宗鏡錄 63.14

63.14

Answer: They grant that seeds are held within the first six consciousnesses, and they also do not exist apart from consciousness. The author of the treatise states: The transformed nimittabhāga, which resembles the five external sense objects, likewise does not exist apart from consciousness. The seeds of the five consciousnesses that possess the capacity to transform—namely, the five sense faculties—likewise do not exist apart from consciousness. Although divided into the ten internal and external bases, yet all are vijñaptimātra. That the Buddha taught them as ten was due to the Buddha's esoteric intention: in order to demolish the non-Buddhists' clinging to the body as a solitary composite self, he thus forcedly used conceptual words upon wordless phenomena to speak of the ten bases of faculties and dusts, which brings great and superior benefit. Thus the Vijñaptimātrasiddhi verse states: 'Relying on this teaching, one is able to enter / the selflessness of the pudgala.' The explanation says: If there are wise persons, they thereupon rely on these scriptural passages in which the Buddha taught the ten bases of faculties and dusts, and immediately contemplate: 'For immeasurable eons, driven by faulty wisdom's scrutiny and mired in foolish delusion and darkness, I have falsely clung to the bodies of self and others as a solitary composite self; on account of this I have sunk and drowned in saṃsāra. Now relying on the teaching, I contemplate that the bodies of self and others have only the ten bases of faculties and dusts to constitute their substance. In each and every single base, there is utterly no function of a master, sovereignty, permanence, or oneness. How could there ever be a self?' Thereupon they are able to awaken and enter into the principle of selflessness, accomplishing the contemplation of the emptiness of self. This is Mahāyāna provisionally taking the five seeds to be the five faculties in order to provisionally answer the Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna raises another objection: 'If so, then the forms that are the nimittabhāga of the five dusts are transformed by the five consciousnesses, and so may be vijñaptimātra as in your school; but as for the forms of the five fundamental objects (mūla-ālambana), one does not know of which consciousness they are the vijñaptimātra. The five consciousnesses and the sixth do not directly take the five fundamental objects as cognitive conditions; then do these five fundamental objects not exist outside the mind? How does this establish vijñaptimātra?' Because of this question, there is the treatise author's second correct reply. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'They depend on what is transformed by consciousness; they are not distinct real entities.' The explanation says: This is the correct explanation according to Mahāyāna's own school, based on having already established the eighth consciousness. Since the author of the treatise says that the fundamental forms of the five dusts are the direct nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness, and the nimittabhāga is not separate from the eighth consciousness, it is also vijñaptimātra. As for the third, the reply by analogy: the author of the treatise raises an analogy to reply to the Hīnayāna regarding why the World-Honoured One established the twelve bases. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'Just as to avert the view of annihilation, he taught the continuity of sentient beings.' It was merely the Buddha's esoteric intention to demolish sentient beings' solitary composite self that he provisionally stated the names of the twelve bases, causing sentient beings to contemplate the phenomena of the twelve bases as completely lacking a self, and thereby enter the emptiness of self. Next, relying on vijñaptimātra, one is able to contemplate that upon all phenomena, none possess real functions such as upholding norms or maintaining a superior nature. Clinging to phenomena having been eliminated, one accomplishes the emptiness of phenomena. The Hīnayāna objects: 'Since you say all phenomena lack real functions such as upholding norms, sovereign autonomy, and superior nature, thereby accomplishing the contemplation of the emptiness of phenomena, then would the substance of this vijñaptimātra not also be empty?' From this there arises the fourth objection, that vijñaptimātra becomes empty. The author of the treatise replies: 'The substance of vijñaptimātra is not empty, because it is not that which is clung to. What I previously spoke of as empty was merely emptying the parikalpita false phenomena—those wherein the deluded mind clings upon all phenomena to real functions such as upholding norms and superior nature. These are empty. It does not empty the substance of vijñaptimātra that is free from clinging. Just as when the fundamental wisdom directly witnesses tathatā, it is free from words and transcends characteristics; its parikalpita false selves and phenomena all do not appear before it. In this stage, there is only the fundamental wisdom merging imperceptibly with principle, not dividing into subject and object. If this substance of consciousness were also empty, there would be no conventional truth. Because conventional truth would not exist, ultimate truth would also not exist, for the ultimate and conventional are established in mutual dependence.' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'To deny the two truths is a pernicious grasp of emptiness; the Buddhas have declared such a person untreatable.' As for the fifth objection, that the characteristics of form are not mind: the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'If the bases of form also have consciousness as their substance, why do they not manifest as the characteristics of form—manifesting, uniform, solid and abiding, turning in succession?' The Hīnayāna's objection means: 'If all external forms have mind as their substance, and it is because mind's svasaṃvittibhāga transforms into the likeness of a grāhaka which is called darśanabhāga, and transforms into the likeness of a grāhya which is called nimittabhāga, then why do the transformed characteristics of form manifest, while the mind that transforms them does not manifest? Moreover, if external forms have mind as their substance, why do the transformed forms turn in a uniform succession? For instance, external forms such as mountains, rivers, and the great earth remain uniform without change for thousands or tens of thousands of years, continuous without interruption, abiding for a long time. But the transforming minds of sentient beings change and are unstable, and do not last long. Now since external forms do not resemble the internal mind, we know clearly that external real forms exist apart from mind. Why say that all is vijñaptimātra?' The reply states: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'Because they arise from the force of the perfuming of nominal conventions.' This is merely because from beginningless time, mutually from before to after, all sentient beings have falsely perfumed nominal conventions, conceiving them to be solid, abiding, continuous, and so forth outside the mind. Due to this force, such characteristics appear; it is not that there are real, solid forms and so on outside the mind. The outsider asks again: 'Since you say vijñaptimātra, why do sentient beings have to transform into the likeness of external forms and manifest them?' Answer: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'If this were absent, there would be no inversion, and consequently no defilement, nor any purified phenomena. Therefore the consciousnesses transform into the likeness of form and manifest.' The author of the treatise says: 'If all sentient beings did not transform into the likeness of external forms to manifest, there would be neither defiled nor purified phenomena. For instance, because all ordinary persons are first deluded by objects such as form and falsely cling in inversion, defilement arises from this. The substance of defilement is the two hindrances. If you outsiders do not accept that consciousness transforms into the likeness of external form to manifest, then sentient beings would not produce inversions; if inverted false clinging does not arise, then defiled afflictions will not be produced; if defilement is not produced, how could purified phenomena exist?' Therefore the verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'The characteristic of confusion and the substance of confusion / should be admitted as the consciousness of form / and the consciousness that is non-form; / if one is absent, the other is also absent.' 'The characteristic of confusion' is the transformed characteristic of form. 'The substance of confusion' is the transformed substance of mind. 'Should be admitted as the consciousness of form' is the aforementioned transformed characteristic of confusion; 'and the consciousness that is non-form' is the aforementioned transforming mind as substance. 'If one is absent, the other is also absent' means that if there were no transformed objects resembling external forms serving as characteristics of confusion, there would also be no substance of consciousness that transforms them. Hence we know that they must transform into the likeness of external objects to manifest. Therefore, all forms are not separate from the mind; all are vijñaptimātra. As for the sixth objection, that direct perception contradicts the school: the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'External objects such as form are clearly and directly witnessed, acquired by direct perception (pratyakṣa); why do you repudiate them as non-existent?' The Hīnayāna's objection means: 'For instance, external form objects of the five dusts are clearly directly witnessed by the five consciousnesses and acquired by direct perception; this is mutually established by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Why do you repudiate them as non-existent, saying all is vijñaptimātra?' In the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā this objection is also raised: 'Phenomena are determined to exist or not by means of pramāṇa; among all pramāṇas, pratyakṣa is supreme. If there were no external objects, how could there be this awareness: "I am now directly witnessing such an object"?' The meaning is: If the author of the treatise says there are no external real objects, why say the five consciousnesses take external five-dust objects through pratyakṣa? If it were anumāna, non-pramāṇa, produced by parikalpa, clung to by parikalpa, produced by forced deliberation and conceptualization, the nimittabhāga would not be separate from the mind and could be established as vijñaptimātra. Now since the five consciousnesses obtain external real five-dust objects through pratyakṣa, why also say all is vijñaptimātra? Reply: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'At the time of witnessing by pratyakṣa, one does not cling to them as external; later, the intellect discriminates and falsely gives rise to the idea of externality.' The author of the treatise says: 'When the five consciousnesses in direct perception are directly cognizing the objects of the five dusts, they attain the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon, without carrying nominal conventions, without a deliberating mind, without generating discrimination, and do not cling to them as external. It is merely the discriminating manovijñāna of a subsequent thought-moment that falsely gives rise to discrimination, and then clings to them as external, claiming there are real objects.'