宗鏡錄 62.11

62.11

Answer: It is not merely when material objects are spoken of as not being separate from citta that it is called mind-only. This is also to negate the citta of grasping and that which grasps, such as craving, among the gods of the formless realm. Because sentient beings in the formless realm also crave objects such as space and arouse their deluded minds, the formless realm is also called mind-only. If the untainted state is attained, that supramundane untainted matter and so forth is consciousness-only of supramundane untainted citta and caittas, and is likewise mind-only. Therefore it says that the three realms are mind-only. The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* also says: ‘It is taught, moreover, that the cognized object is only what is manifested by consciousness.’ That is, all cognized objects are solely transformations of consciousness, and there are no external dharmas at all. Therefore the Buddha said to Maitreya Bodhisattva: ‘There is no slightest dharma that can grasp any slightest dharma, because there is no active agency.’ The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* also says: ‘Dharmas are all not separate from citta.’ The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* also says: ‘Sentient beings are defiled or pure according to their citta.’ Furthermore, the commentary explains the rationale for consciousness-only by establishing four kinds of logical principles, which are four formal inferences (anumāna). The first formal inference establishes that the nimittabhāga of matter of the five sense-objects are all the immediate conditions as object (pratyakṣālambanapratyaya) of the five consciousnesses, establishing the meaning of consciousness-only. The second establishes that the sixth consciousness, and implicitly establishes that the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, all take their own immediate nimittabhāga as object and are not separate from consciousness, which is the meaning of consciousness-only. The third establishes generally that all immediate nimittabhāgas are not separate from the substance of citta, succeeding in establishing consciousness-only. The fourth establishes that all mediate conditions as object (vyavahitālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta, succeeding in establishing consciousness-only. As for the first, establishing that the nimittabhāga of the five sense-objects are all not separate from the five consciousnesses: here we only establish that the nimittabhāga of one consciousness is not separate from that consciousness, and the remaining four consciousnesses should be formulated accordingly. The inference states:
Subject (pakṣa / dharmin): The well-established visual consciousness;
Thesis predicate (sādhya / dharma): Definitely does not directly cognize matter that is separate from its own consciousness;
Reason (hetu): Because it is subsumed under any one of the well-established five consciousnesses;
Example (dṛṣṭānta): Just like the other well-established four consciousnesses.
In explaining this inference, it is divided into two: first, explaining the terms and setting aside fallacies; second, briefly setting forth questions and answers. As for the first: stating ‘well-established’ (prasiddha) before the thesis subject sets aside visual consciousness that is not well-established for both schools. For instance, the Mahāyāna school accepts that there is visual consciousness of Buddhas of other worlds, and the untainted visual consciousness of a Buddha; since the Hīnayāna does not accept this, it is also set aside and not taken up. If the Hīnayāna school asserts that a Buddha's visual consciousness is tainted, or the defiled visual consciousness of a bodhisattva in his final lifetime, the Mahāyāna does not accept this, so it must also be set aside. That is, what is mutually rejected by both schools is a dharma that is not well-established. Now, taking only the visual consciousness that is mutually accepted and well-established by both schools, it is then established as the thesis subject. Therefore the subject statement says ‘well-established visual consciousness’.