused intimately in one place, it does not commit the fault of the grasped self extending across two natures. Just as with the taste of salt in water, one merely grasps it as water and does not grasp the salt, yet water and salt are originally not separate from each other.

52.45

Question: Since the seventh has its own nimittabhāga, why does it not condition its own nimittabhāga, but conditions the other's eighth darśanabhāga as self?

52.46

Answer: The ancient masters said: 'When it is said now that it conditions the darśanabhāga, that is a remote conditioning. If one says it is direct, where is the meaning of consciousness-only?'

52.47

The question is asked again: 'Even granted that it remotely conditions the eighth, upon what dharma does the seventh's own consciousness give rise to grasping?'

52.48

Answer: It gives rise to grasping upon its own consciousness's nimittabhāga.

52.49

The question is asked again: 'What is the distinction between nimitta and darśana?'

52.50

Answer: If discussed in terms of external objects, nimitta and darśana are completely different. If discussed with regard to mind, nimitta and darśana are not different; nimitta is darśana. Hence the sūtra says: 'Mind is manifested like nimitta; darśana is what mind relies upon.'

52.51

Question: If there were no manas, what faults would there be?

52.52

Answer: If there were no seventh, there would be no ordinary being to be reviled and no noble one to be sought; ordinary beings and noble ones would not be established, and both defilement and purity would be lost. The śāstra states: 'Therefore, there must definitely be this manas separately.' Furthermore, a sutra states: 'In non-conceptual sentient beings, throughout one lifetime, mind and mental factors are extinguished. If this consciousness did not exist, they should be without defilement'—meaning that they are without the six evolving consciousnesses for a long time; if this manas did not exist, the grasping of self would be absent—'and so forth; therefore, there must separately be a defiled manas that constantly gives rise to the grasping of self in the Non-conceptual Heaven. On this account, the worthy and noble together revile and detest it.' Furthermore, a sutra states: 'When ordinary beings have wholesome, defiled, or indeterminate minds, they constantly carry the grasping of self. If this consciousness did not exist, that should not be'—meaning that among the class of ordinary beings, when their minds are of the three natures, although they externally give rise to karmic actions, internally they constantly grasp a self; because they internally grasp a self, this causes the giving and so forth arising within the six consciousnesses to be unable to forget characteristics. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi says: 'The defiled manas is the support for consciousness. When it has not yet ceased, one cannot be liberated from the bond of characteristics and discerning. When manas has ceased, one is liberated from the bond of characteristics.' The 'bond of characteristics' refers to being unable to comprehend that objective characteristics are like illusory phenomena and so forth; because of this, the darśanabhāga is constrained by the nimittabhāga and cannot attain sovereignty; hence it is called the 'bond of characteristics'. In accordance with this meaning, a gāthā states: / 'Such a defiled manas / Is the support of consciousness. / While this manas has not ceased, / Consciousness is never freed from bondage.' / The commentary explains: Regarding 'Constantly gives rise to the grasping of self in the Non-conceptual Heaven; on this account, the worthy and noble together revile and detest it'—it is because the seventh consciousness gives rise to the grasping of self there and they are ordinary beings, so after emerging from meditative absorption, they sink back into saṃsāra and give rise to various kleśas; thus the noble and worthy revile them. If there were no seventh, they should not revile them, as there would be no faulty result. Regarding 'Because they grasp a self, this causes the giving and so forth arising within the six consciousnesses to be unable to forget characteristics'—this self conditions externally, and its activity is coarse and agitated, not arising from the seventh; yet it is due to the seventh that the sixth gives rise to this, produced entirely through the seventh, spoken of in terms of reinforcement. In the sixth consciousness, the substance of the grasping of self is intermittent, extending through minds of the three natures, because it arises interspersed; and this is because the seventh does not arise conditioning external objects. The above is an abridged record of the seventh manas, which all teachings equally explain and all the worthy together expound. For those newly entering the Path, this manas must be understood. It is the cause from which ordinary beings and noble ones arise, so one should thoroughly explore its substance and nature; it establishes the basis of liberation and delusion, so one may investigate its roots and origins. Deluded about it, one falls into the foolishness of grasping persons and dharmas; awakened to it, one accomplishes the wisdom of equality (samatājñāna). Among all the consciousnesses, it alone obtains the name of 'manas'. Within the contaminated, it serves as the master of avidyā. Never pausing and never broken, it is treated by the non-conceptual absorption yet not dispelled; constantly cogitating and ever persistent, it is avoided in the four formless heavens yet arises again. Although obscured, it is indeterminate; it does not grasp externally, but conditions internally. Ever producing active manifestation, it can obscure the true and obstruct the Path. It is solely termed 'unshared', merely establishing defilement and moistening rebirth. Therefore, if one wishes to penetrate worldly dust and toil, one must know the essential path; about to apply the wondrous medicine, one must first observe the origin of the disease. If one investigates with a subtle mind and contemplates profoundly with an unified heart, then what dust will not be escaped, and what disease will not be dispelled? In the gateway of severing delusion, this is indeed the essential.

52.53

Record of the Mirror of the Source, Fascicle Fifty-Two

52.54

Printing blocks carved in the wushen year by the Bureau of the Grand Canon in the Branch Office.

Linked texts (1)

宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese