宗鏡錄 63

English (machine translation) 63

Language: English

63.1

Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Temple.

Regarding the fourth objection, the objection concerning the indetermination of function: within it three objections are distinguished. The first objection says: 'What is the cause that what is seen by those afflicted with cataract, such as hairs and flies, lacks the actual function of hairs, flies, and so forth, while what is seen by others not afflicted with cataract, such objects as hairs and flies, possesses actual function and is not nonexistent? Since you of the Mahāyāna maintain that all are consciousness-only, then all must simultaneously possess actual function, or else all must simultaneously lack actual function. Now, since they are not alike, we do not know which of them is consciousness-only.' The second objection says: 'What is the cause that what sentient beings obtain in dreams, such as food and drink, knives and staves, poisons, and clothing, lacks actual function, whereas upon awakening, if obtained, it possesses actual function?' The third objection says: 'What is the cause that a gandharva city and the like lack actual function, whereas other cities of brick and earth possess actual function?' The Master of the Treatise responds to the preceding four objections by citing a verse from the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā: 'Spatial and temporal determination are like in a dream; indetermination of stream is like in ghosts, / Who together see rivers of pus and the like; as in a dream, an emission has function.' If one relies on this verse, responding to the preceding four objections is sufficient. First, to respond to the preceding objection concerning spatial determination: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you also concede that when a sentient being in a dream sometimes sees a village, a garden, or men and women in one place, it is fixed, yet that sentient being's dreaming citta sometimes directs itself toward another place, and in that other place does not see the former village, garden, and so forth, so that the dreaming citta is indeterminate? Do you generally concede that this is consciousness-only, or not?' The Sautrāntika answers: 'In my school, although in a dream the place of the dream object is fixed while the dreaming citta is indeterminate, nevertheless it is not separate from the dreaming citta of the sentient being; it is entirely consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The objective forms of my waking state are also like this. Although the place of a mountain is permanently fixed, the grasping citta of sentient beings is indeterminate; yet none of them are separate from the present citta; all are consciousness-only.' He sets up a formal syllogism (prayoga): 'The objective forms seen in the waking state of our school are the subject (pakṣa / dharmin); they are necessarily consciousness-only is the proposition (pratijñā / sādhya); the reason (hetu) is: "because the place of the object is fixed while the citta is indeterminate"; the example (dṛṣṭānta) is: "like the objects in a dream in your school, which are all consciousness-only."' Second, to respond to the preceding objection concerning temporal determination: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Take, for instance, when a sentient being in a dream sees such things as a village or garden: if the dreaming citta is directing itself toward them, it may be consciousness-only; if it is not directing itself toward them, it should not be consciousness-only.' The Sautrāntika answers: 'Regarding the objects in my dream, if the dreaming citta directs itself toward them, they are consciousness-only; if there are times when the dreaming citta does not direct itself toward them, yet they are not separate from the dreaming citta, they are also consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The objective forms of my waking state are also like this. Now, when I direct myself toward the Southern Mountain for a long time, the mountain is not separate from the citta and is consciousness-only; when there are times I do not direct toward the mountain and the citta does not arise, yet it is not separate from the present citta, it is also consciousness-only.' The verse says: 'Spatial and temporal determination are like in a dream.' This single line answers the preceding two objections. Third, to respond to the objection concerning the indetermination of stream: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you, Sautrāntika, also concede that among numerous hungry ghosts together in one place, three or five among them whose karma is identical will together see a river of pus definitely, while another three or five, following their own karmic power, will have indeterminate perceptions, so that in the very same place some see raging fire, some see excrement and filth, or some see men holding clubs barring the way? Among such hungry ghosts together in one place, half see a fixed object, while half see diverse objects. Do you generally concede that this is the consciousness-only of the hungry ghosts, or not?' The answer is: 'Although what is seen has identity and difference, nevertheless they are not separate from the transformations of the hungry ghosts' own karmic consciousness; all are consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The consciousness-only of my school is also like this. Although one class, all of whom are afflicted with cataract, see differently, and another class, who are not afflicted with cataract, see identically, nevertheless they are not separate from the transformations of consciousness of these two classes of sentient beings; all are consciousness-only.' The verse says: 'Indetermination of stream is like in ghosts, / Who together see rivers of pus and the like.' These two lines of verse answer this single objection. As the verse in the Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā says: '"Indetermination of stream is like in ghosts": in reality it is a clear river, without an external distinct object. Yet the hungry ghosts all together see it as full of pus and flowing; it is not seen by only one. Yet in this place there is actually not the slightest bit of pus or blood to be found; how could there be an overflowing of the banks? Although there is no real object, that it should definitely belong to only one [person] is logically impossible. From this it should be known that the citta observing form and so forth, although without an external object, does not have indetermination regarding the stream. If one rejects the nonexistence of objects, then the reason establishing the existence of objects has the fallacy of indetermination (anaikāntika). In a place where there is no object, many streams also collectively observe without determination. How is it that, although there is really no flowing pus, the hungry ghosts do not observe it differently? Because of their shared karma, they are brought to this state and together see flowing pus; their stingy karma ripening, they together see this suffering. Because former shared karma separately perfumed their own substances, at this time the maturation of both appears before them. Those many sentient beings together see this phenomenon; there is really no external object, for it is due to memory. In accord with its principle, for you, noble one, it is also like this. When the perfuming of what was collectively created ripens, there is no distinct characteristic; the nimittabhāga of form and so forth arises from consciousness. Therefore it is definitely known that consciousness does not arise by relying on external objects. Is it not conceded that beings born in this same destiny do not have determinately identical karma? Since one sees differences such as highborn and lowborn families, rich and poor, in this way the forms seen should have differences, just as different kinds of beings see unequally. Therefore one knows this class is different from that; neither do they generate objects like form by the power of external objects. However, although hungry ghosts belong to the same destiny, what they see also differs; because of the different characteristics of their karma, what they see is also like this. Some among them see large, red-hot iron balls boiling and bursting; or at times they see feces and urine overflowing, which are not alike. Although belonging to the human destiny, when a gold belt appears to a person of meager merit, he sees it as an iron shackle, blazing hot and unapproachable, or sees it as a serpent vomiting poisonous fire. Therefore it is definitely known that even within the human destiny they do not see alike. If such classes had no distinct visual nature, it would be because they all have the same kind of karma. However, because those classes have common-share karma, they are born into a common destiny, and because they have individual karma, they see individually. This single capacity, following its power, causes those persons to have identical and different perceptions. Furthermore, by this principle one also answers other assertions: Some say that sentient beings of different destinies, such as ghosts and animals, should not have non-distinct perceptions in the same place, because of the ripening nature of their individually created karma. Although they form different destinies and their karma has differences, the karma of collective observation is still not different. That is, within the personal continuity of sentient beings, individual distinct karmic seeds accompany them; when they encounter their conditions, each arises.' Fourth, to generally answer the three objections within the indetermination of function: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you, Sautrāntika and others, concede that what sentient beings obtain in dreams, such as knives, staves, food, and drink, lacking actual function, is consciousness-only, or not?' The answer is: 'Yes.' He asks again: 'Just as when a sentient being in a dream sometimes emits impurities or discharges urine, having actual function, do you also concede that this is consciousness-only, or not?' The answer is: 'Yes.' The Master of the Treatise answers by analogy: 'Since you concede that in a dream both having actual function and lacking actual function are consciousness-only, then you should know that in my school the afflicted with cataract and the unafflicted, waking and dreaming, as well as an illusory city and a real city—these three pairs all possess actual function, just as in your dream both possessing and lacking actual function are consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise establishes it by a syllogism, saying: 'The waking objective forms of my school are the subject; they are necessarily consciousness-only is the proposition; the reason is: "because they possess actual function"; like the objective forms in your dreams. Otherwise, the objective forms in your dreams are the subject; they should not be consciousness-only is the proposition; the reason is: "because they possess and lack actual function"; like the objective forms in your waking state.' The Triṃśikā verse says: 'As in a dream, an emission has function.' This single line answers the objection regarding objects above. Furthermore, using a single analogy, he generally answers the four objections. The Triṃśikā verse says: 'All is like in hell, / Where they together see the wardens and the like, / Which are able to inflict torment; / Therefore all four points are established.' Take, for instance, mundane spatial determination, temporal determination, indetermination of stream, and indetermination of function: they are also like the punishment seen by suffering sentient beings in hell, which also have spatial determination, temporal determination, indetermination of stream, and indetermination of function. All these are consciousness-only. It is merely that by the predominance of sentient beings' evil karma, although they are in the same hell, when undergoing suffering, the copper dogs, iron serpents, ox-headed hell wardens, and instruments of punishment seen by them may be identical or different. Such instruments of suffering oppress and torment the sinners; these are entirely manifested by the sinners' own citta of evil karma, and there are no real copper dogs and the like outside citta. Mundane phenomena of today are also like this: if sinners share the same hell, it is by the power of collective retribution karma; if they undergo suffering individually, it is by the power of individual retribution karma. The Zhujing yaoji says: 'Regarding sinful conduct: falsely perceiving objects, defiled grasping firmly to self and person, and grasping at agreeable and disagreeable cause both self and others to accomplish evil karma. Therefore a sūtra verse says: "Desire does not arise or cease; / It cannot afflict the citta. / If a person has the idea of a self / And possesses graspings and views, / This person, on account of desire, / Will enter into hell." Therefore, although outside citta there is no distinct object, conforming to that deluded sentiment, they forcefully perceive and generate defilement. It is like seeing objects in a dream, generating greed and anger; conforming to that dreamer, he deems them real and not false, but in true principle there are no objects, and they are only falsely seen by sentiment. Therefore the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Like in a dream, where without good things one feels good, without angry things one is angry, and without frightening things one is frightened, sentient beings of the three realms are also like this: because of the slumber of avidyā, where they should not be angry they are angry, and so forth." Therefore one knows that although outside citta there is no distinct object, conforming to that deluded sentiment, false seeing generates defilement. Although outside citta there are no characteristics of hell and the like, when evil karma is accomplished, they falsely see and undergo suffering. As the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra says: "The men of Yama are not sentient beings; sinners see them and deem them sentient beings, holding blazing iron pincers in their hands. When the evil karma of those hell dwellers is exhausted, after their life ends they no longer see the hell wardens of Yama. Why? Because they do not belong to the category of sentient beings. Just as when oil and wick are exhausted there is no lamp, when karma is exhausted it is also like this: they no longer see the hell wardens of Yama. Just as in Jambudvīpa when the light of the sun appears there is no darkness, when evil karma is exhausted, the hell wardens of Yama are also like this: their evil eyes and evil mouths, appearing like sentient beings, their terrifying forms, are all wiped out. Just as when a painted wall is broken, the painting is also destroyed along with it, the painted wall of evil karma is also like this: they no longer see the terrifying forms of the hell wardens of Yama." Corroborated by this text, when the evil karma of sentient beings is such that they should undergo suffering, naturally therein they falsely see hell.'

63.3

The question asks: 'For those who see hell, what they see as wardens, tigers, wolves, and the like might be conceded to be false perceptions. But in that place of hell, Yama resides in the midst to judge all the sinners; then this realm exists. How can you say it does not exist?'

63.4

The answer says: 'Their seeing the master of the hell is also a false perception. It is simply that the evil karma of the sinners perfumes their citta, causing the citta to transform, so that amidst nothingness they falsely perceive it; there is really no hell with Yama in the midst.' Furthermore, in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra,

63.5

The question asks: 'Are the masters, crows, dogs, sheep, and the like in hell sentient beings, or are they non-sentient beings?'

63.6

The answer says: 'They are non-sentient beings.'

63.7

The question asks: 'For what reason are they non-sentient beings?'

63.8

The answer is: Because of lack of correspondence. What does this mean? There are five meanings according to which the hell masters, crows, dogs, and the like are not sentient beings. What are the five? First, just as the sinful sentient beings in hell experience diverse sufferings, if the hell masters and the like were sentient beings, they also should experience diverse sufferings in this way. Yet they exclusively do not experience such diverse sufferings and afflictions. For this reason, they are not sentient beings. Second, if the hell masters and the like were sentient beings, they would mutually kill and harm one another, and it would be impossible to distinguish, 'This is a sinful person, and this is a master, etc.' Yet in reality they do not mutually kill and harm one another, and it is possible to distinguish, 'This is a sinful person, and this is a hell master.' For this reason, they are not sentient beings. Third, if the hell masters and the like were sentient beings, having physical forms and strengths [like others], they should mutually kill and harm one another, and they should not be feared only by those undergoing retribution for sins. Yet in reality they are feared exclusively by sinful persons. For this reason, they are not sentient beings. Fourth, the ground of that hell is constantly burning iron. If the hell masters and the like were sentient beings, they would be unable to endure the pain; how could they harm those persons undergoing retribution for sins? Yet in reality they are able to harm those persons undergoing retribution for sins. For this reason, they are not sentient beings. Fifth, if the hell masters and the like were sentient beings and not persons undergoing retribution for sins, they should not be born in that hell. Yet in reality they are born in that hell. For this reason, they are not sentient beings. What does this mean? Those sentient beings undergoing suffering in that hell have created the evil sinful karma of the five inexpiable offenses and the like, and are born therein. The hell masters and the like have not created evil karma; how could they be born there? Due to these five meanings, it is called 'lack of correspondence'.

63.9

Question: If those masters and the like are not sentient beings, do not create sinful karma, and are not born there, how is it that there can be animals in the heavens? What does this mean? For instance, there are various birds and diverse animals born in that place [in heaven]. Why is it not likewise in hell, where animals and hungry ghosts of various kinds are born and made to be the masters?

63.10

The answer is: A verse states, / 'Animals are born in the heavens, / But hell is not like this; / Because when dwelling in heaven, / They do not suffer the pain of animals.' / What does this verse explain? Those animals and the like that are born in heaven have a small portion of karma pertaining to the receptacle world of heaven, and therefore in that receptacle world they experience pleasant retributions. The hell masters, crows, dogs, and the like do not experience various sufferings. For this reason, in that hell there are no real masters, crows, dogs, or the like, apart from the sinful sentient beings. Furthermore, the Ratnagotravibhāga-śāstra states: 'As said above, they attain distinct bodily substances, and they do not together experience the vessels of suffering in hell. Or, by the power of karma, the fierce fires simply cause no burning pain. If one were not oneself a good friend, who could make such a statement arbitrarily? Anyone who is a close friend and fundamentally kind by nature, irrespective of smooth or perilous circumstances, constantly deliberates what will benefit. Wishing to show that they do not undergo the pain of burning, they therefore express these words. Yet at this time, to help establish the doctrine is precisely to reveal the intent of a good friend. Because they do not experience that suffering, the intention is to establish that they are not naraka beings. Now it is further said: "By their karmic power, although there is said to be great fire, it does not burn." This truly establishes the doctrine of consciousness-only. Because there is no real fire, it is merely the power of karma that can destroy its own nature; since they definitely do not experience such pain, it follows that this fire originally lacks inherent nature. Yet the existence of a real nature is what is accepted by that school. If it is also admitted that it is an appearance manifested by consciousness and that the actual entity originally does not exist, then that there is no fire due to karmic power becomes logically sound. This is because their prior karma sets the limit. If it were otherwise, since the result brought about by that sovereign karma is already present there, how could it not be seen? It is like an ignorant person who, wishing to extinguish a fire, pours more clarified butter upon it. Now the Consciousness-Only school becomes all the more radiant. Due to these various reasons, this proves that they do not constitute the category of naraka beings. Therefore we know that it is merely manifested by citta; the correct principle is without error.' As the Chapter on Contemplating the Buddha's Citta in the Guan fo sanmei hai jing states: 'At that time, the Buddha's citta was like a red lotus flower. Between the petals of the lotus flower there were eighty-four thousand white rays of light. Their light illuminated everywhere the sentient beings of the five destinies. When this light came forth, the sentient beings undergoing suffering all appeared. As for those sufferings, they were the Avīci Hell, the eighteen minor hells, the eighteen cold hells, up to the five hundred billion sword-forest hells, and so forth.'

63.11

Question: If the evil karmic citta of sentient beings induces the manifestation of the events of hell, the principle is readily admissible. But when contemplating the Buddha's citta, why does hell alone manifest?

63.12

Answer: Here there are briefly two meanings. First, if contemplated according to principle, the citta-nature of the Buddha originally contains the dharmadhātu; there is not a single dust mote that it does not pervade, nor a single dharma that it does not penetrate. Second, if contemplated according to phenomena, the Buddha takes only the rescue of suffering as his purpose and takes the citta of beings as his citta; thus the realm of hell is entirely the Buddha's citta. He exercises unconditioned compassion, uninterruptedly being of the same substance. Therefore, the Chapter on Contemplating the Buddha's Citta states: 'The Buddha told the heavenly king: "If you wish to know what the light of the Buddha's citta illuminates, it constantly illuminates these sentient beings of relentless and unrescued sufferings. That which the Buddha's citta takes as its object constantly takes these extremely evil sentient beings as its object. Because the Buddha's citta-power adorns itself, after incalculable kalpas it causes those sinful persons to produce the aspiration for bodhi." … And further: "At that time, when the World-Honoured One spoke these words, the power of the Buddha's citta emitted ten kinds of white light coming forth from the Buddha's citta. Its light illuminated everywhere the worlds of the ten directions. In each ray of light, immeasurable transformed buddhas rode on jewelled lotus flowers. The great assembly in the congregation at that time saw the Buddha's light as being like crystal water, or saw it as being like milk. They saw the transformed buddhas emerge from the Buddha's chest, enter the Buddha's navel, roam within the Buddha's citta, ride on a great jewel ship, and proceed to the places of those undergoing retribution for sins in the five destinies. Each sinful person saw the transformed buddhas as their own parents or beloved good friends, who gradually expounded for them the supramundane Dharma. At that time, there was a great voice in empty space addressing the great assembly: 'All of you now should contemplate the Buddha's citta. The citta of all buddhas is great compassion. That which great compassion takes as its object takes suffering sentient beings as its object.' … Next, one practices great joy: seeing all sentient beings peacefully enjoying bliss, joy arises in the citta, no different from one's own. Having given rise to joy, next one practices the dharma of equanimity: these sentient beings have no characteristics of coming and going; they are born from thoughts of the citta. That which is born from thoughts of the citta is a combination of causes and conditions, designated only by the provisional name 'citta'. Such thoughts of the citta are like mad flowers, arising from inversion. Suffering arises from thought, and bliss is born from thought. The citta is like a plantain tree, with no solid reality inside. This is expounded at length as in the ten metaphors of the sūtra. When making this contemplation, one sees neither body nor citta; one sees all dharmas as identical with the true nature of reality. This is called the bodhisattva's dharma of bodily experience of citta. Relying upon this dharma, one extensively cultivates the thirty-seven factors conducive to bodhi. If one grasps realization, it is the śrāvaka dharma; if one does not grasp realization, it is the bodhisattva dharma."' Furthermore, the Ratnagotravibhāga-śāstra states: 'Regarding "the spatio-temporal determination being like a dream," some say that due to the confusion of the citta, one thereupon produces a definite understanding of time and place; yet in a dream, no real object is definitively obtainable, as is universally accepted in the world. How could this be compared to other determined events so as to impute an error? … And further: At that time, within that dream, there is really no definite characteristic of time and place in the citta. How is this known? As a verse states: / "If sleeping in the night, / One sees the sun rising in the north, / When the time and place of the dream are irregular, / How could there be a determinate citta?" / It also states: "What marvel is there in this dreaming citta? It accomplishes great tasks without relying on external forms, yet it can skillfully and adroitly construct such magnificence: one may see towering walls of nine ren, soaring eaves of ten zhang, lush azure branches, and glittering red blossoms, which even a craftsman exhausting his contemplation could not carve." If it is said that this objection applies equally to others, they have no such fault. Because it arises without relying on the effort of external matter, simply through the ripening of seeds and depending on consciousness as a condition, at that very moment the manovijñāna manifests. Furthermore, one has never seen any sūtra or treatise state that distinct matter is born within that dream.' The Baifa chao states: 'The treatise master says: "For example, having intercourse with a woman in a dream and discharging impurity, or being bitten by a snake in a dream which can cause fainting, sweating, and mental confusion—although there is no real object, there is a real function. Is this consciousness-only or not?" The Sautrāntika answers: "This is consciousness-only." The treatise master says: "Since you admit that having real function and having no real function in a dream are both consciousness-only, then according to my school: what is manifested in wakefulness during a dream, having cataracts, not having cataracts, a fictional city, and an actual city—these three pairs of cases, whether possessing real or unreal function, just like your dream, are also consciousness-only." The treatise master establishes the syllogism: The subjects (dharmin) are "having cataracts, not having cataracts, and so forth"; the thesis (pratijñā) is "the principle that they have function or lack function is also established"; the reason (hetu) is "because it is admitted that there is no real object"; the example (dṛṣṭānta) is "like the defilements and so forth in a dream." Therefore, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: "Like a dream impairment having efficacy." Regarding the third, explaining the objection of contradiction with the sacred teachings: the intent of the Hīnayāna objection is: "If the treatise master says that all is consciousness-only and that there are no real objects outside citta, why did the World-Honoured One speak of twelve āyatanas in the Āgama sūtras? If all were consciousness-only, the World-Honoured One should only have spoken of the mind-āyatana and dharma-āyatana, and should not have spoken of the ten material āyatanas. Now since the World-Honoured One spoke of twelve āyatanas, it is clearly known that apart from the mind and dharma āyatanas, there are separately ten material āyatanas that exist outside citta. Why do you say that all is consciousness-only?" In the treatise master's answer, there are three parts: first, a provisional answer; second, the correct answer; third, an answer by metaphor. First, the provisional answer: quoting the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi verse: / "Consciousness is born from its own seed, / And evolves resembling the appearance of an object. / In order to establish the internal and external āyatanas, / The Buddha declared them to be ten." / Saying that "consciousness is born from its own seed" means that the actual occurrences of the self-authenticating part of the five consciousnesses each arise from the respective seeds of the five consciousnesses. Taking the seeds of the five consciousnesses, they are made into the five sense organs. Saying that it "evolves resembling the appearance of an object" means that after the self-authenticating part of the five consciousnesses is born from its own seeds, it can transform to manifest resembling the two parts. The transformed darśanabhāga is called the five consciousnesses; the transformed nimittabhāga manifests resembling external objects and is called the five sense objects. In truth, the ten āyatanas of organs and objects are none other than consciousness; they too are consciousness-only. This is provisionally taking the seeds of the five consciousnesses to be the five sense organs, answering the Sautrāntika master, because the Sautrāntika admits the existence of seeds.'

63.13

Question: Even if they admit the existence of seeds, do they not grasp them as existing apart from consciousness?

63.14

Answer: They grant that seeds are held within the first six consciousnesses, and they also do not exist apart from consciousness. The author of the treatise states: The transformed nimittabhāga, which resembles the five external sense objects, likewise does not exist apart from consciousness. The seeds of the five consciousnesses that possess the capacity to transform—namely, the five sense faculties—likewise do not exist apart from consciousness. Although divided into the ten internal and external bases, yet all are vijñaptimātra. That the Buddha taught them as ten was due to the Buddha's esoteric intention: in order to demolish the non-Buddhists' clinging to the body as a solitary composite self, he thus forcedly used conceptual words upon wordless phenomena to speak of the ten bases of faculties and dusts, which brings great and superior benefit. Thus the Vijñaptimātrasiddhi verse states: 'Relying on this teaching, one is able to enter / the selflessness of the pudgala.' The explanation says: If there are wise persons, they thereupon rely on these scriptural passages in which the Buddha taught the ten bases of faculties and dusts, and immediately contemplate: 'For immeasurable eons, driven by faulty wisdom's scrutiny and mired in foolish delusion and darkness, I have falsely clung to the bodies of self and others as a solitary composite self; on account of this I have sunk and drowned in saṃsāra. Now relying on the teaching, I contemplate that the bodies of self and others have only the ten bases of faculties and dusts to constitute their substance. In each and every single base, there is utterly no function of a master, sovereignty, permanence, or oneness. How could there ever be a self?' Thereupon they are able to awaken and enter into the principle of selflessness, accomplishing the contemplation of the emptiness of self. This is Mahāyāna provisionally taking the five seeds to be the five faculties in order to provisionally answer the Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna raises another objection: 'If so, then the forms that are the nimittabhāga of the five dusts are transformed by the five consciousnesses, and so may be vijñaptimātra as in your school; but as for the forms of the five fundamental objects (mūla-ālambana), one does not know of which consciousness they are the vijñaptimātra. The five consciousnesses and the sixth do not directly take the five fundamental objects as cognitive conditions; then do these five fundamental objects not exist outside the mind? How does this establish vijñaptimātra?' Because of this question, there is the treatise author's second correct reply. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'They depend on what is transformed by consciousness; they are not distinct real entities.' The explanation says: This is the correct explanation according to Mahāyāna's own school, based on having already established the eighth consciousness. Since the author of the treatise says that the fundamental forms of the five dusts are the direct nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness, and the nimittabhāga is not separate from the eighth consciousness, it is also vijñaptimātra. As for the third, the reply by analogy: the author of the treatise raises an analogy to reply to the Hīnayāna regarding why the World-Honoured One established the twelve bases. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Just as to avert the view of annihilation, he taught the continuity of sentient beings.' It was merely the Buddha's esoteric intention to demolish sentient beings' solitary composite self that he provisionally stated the names of the twelve bases, causing sentient beings to contemplate the phenomena of the twelve bases as completely lacking a self, and thereby enter the emptiness of self. Next, relying on vijñaptimātra, one is able to contemplate that upon all phenomena, none possess real functions such as upholding norms or maintaining a superior nature. Clinging to phenomena having been eliminated, one accomplishes the emptiness of phenomena. The Hīnayāna objects: 'Since you say all phenomena lack real functions such as upholding norms, sovereign autonomy, and superior nature, thereby accomplishing the contemplation of the emptiness of phenomena, then would the substance of this vijñaptimātra not also be empty?' From this there arises the fourth objection, that vijñaptimātra becomes empty. The author of the treatise replies: 'The substance of vijñaptimātra is not empty, because it is not that which is clung to. What I previously spoke of as empty was merely emptying the parikalpita false phenomena—those wherein the deluded mind clings upon all phenomena to real functions such as upholding norms and superior nature. These are empty. It does not empty the substance of vijñaptimātra that is free from clinging. Just as when the fundamental wisdom directly witnesses tathatā, it is free from words and transcends characteristics; its parikalpita false selves and phenomena all do not appear before it. In this stage, there is only the fundamental wisdom merging imperceptibly with principle, not dividing into subject and object. If this substance of consciousness were also empty, there would be no conventional truth. Because conventional truth would not exist, ultimate truth would also not exist, for the ultimate and conventional are established in mutual dependence.' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'To deny the two truths is a pernicious grasp of emptiness; the Buddhas have declared such a person untreatable.' As for the fifth objection, that the characteristics of form are not mind: the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'If the bases of form also have consciousness as their substance, why do they not manifest as the characteristics of form—manifesting, uniform, solid and abiding, turning in succession?' The Hīnayāna's objection means: 'If all external forms have mind as their substance, and it is because mind's svasaṃvittibhāga transforms into the likeness of a grāhaka which is called darśanabhāga, and transforms into the likeness of a grāhya which is called nimittabhāga, then why do the transformed characteristics of form manifest, while the mind that transforms them does not manifest? Moreover, if external forms have mind as their substance, why do the transformed forms turn in a uniform succession? For instance, external forms such as mountains, rivers, and the great earth remain uniform without change for thousands or tens of thousands of years, continuous without interruption, abiding for a long time. But the transforming minds of sentient beings change and are unstable, and do not last long. Now since external forms do not resemble the internal mind, we know clearly that external real forms exist apart from mind. Why say that all is vijñaptimātra?' The reply states: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Because they arise from the force of the perfuming of nominal conventions.' This is merely because from beginningless time, mutually from before to after, all sentient beings have falsely perfumed nominal conventions, conceiving them to be solid, abiding, continuous, and so forth outside the mind. Due to this force, such characteristics appear; it is not that there are real, solid forms and so on outside the mind. The outsider asks again: 'Since you say vijñaptimātra, why do sentient beings have to transform into the likeness of external forms and manifest them?' Answer: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'If this were absent, there would be no inversion, and consequently no defilement, nor any purified phenomena. Therefore the consciousnesses transform into the likeness of form and manifest.' The author of the treatise says: 'If all sentient beings did not transform into the likeness of external forms to manifest, there would be neither defiled nor purified phenomena. For instance, because all ordinary persons are first deluded by objects such as form and falsely cling in inversion, defilement arises from this. The substance of defilement is the two hindrances. If you outsiders do not accept that consciousness transforms into the likeness of external form to manifest, then sentient beings would not produce inversions; if inverted false clinging does not arise, then defiled afflictions will not be produced; if defilement is not produced, how could purified phenomena exist?' Therefore the verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'The characteristic of confusion and the substance of confusion / should be admitted as the consciousness of form / and the consciousness that is non-form; / if one is absent, the other is also absent.' 'The characteristic of confusion' is the transformed characteristic of form. 'The substance of confusion' is the transformed substance of mind. 'Should be admitted as the consciousness of form' is the aforementioned transformed characteristic of confusion; 'and the consciousness that is non-form' is the aforementioned transforming mind as substance. 'If one is absent, the other is also absent' means that if there were no transformed objects resembling external forms serving as characteristics of confusion, there would also be no substance of consciousness that transforms them. Hence we know that they must transform into the likeness of external objects to manifest. Therefore, all forms are not separate from the mind; all are vijñaptimātra. As for the sixth objection, that direct perception contradicts the school: the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'External objects such as form are clearly and directly witnessed, acquired by direct perception (pratyakṣa); why do you repudiate them as non-existent?' The Hīnayāna's objection means: 'For instance, external form objects of the five dusts are clearly directly witnessed by the five consciousnesses and acquired by direct perception; this is mutually established by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Why do you repudiate them as non-existent, saying all is vijñaptimātra?' In the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā this objection is also raised: 'Phenomena are determined to exist or not by means of pramāṇa; among all pramāṇas, pratyakṣa is supreme. If there were no external objects, how could there be this awareness: "I am now directly witnessing such an object"?' The meaning is: If the author of the treatise says there are no external real objects, why say the five consciousnesses take external five-dust objects through pratyakṣa? If it were anumāna, non-pramāṇa, produced by parikalpa, clung to by parikalpa, produced by forced deliberation and conceptualization, the nimittabhāga would not be separate from the mind and could be established as vijñaptimātra. Now since the five consciousnesses obtain external real five-dust objects through pratyakṣa, why also say all is vijñaptimātra? Reply: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'At the time of witnessing by pratyakṣa, one does not cling to them as external; later, the intellect discriminates and falsely gives rise to the idea of externality.' The author of the treatise says: 'When the five consciousnesses in direct perception are directly cognizing the objects of the five dusts, they attain the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon, without carrying nominal conventions, without a deliberating mind, without generating discrimination, and do not cling to them as external. It is merely the discriminating manovijñāna of a subsequent thought-moment that falsely gives rise to discrimination, and then clings to them as external, claiming there are real objects.'

63.15

Question: Does the Hīnayāna grant that in the mind of pratyakṣa, one does not cling to them as external?

63.16

Answer: They grant it.

63.17

Question: What is the difference with the Mahāyāna?

63.18

Answer: The Mirror of Vijñaptimātra states: In the Mahāyāna, the five consciousnesses and the simultaneous manovijñāna are all pratyakṣa and do not cling to them as external. In the Hīnayāna school, it is solely the five consciousnesses that do not cling to them as external. The author of the treatise says: Since you in the Hīnayāna grant that the five consciousnesses cognizing objects are pratyakṣa and do not cling to them as external, we know clearly that in the mind of pratyakṣa there are no external objects at all; this is precisely vijñaptimātra.

63.19

The outsider asks again: Are the five-dust objects of pratyakṣa cognized by the five consciousnesses real or provisional?

63.20

Answer: They are real.

63.21

Objection: If so, then real five-dust objects exist externally apart from the mind; why say vijñaptimātra?

63.22

Answer: When the five consciousnesses cognize the five-dust objects, although they are real, they are transformed by the five consciousnesses; they are the nimittabhāga of their own consciousness, not separate from the five consciousnesses, and all constitute vijñaptimātra. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Therefore, the object of pratyakṣa is its own nimittabhāga; because it is transformed by consciousness, it is also said to exist. External real forms and so forth clung to by the manovijñāna are falsely imagined to exist, so they are said to be non-existent.' The meaning is: Each of the five consciousnesses has four parts. The five-dust objects are the direct nimittabhāga of the five consciousnesses. The svasaṃvittibhāga of the five consciousnesses transforms into the likeness of nimittabhāga objects such as form and manifests them; this nimittabhāga is furthermore not separate from the darśanabhāga, so all is vijñaptimātra. If later the discriminating manovijñāna arises and falsely clings that real objects exist outside the mind, this is non-existent, because it is known without conforming to the substance of the object.

63.23

Question: When afflictions such as dveṣa arise in the five consciousnesses, they do not conform to the fundamental object; why say they are solely pratyakṣa?

63.24

Answer: Although they do not conform to the fundamental object, they conform to the nimittabhāga, and thus are also pratyakṣa, because the mind is free from clinging. When the dveṣa associated with the sixth manovijñāna is accompanied by clinging, it conforms to neither the nimittabhāga nor the fundamental object; when it does not arise together with clinging, it is the same as the five consciousnesses.

63.25

Question: Why are the five consciousnesses free from clinging?

63.26

Answer: Because they do not pertain to the two pramāṇas of inference (anumāna) or non-pramāṇa, they are free from clinging. Thus we know that the five consciousnesses cognizing objects through pratyakṣa do not cling to them as external; all are vijñaptimātra.

63.27

Furthermore, the Hīnayāna collectively raises an objection: If there are no external objects in vijñaptimātra, from what are the various states of mind produced? If there are no objects to induce and generate the mind, from what does the false mind arise? There has never been an object without a mind, nor has there ever been a mind without an object.

63.28

Answer: A verse in the treatise says:
'Due to the consciousness containing all seeds,
Transforming in such and such ways,
Through the power of reciprocal influence,
These and those conceptual discriminations arise.'
'The consciousness containing all seeds' is precisely the eighth consciousness. Because this consciousness can hold the seeds of all conditioned phenomena, the differentiated capacities of all seeds to each produce their own fruits are called 'the consciousness containing all seeds'. There are two kinds of capacity: first, actual activity is called capacity, which is like the seeds of grain and wheat, etc., having the capacity to produce sprouts; second, the seeds within the eighth consciousness are called capacity, because they have the capacity to produce actual activity. What is spoken of now as 'the consciousness containing all seeds' takes only the capacity of the seeds within the fundamental consciousness to be able to produce all conditioned phenomena, such as form and mind. Thus form is the object-condition (ālambana), and mind is precisely that which conditions [it]. Thus form is the object; it is not separate from mind, and this is vijñaptimātra. These minds and objects only arise from within the fundamental consciousness—why would external objects be required for them to arise? 'Transforming in such and such ways': such eight consciousnesses arise from seeds; that is, the self-corroborating division (svasaṃvittibhāga) of the eight consciousnesses transforms and produces the darśanabhāga and the nimittabhāga. The nimittabhāga is not separate from the darśanabhāga; this is vijñaptimātra. 'Through the power of reciprocal influence': that is, the remaining conditions constitute the power of reciprocal influence, for mental phenomena arise from four conditions and material phenomena arise from two conditions. 'These and those conceptual discriminations arise': that is, based upon those darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, one falsely grasps that there are real selves and dharmas externally, and thus conceptual discriminations arise. Therefore one knows that it is merely through the seeds within the fundamental consciousness that the consciousnesses arise; they can arise without relying on external false objects. Therefore one knows that all is vijñaptimātra.

63.29

Furthermore, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states:
'Question: As you said before, there is only internal consciousness and no external objects. If so, is internal consciousness grāhya (apprehended) or is it not grāhya? If it is grāhya, it is identical to external objects such as form and fragrance. If it is not grāhya, then it is a non-existent dharma. How then can you say that there is only internal consciousness and no external objects?'

63.30

Answer: As an expedient means, the Tathāgata gradually leads sentient beings to attain entry into the emptiness of the self and the emptiness of dharmas, and therefore taught that there is internal consciousness, but in reality there is no internal consciousness that is grāhya. If it were not so, then one could not speak of the emptiness of self and the emptiness of dharmas. For this reason, by false discrimination, this mind knows that mind, and that mind knows this mind.

63.31

Question: There is yet another objection: How is it known that the Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, based on this meaning, spoke of all the āyatanas such as form, and yet these āyatanas such as form do not really exist? Furthermore, since consciousness and so forth can apprehend objects, for this reason one cannot say there are no āyatanas such as form.

Linked texts (1)

宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese