宗鏡錄 62.5

62.5

Answer: They are neither one nor different. The treatise says: 'The intrinsic natures of the eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be definitively one, because their mental operations, bases, cognitive objects, and associated [factors] are different; furthermore, when one ceases, the others do not cease; and because the characteristics of perfumer and perfumed, and so forth, are each different. Nor are they definitively different, because the sūtras state that the eight consciousnesses are like water and waves, without distinction; because if they were definitively different, they should not possess the nature of cause and effect; and because, like illusory matters, they lack a definitive nature. As stated before, the distinguished characteristics of the consciousnesses rely on rational conventional truth, not true ultimate truth. Within true ultimate truth, mind and speech are severed.' As a gāthā says: / The eight kinds of citta, manas, and vijñāna / Conventionally have distinct characteristics; / Ultimately their characteristics are not distinct, / Because characteristics and that which is characterized are nonexistent. / The commentary states: 'The phrase "cannot be definitive" is explained through three meanings: first, mental operations, meaning the darśanabhāga; second, the support, meaning the faculties; third, cognitive objects, meaning the perceived objects. Because according to these three meanings their associations are different: for instance, the eye consciousness taking visual form as its mental operation, up to the eighth transforming into visual form and so forth as its mental operation. If one consciousness ceases, the other seven and so forth do not necessarily cease: the seven are the perfumers, and the eighth is that which is perfumed; furthermore, the seven are causes, and the eighth is the fruit. Regarding "nor are they definitively different": the Laṅkāvatārasūtra states that the consciousnesses are like the waves of the great ocean, having no differentiated characteristics. Furthermore, if they were definitively different, they should not be cause and effect, because they mutually serve as cause and effect. Causality in the nature of dharmas is not definitively different, just as barley does not produce bean sprouts, and so forth. Furthermore, all dharmas are like illusions, so we know they lack a definitively different nature.'