宗鏡錄 62.21

62.21

Answer: The other four consciousnesses are the basis of the example (dṛṣṭāntāśraya). That each does not directly cognize things separate from its own consciousness is the substance of the example (dṛṣṭānta-svabhāva). Here we take the substance of the example, not the basis of the example. It is also like the thesis 'sound is impermanent', where the concordant example is 'like a pot': one should not distinguish between sound and pot as different, but merely take the fact that sound and pot each have the meaning of impermanence as being similar, which serves as the reason, and so forth.

Second, establishing the sixth consciousness through reasoning while implicitly establishing the seventh and eighth consciousnesses: The syllogism runs: 'Widely accepted other consciousnesses (subject/pakṣa) also do not directly cognize things separate from their own consciousness (predicate/sādhya); because of being of the nature of consciousness (reason/hetu); like the widely accepted five consciousnesses (concordant example/dṛṣṭānta).'

Explanation: In the subject term of the thesis, stating 'widely accepted' also excludes what is not widely accepted. If one did not say 'widely accepted', it would commit the fallacy of a partially unaccepted subject for oneself or the opponent. If one stated the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses as the subject, since the opponent does not accept the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, it would commit the fallacy of a partially unaccepted subject for the opponent. If one only established the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) as the subject, the reason would then commit the fallacy of being inconclusive (aniyata), for the opponent would take the seventh and eighth consciousnesses as contrary examples, and the inference would commit the fallacy of being inconclusive in common to oneself. Now, by merely stating 'other' in general, one specifically takes the sixth while intending to include the seventh and eighth, thus implicitly establishing and subsuming the seventh and eighth within 'other consciousnesses'.

In the predicate term, stating 'also do not directly cognize things separate from their own consciousness': 'also' means 'the same'—the same as the aforementioned widely accepted five consciousnesses not directly cognizing things separate from their own consciousness. In the reason, stating 'because of being of the nature of consciousness' means being the same as the five consciousnesses in having the nature of consciousness. In the example, stating 'like the widely accepted five consciousnesses' means being the same as the five consciousnesses in likewise not directly cognizing [things] separate from themselves. Thus we clearly know that they directly cognize things not separate from their own consciousness. Since this has been established, we know that all objects as direct objective conditions (pratyakṣālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta; this is the meaning of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā). Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Other consciousnesses, because of being consciousness, like the eye consciousness and so forth, also do not directly cognize things separate from themselves.'

Third, establishing through reasoning that the nimittabhāgas of the direct objective conditions of the first six consciousnesses all resolve into the substance of citta: What is called the substance of citta is the self-verifying division (svasaṃvittibhāga). Although the darśanabhāga also operates in dependence on the self-verifying division, here we establish only the nimittabhāga because the darśanabhāga is mutually accepted. The syllogism runs: 'The direct objective conditions of the six consciousnesses (subject) definitely are not separate from the substance of the six consciousnesses (predicate); because of being subsumed under either one between the darśana and nimitta divisions (reason); like that cognizing darśanabhāga (concordant example).'

Since the Hīnayāna accepts that the darśanabhāga is not separate from the substance of citta, it is taken as the concordant example. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'This direct objective condition is definitely not separate from this [citta], because of being one of the two, like that cognizer.'

Fourth, establishing through principle that all objects as remote objective conditions (adhipaty-ālambanapratyaya) are not separate from citta, which is consciousness-only: namely, the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness, in relation to the first six, is called a remote objective condition. Because the Hīnayāna does not accept the eighth consciousness, it is simply called a remote objective condition. The syllogism runs: 'All objects cognized in accordance with one's own consciousness (subject) definitely are not separate from my cognizing citta and caittas (predicate); because of being an objectified phenomenon (reason); like associated phenomena (concordant example).'

Explanation: In this syllogism's predicate term, stating 'definitely are not separate from my cognizing [citta]' means that all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, as long as they are objectified phenomena, definitely are not separate from my cognizing consciousness. If the predicate did not say 'my cognizing [citta]', it would commit the flaw of partial triviality (siddhasādhana), because the Hīnayāna also accepts that the object cognized by the knowledge of others' minds (paracittajñāna) is not separate from the cognizing citta. To eliminate this fallacy of triviality, one therefore says 'my cognizing [citta]', which excludes the cognizing [citta] of others. Stating 'like associated phenomena' as the concordant example refers to the direct nimittabhāgas already established previously, because they are all objectified phenomena. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Being an objectified phenomenon, like associated phenomena, it is definitely not separate from citta and caittas.'

Therefore, self and dharmas are not existent, while emptiness and consciousness are not non-existent. Being free from existence and free from non-existence precisely accords with the Middle Way. Hence the Benevolent Lord [Maitreya] spoke two verses on the Middle Way:

'False discrimination exists;
In it, both do not exist at all.
Herein there is only emptiness;
In that, this also exists.

Therefore all phenomena are said to be
Neither empty nor non-empty;
Because of existence, non-existence, and existence,
This accords with the Middle Way.'

'False discrimination exists' means that there is the false discriminating citta of the three realms. 'In it, both do not exist at all' means that the characteristics of the dual grasping at subject and object—self and dharmas—do not exist at all upon this false citta. 'Herein there is only emptiness' means that within this false citta there is only tathatā; this is the nature of emptiness, because it is revealed based on emptiness. 'In that, this also exists' means that in that nature of emptiness, this also exists—there is also this false discriminating consciousness; for false discrimination is conventional truth, and within this conventional truth there is also the nature of emptiness of the ultimate truth. 'Therefore all phenomena are said to be' refers to the two kinds of phenomena, conditioned and unconditioned, which constitute all phenomena. 'Neither empty nor non-empty': 'neither empty' refers to the false discriminating citta and the nature of emptiness—that is, the dependent (paratantra) and consummate (pariniṣpanna) natures are existent, hence termed 'neither empty', because both truths exist. 'Nor non-empty' means that the characteristics of the dual grasping at subject and object—self and dharmas—are empty, which is the imaginary nature (parikalpita). 'Because of existence, non-existence, and existence': 'existence' is because false discrimination exists; 'non-existence' is because the dual grasping at self and dharmas does not exist; 'and existence' means that within false discrimination there is true emptiness, and within true emptiness there is also false discrimination. 'This accords with the Middle Way' means that it is not solely empty like Bhāviveka and others, nor solely existent like the Hīnayāna and others; hence it is called the Middle Way. That both truths exist is unlike Bhāviveka; that the dual grasping at self and dharmas is non-existent is unlike the Hīnayāna; hence it is called the Middle Way.

Furthermore, the Abhidharmasūtra states that when a bodhisattva accomplishes four kinds of knowledge, he can accordingly awaken to and enter consciousness-only without external objects. That is, a minor bodhisattva before the bhūmis, though he has not yet realized the principle of consciousness-only, relies on the Buddha's teaching and observes the bodhisattvas on the bhūmis accomplishing four kinds of consciousness-only knowledge, and thereupon enters an impure (sāsrava) contemplation. He contemplates the deeds of those bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis transforming the great earth into gold, churning great rivers into ghee, and manifesting mountains of meat, fish, and rice. Having entered contemplation and observed this, this minor bodhisattva says: 'These transformed real gold, silver, and so forth are none of them separate from the transforming minds of the bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis; there are no external objects besides them.' Having performed this contemplation, he is also able accordingly to awaken to and enter the true principle of consciousness-only. Again, for example, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika, in order to preserve the six categories (padārtha), transformed his body into a great stone; this had real utility. If objects were definitely real, he should not have been able to transform his body and objects into stone in accordance with his mind.