宗鏡錄 62.31

62.31

Answer: Take, for example, the time when one grasps all nominal objects such as flowers in the sky; the mind still arises. Why say that grasping nothing, thought does not arise? Hence we know that when grasping nominal objects that lack substance, it is not that there is no real nimittabhāga of the internal mind capable of inducing the arising of mind. In relation to the darśanabhāga, it also fulfills the meaning of an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). There has never been an object without a mind, nor has there ever been a mind without an object. Furthermore, it does not contradict Dharmapāla's four divisions establishing the meaning of consciousness-only. If one sets aside the real nimittabhāga of the internal mind, the object of that conceptualizing, fully conceptualized grasping mind would simply not exist. The Tang Tripiṭaka Master said: 'One should say that the object is not real, yet thought arises; this proves that there is only consciousness.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Second, the cognition of consciousness without an objective referent: grasping the past, future, dreams, mirror images, and so forth, which are not really existent objects, consciousness is seen to be obtainable. Since those objects do not exist, the rest should also be like this.' Since the bodhisattva observes that the fully conceptualized objects grasped by all ordinary beings are all not separate from the ordinary beings' minds, one clearly knows that all other real objects are all completely like this. Third, the cognition that [ordinary beings] should naturally be non-deluded (svayam-aviparyāsa-jñāna): this refers to a bodhisattva of the ten grounds giving rise to cognition to observe that all sentient beings falsely grasp their own bodies as permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure. The bodhisattva says: 'This is merely the grasping mind and inverted views of ordinary beings; setting aside the falsely grasping mind, there is truly no object of permanence, pleasure, self, and purity upon an ordinary being's body. If it were truly there, then ordinary beings should attain liberation without relying on cultivation. Since that is not so, one clearly knows there is only false consciousness.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Third, the cognition that [ordinary beings] should naturally be non-deluded: if the cognition of fools were to obtain real objects, they should naturally become free of inversion without relying on effort, and should attain liberation.' Fourth, the cognition of conforming to the transformation of the three cognitions (trijñāna-parivṛtti-jñāna): First, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the master of sovereignty: this refers to a bodhisattva giving rise to cognition to observe that the objects transformed by oneself are all not separate from one's own transforming mind; this is their consciousness-only. For bodhisattvas from the eighth ground onward, they are able spontaneously to transform the great earth into yellow gold and churn the long rivers into clarified butter. This is the object conforming to the transformation of true cognition; the transformed phenomena all succeed. 'Transformation' means the sense of changing the old substance; that is, altering and transforming the old substance of the great earth, mountains, and rivers into gold, silver, and the like, so that sentient beings truly obtain their use, and forging them into various utensils is fully possible. If there were real external objects separate from the mind, how could mountains, rivers, and the like conform to the bodhisattva's mind and immediately transform into things like gold and silver? Because the nimittabhāga and the underlying substance (vastu) are all transformed. Hence we know that all objects are not separate from the bodhisattva's transforming mind. Even ordinary beings can also transform fire into water, transform day into night, touch iron to make gold, and so forth; these are all objects conforming to the transformation of phenomenal cognition, and the transformed phenomena all succeed; this is also consciousness-only. If it were the palaces, gold, and silver transformed by Kātyāyana, none of them succeed; therefore we know that separate from the mind there are no real objects. The treatise says: 'Generally, transformed gold, silver, and palaces are real matter resulting from samādhi (samādhija-rūpa); only from the first ground onward can one transform them. In terms of sovereignty, bodhisattvas from the eighth ground and above attain sovereignty over both characteristics and lands. Because the superior samādhi mind possesses great power, the transformed gold, silver, palaces, and the like all succeed. Just like transforming gold and silver and forging them into various utensils, one truly obtains their use. The transformed gold and silver are real matter resulting from samādhi, and none are separate from the bodhisattva's internal mind; this is their consciousness-only, and there are no objects outside the mind. If the śrāvakas and lesser bodhisattvas before the grounds transform gold, silver, and palaces, they rely on the gold, silver, and palaces transformed by bodhisattvas as the underlying substance; the gold, silver, and so forth transformed by their sixth consciousness do not succeed and have no real function. However, the transformed gold and silver are nominal matter resulting from samādhi, not separate from the internal minds of the śrāvakas and lesser bodhisattvas; this is their consciousness-only, and there are no objects outside the mind. Now, because Kātyāyana is a śrāvaka and has not attained superior samādhi, the gold and silver he transforms, though lacking real function, are nevertheless not separate from internal consciousness; there are no objects outside the mind.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'First, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the master of sovereignty: those who have already realized sovereignty of mind, whatever they wish to transform—earth and so forth—all succeeds. If the objects were real, how could they be transformed?' Also, an ancient virtuous one said: 'Because matter is born from the sovereign mind, the mind can transform matter. Therefore, moving mountains and overturning oceans, upending the earth and flipping heaven, churning long rivers into clarified butter, and transforming the great earth into yellow gold are all without difficulty.' Second, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the observer: Bodhisattva Asvabhāva said: 'This means that when śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and the like cultivate the contemplations of suffering, emptiness, and so on and attain correspondence, or when cultivating the contemplation of the four truths, in conforming to the contemplation of any single dharma, only numerous characteristics such as impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self are distinctly manifest. It is not that upon the substance of dharmas there exist these numerous meanings of suffering, emptiness, and so forth; rather, the numerous characteristics of suffering, emptiness, and so on are simply the substance of the dharmas. Since the characteristic of impermanence exists upon the holy person's contemplating mind, we therefore know that all dharmas exist not separate from the contemplating mind.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Second, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by the cognition of the observer: those who have attained superior samādhi and cultivate the contemplation of dharmas, in conforming to the contemplation of a single object, numerous characteristics present themselves. If the object were real, how could it conform to the mind's transformation?' Third, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpaka-jñāna): when the bodhisattva's fundamental cognition realizes tathatā, the object of tathatā and the cognition merge in unison; subject and object are identical, and there is no further differentiation. Separate from the fundamental cognition, there is no distinct object; that is, the object conforms to the transformation of true cognition, and therefore it is said to be citta-only. If you of the Hīnayāna grasp that there are real objects outside the mind, then when realizing tathatā, why do all objective characteristics not present themselves? Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Third, the cognition of conforming to the transformation by non-conceptual cognition: when directly realizing the real non-conceptual cognition, all objective characteristics do not present themselves. If the objects were real, how could they fail to appear?' Second, the objection regarding worldly matters contradicting the doctrine: this is the Sautrāntika master's objection, which says: 'If the treatise master says that there is only internal consciousness and no objects outside the mind, how is it that we directly see in the world that sentient and insentient things have determination of place, determination of time, indeterminacy of person, and indeterminacy of function, and so forth?' Within this, there are naturally four objections: first, the objection regarding determination of place; second, the objection regarding determination of time; third, the objection regarding indeterminacy of person; fourth, the objection regarding indeterminacy of function. The first objection says: 'If the treatise master says that everything is consciousness-only and there are no objects outside the mind, consider how when a worldly person uses direct perception consciousness to directly grasp the Southern Mountain, that consciousness and the mountain are together in the south; the mountain is not separate from consciousness, and one could say it is consciousness-only. But if one suddenly uses direct perception consciousness to grasp the north, that mountain remains determined in the south, and certainly does not conform to the grasper's mind to turn and face north. Since when one grasps the north, the mind grasping the Southern Mountain does not arise, one clearly knows that separate from consciousness there is a real object of the Southern Mountain. How does this constitute consciousness-only?' The second objection regarding determination of time: the objection says: 'If when directly grasping the Southern Mountain, consciousness manifests and the mountain also arises in accordance with the mind, then that could establish the meaning of consciousness-only. But when one is not grasping the Southern Mountain, that mind grasping the mountain does not arise, yet the mountain still exists and does not perish along with the mind. That means there is an object separate from the mind; how does this establish the meaning of consciousness-only?' These two objections above both challenge direct perception consciousness, and also challenge inference. If evaluated by the inferential mind, the nimittabhāga of the mountain also manifests upon the mind elsewhere. The third objection regarding the indeterminacy of sentient beings' persons: the objection says: 'If it is said that everything is consciousness-only, suppose there are many sentient beings together in one place, among whom half suffer from cataracts or eye disease—say, ten or five of them—some seeing flowers in the sky, some seeing hairs, some seeing flies, and some seeing nothing at all. These are all transformed and arisen from the diseased-eyed persons' own consciousness; the nimittabhāgas of hairs, flies, and so forth that are transformed are all not separate from the minds of those suffering from cataracts, and this could be consciousness-only. But consider the other half who do not suffer from cataracts—say, ten or five together in the same place—what they see is identical, and things all share the same objective realm. Since it is singular, we clearly know there is an object separate from the mind; how does this establish consciousness-only?'