宗鏡錄 64

English (machine translation) 64

Language: English

64.1

Compiled by Chan Master Zhijue, Yanshou, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Temple.

Seventh, the objection concerning the contradiction between dreaming and waking. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'If forms when awake are all like dream-objects, not separate from consciousness, then just as upon awakening from a dream one knows that it was only mind, why is it that when awake, regarding one's own objects of form, one does not know they are vijñaptimātra?'

64.3

Answer: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: 'As when dreaming one has not yet awakened, one cannot know it oneself; one must wait until awakening before one can retrospectively realize it. The objects and forms when awake should be known to be the same: in the stage prior to true awakening, one cannot know it oneself; upon reaching the time of true awakening, one can then retrospectively realize it.' Having not yet attained true awakening, one constantly dwells in a dream; therefore the Buddha spoke of it as the long night of birth and death. Because of this, one does not understand that objects of form are vijñaptimātra. Thus the seventh [consciousness] is the root of the long night of birth and death, able to cause the arising of delusion, the creation of karma, and saṃsāra in the three realms. Only when one reaches the stage of true awakening does one know that everything is vijñaptimātra.

64.4

Therefore, the Vijñaptimātra-shūyào asks: 'When the consciousnesses arise resembling self and dharmas, is it entirely through the force of the perfuming of the discrimination of self and dharmas, or is it also not through it? If it is entirely through it, the eighth consciousness and the five consciousnesses lack the two discriminations, so when producing their fruits, they should not resemble the two. If it is not through it, why is it said here only that the perfuming of self and dharmas is the cause?'

64.5

Answer: Both explanations are acceptable. As for the explanation that it is entirely through it: all defiled [consciousnesses] are concomitant with the two discriminations of the seventh consciousness, or they are induced by the two discriminations of the sixth consciousness; therefore, when later producing fruits, they all resemble self and dharmas. As for the explanation that it is not through it: this refers to the sixth consciousness as the root, which concurrently takes all as objects to be the cause, conditioning the arousal of the consciousnesses so as to cause perfuming; therefore, when later producing fruits, they arise resembling the marks of self and dharmas. Alternatively, they are not external but resemble the external, because the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses] falsely imagine them as arising resembling the external. As for 'like a dream', it refers to the story of King Śaraṇa—which is translated here as 'transmigration'. This king was handsome in appearance and considered himself matchless. He searched for someone of [equal] countenance, wishing to find a peer to show his own exceptional class. At that time someone said: 'In Rājagṛha there is Mahākātyāyana, whose appearance is extremely fine, matchless in the world.' He sent an envoy to invite him. When Kātyāyana arrived, the king came out of the palace to welcome him. The king was not equal to him; when people looked at Kātyāyana, none looked at the king. The king asked why, and the crowd said: 'Kātyāyana's countenance surpasses the king's.' The king asked: 'Venerable, what was the past cause of your present fruit?' Kātyāyana answered: 'Formerly, when I went forth into the homeless life, you were a beggar. When I was sweeping the monastery grounds, you came to beg for food. After I finished sweeping the grounds, I had you clear away the dung and sweepings. Only after you finished clearing away the dung and sweepings did I give you food. By this karmic cause, I was born among humans and devas, obtaining the retribution of a handsome appearance.' Having heard this, the king immediately asked to leave home and become Kātyāyana's disciple. Later, together with Kātyāyana, he went to the country of Avanti to cultivate the Way in the mountains, sitting in meditation in a secluded place. The king of Avanti was named Palāśaka (Poshutu). He brought his palace women into the mountains for amusement. When the palace women saw King [Śaraṇa's] handsome countenance, they surrounded him to look at him. King Palāśaka saw King Śaraṇa and suspected he had lustful intentions. He asked King Śaraṇa: 'Are you an arhat?' The king answered, 'No.' Next he asked about the other three fruits, and to all he answered, 'No.' He said again: 'Are you free from lust?' He answered, 'No.' King Palāśaka was enraged and said: 'Why have you entered among my palace maidens?' Thereupon he whipped him until his body broke open, and he swooned and died. Only at night did he regain consciousness and go to Kātyāyana's place. Seeing him, Kātyāyana gave rise to compassion in his mind, and his fellow students treated him. King Śaraṇa said to Kātyāyana: 'I beg of Master that I may temporarily return to my own country, raise an army to crush that country of Avanti, and kill King Palāśaka; when the matter is finished, I shall return to cultivate the Way under the Master.' Kātyāyana consented to his request and told him: 'If you wish to go, stay for one night.' Kātyāyana arranged a fine place for him to sleep, wishing to induce a dream. He dreamt that he raised an army to invade the country of Avanti, but his own army was defeated, he himself was captured by the other, his hands and feet were firmly bound, red flowers were placed on his neck, and the drums were beaten ready to execute him. In the dream the king was terrified and cried out aloud: 'Now I have no refuge; I pray the Master will rescue me, be my refuge, so that I may attain long life!' Kātyāyana, through spiritual power, held fire on his finger, and called him to wake up, asking: 'What is the matter?' His mind was not yet sober, and he still spoke of the calamity. Kātyāyana illuminated him with fire and asked: 'Where is this place? Look for yourself.' His mind then woke up. Kātyāyana told him: 'If you invade them, you will certainly be defeated, just as seen in the dream.' The king said: 'I pray the Master will eliminate my poisonous intention.' Kātyāyana explained to him that all dharmas are like a country—mere nominal designations without reality; apart from houses and buildings, there is no separate country—and so on, extensively explaining various causes and conditions, down to a single paramāṇu, which is also not a real entity: there is neither this nor that, neither foe nor kin. Having heard the Dharma, the king attained the fruit of stream-enterer (srotāpanna), and later gradually attained the fruit of arhat. Therefore one knows that the myriad dharmas are vijñaptimātra, and dreaming and waking are identical. What is seen when awake is the clear, distinct manovijñāna; what is seen in a dream is the manovijñāna in the dream. Since the discriminating mind is the same, how could the differentiated objects be different? When delusion and awakening are like this, why have doubt? When sleep and awakening are thus, it can be thoroughly understood! Eighth, the objection concerning apprehending another's mind externally. If the treatise master says that external forms do not truly exist and are objects of internal consciousness, that may be granted. But another person's mind is truly existent; is it not an object conditioned by one's own mind? The idea is: if this person's mind can directly condition and reach another's mind, then separate from this person's mind, another mind exists as an object. If this person's mind cannot condition and reach another person's mind, then there is an object that is not conditioned. If it does reach it, that contradicts the principle of vijñaptimātra. If it does not reach it, how is knowledge of others' minds (paracittajñāna) established? The treatise master answers: Although it is said that another's mind is not an object of one's own consciousness, it is only that it is not said to be a direct object-condition (pratyaya-ālambana). The meaning is: although it is said that another person's mind is not this person's object, if this person were to directly condition another person's mind, that would be impossible. If, relying on another person's mind as the basic substance (ālambana-dravya), one transforms one's own nimittabhāga to condition it, there is also knowledge of others' minds. But when transforming the nimittabhāga to condition it, one does not reach the other person's original substance; it is merely because the other person's reflected image appears upon one's own mind that it is called knowing another's mind. Thus one knows that the nimittabhāga of another's mind is not separate from one's own mind, and is also vijñaptimātra. The meaning is: when this person's mind conditions another person's mind, the nimittabhāga that is transformed and arises is present before the mind; the nimittabhāga has no real activity, unlike a hand grasping an object, nor like the sun emitting light directly illuminating its object. When conditioning another's mind, it is merely like an image in a mirror appearing to resemble an external substance; the image in the mirror also has no real activity. When conditioning another person's mind, it is also like this. It is not that, lacking the conditioning of the substance of another person's mind, it is called knowing another's mind; yet one cannot directly know it. What is directly known is what is transformed by oneself.

64.6

Furthermore, an ancient master asked: Concerning the knowledge of others' minds, since there is another person's mind that is known by one's own mind, that means that apart from one's own mind, there is another person's mind serving as the object of one's own mind. How can one say there is no object and only consciousness?

64.7

Answer: It is said that when cognizing the form that is the nimittabhāga of another's gross physical sense faculties, one does not directly grasp it either; one merely relies on it as the substantive cause (mūla-ālambana). Just as when one's own visual consciousness cognizes the forms of the receptacle world transformed by one's eighth consciousness, it also merely relies on them as the substantive cause and does not directly grasp them. The four consciousnesses such as the auditory consciousness, in cognizing sounds and so forth transformed by the fundamental consciousness, do likewise: because the substantive cause is transformed by the eighth consciousness, when viewed from the perspective of the five consciousnesses, they are called shadow-consciousnesses. Just as the five consciousnesses cognize the substantive objects transformed by the fundamental consciousness without directly grasping them—though they cognize them, they only constitute a distal objective condition (dūra-ālambana-pratyaya)—if knowing as it truly is constitutes the Buddha's realm, the treatise says: 'With respect to the object, each of the two cognitions is obscured by ignorance, and therefore neither knows the ineffable realm as traversed by the Buddha.' There are two interpretations of this. The first says: it is the wondrous principle of tathatā, which verbal descriptions cannot reach—the ineffable realm. That is, this ineffable realm of tathatā is something that only a Buddha alone can clearly, determinately realize; others cannot realize it because they are veiled by the seventh [consciousness's] constantly operating unshared avidyā, and so they do not know it. The second says: the ineffable realm refers to the object of the cognition of others' minds and the object of the cognition of one's own mind. These two cognitions are called the ineffable realm, meaning that the svabhāva of tathatā is not an object for either nominal cognition or verbal designation. Verbal designation refers to the designating names of linguistic expressions. Since they do not grasp the svabhāva, this reveals that the realm of the two cognitions of self and other is that which is traversed by the Buddha's cognition—the ineffable realm. Because the svabhāva of the object known by these two cognitions is that which is traversed by the Buddha's cognition—the ineffable realm—other people, being obscured by the constantly operating unshared avidyā, cannot know it as it truly is. Furthermore, since it is said that when this person cognizes another's mind, they rely on the other's mind as the substantive cause and transform their own nimittabhāga to cognize it, then the nimittabhāga is not apart from this person's mind: this is consciousness-only. If one cannot directly reach the substantive cause of the other person's mind, then apart from this person's mind there is another person's mind: how could that be consciousness-only? Thereupon, the ninth objection is raised: 'the objection that a distinct object is not consciousness.' The Hīnayāna says: 'The meaning of consciousness-only is that only when there is not a single thing apart from the mind can it be called consciousness-only. Since another person's mind is an object distinct from this person's mind, how can it be consciousness-only? Moreover, another person's object is also distinct from this object; thus, apart from this person's mind, there are distinct objects: how can that be consciousness-only?' The answer rebukes them, saying: 'How extraordinary is your stubborn obstinacy, giving rise to doubts at every turn! Does the statement of consciousness-only speak of only a single consciousness? Why do you, [followers of] Hīnayāna, cling firmly to this and give rise to doubts at every turn? Does the statement of consciousness-only speak of only one person's consciousness? If one were to say that there is only one person's consciousness, then how could there be ordinary and noble, exalted and base? If there were no Buddhas, what would sentient beings seek? If there were no ordinary persons, for whom would the Buddha preach? You should know that our statement of consciousness-only has a profound purport.' The treatise says: 'The term consciousness-only generally reveals that all sentient beings each possess eight consciousnesses, the differentiated states of the nimittabhāga transformed by the six categories of mental factors, and the tathatā revealed by that principle of emptiness. The single word "consciousness" does not refer to the consciousness of one person; it generally reveals that all sentient beings each possess eight consciousnesses, which are the svabhāva of consciousness, and fifty-one mental factors, which are the associates of consciousness. Why do you cling solely to the consciousness of one person?'

64.8

Question: Vimalakīrti then entered samādhi and caused this monk to recognize his own past lives—that he had once planted numerous roots of virtue before five hundred Buddhas and dedicated them to anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi—whereupon he was immediately enlightened and recovered his fundamental mind. Now, as the past mind has already passed away, the future mind has not yet arrived, and the present mind does not abide, how can one contemplate another's past mind of roots of virtue?

64.9

Answer: From the perspective of the ultimate truth, it does not exist; in accordance with the conventional, it exists. When a single thought-moment of mind arises, it still contains the discriminations of the ten time-periods and the four operations; one must not adopt an annihilationist view like that of a turtle's fur or a rabbit's horns. Although past dharmas do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, they have all perfumed the eighth consciousness, where past seeds exist. Those who know past events do so because the seeds perfumed in the past are stored within the svasaṃvittibhāga of the present ālayavijñāna. However, during the past time, although there is no substance, by merely taking the seeds within consciousness as the substantive cause, one transforms an image and cognizes it, thereby knowing past events. This is cognition by way of an object with substantive basis (dravyālambana). Alternatively, it is said that what is cognizable is the reflected image upon the mind: that is, on the darśanabhāga of the sixth manovijñāna, a reflected image of the past is transformed and arisen, and thus known. This is a solitary reflected image (kevalapratibimba), meaning that the past has no substance and no substantive cause. Furthermore, if a past dharma has not fallen away, it is not called past; if it has already fallen away, there is no dharma to be known. If it is only that having once passed through the mind, its seed-image appears before one, and therefore one is said to recollect and know it, then one merely perceives one's own mind and does not perceive that dharma. As the Candrapradīpasamādhisūtra states: 'The Buddha said: How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva attain the treasury of cognition of the past, future, and present? Youth, this bodhisattva knows the mental activities of all sentient beings as they truly are; in accordance with the arising of the sequence of his own mental activities, he contemplates the dharmas of his own mind, and through the skillful means of cultivation free from disordered thought, just as with his own mental activities, he infers the same for others. In accordance with whatever forms he sees and sounds he hears, whether liked or not liked, his mind knows them all as they truly are. Youth, this is called the bodhisattva's attainment of the treasury of cognition of the past, future, and present.'

64.10

Question: Does the cognition that contemplates another's mind know another's mind truly, or does it not know it truly? Both [positions] involve faults.

64.11

Answer: As stated previously, if one posits self and other, both are lost with respect to the source. These are all distinctions of the conscious mind based on worldly truth. A verse in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'Cognition of another's mind regarding its object / does not perceive and know it as it truly is, / because it is not an object apart from consciousness; / only a Buddha knows it as it truly is.' Cognition of another's mind does not know truly, because through one's own internal mind, one falsely discriminates, taking it to be another's mind; this is because one's own mind and manovijñāna are admixed. Like that true fruit-substance of the Buddha-ground, the supremely wondrous realm where speech does not reach, only a Buddha can know it; other people do not know it. Because those worldly people with cognition of another's mind do not know those two dharmas as they truly are, they falsely discriminate the realms of grāhaka and grāhya. This is consciousness-only; its immeasurable and boundless, extremely profound realm cannot be measured by the mind-consciousness. The above is explained according to the Faxiang school. If explained according to the Faxing school, former masters of virtue said: 'Those who know another's mind all know it as it truly is, because they examine the reality of things and perceive the reality of principle. Neither can it be perceived outside the mind, nor is it that there is no object to be known. If the characteristics of self and other are eliminated, then one is of the same single substance as the minds of sentient beings; therefore, there is nothing outside the mind. Because the objective realm is not destroyed, one is capable of knowing.' Furthermore, regarding another's mind, Sthiramati said: 'The Buddha's cognition, in cognizing another's mind, cognizes and reaches the substantive cause; all others merely transform an image. If cognizing the substantive cause meant reaching a dharma outside the mind, it would destroy consciousness-only.' Now, because we subsume objects into mind alone, we do not destroy objects; because grāhaka and grāhya are both obliterated, their subsistence is not obstructed. In ultimate-truth mind-only, they are neither one nor different. At the very moment of cognizing the other, it is precisely oneself. Taking the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind as the cognized object (ālambana), not the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind; taking the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind as the cognizing subject, not the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind. Fused in this manner, they are neither one nor different. If, apart from the Buddha, there were separate sentient beings, one would further need to transform an image, which on the contrary would lose the true meaning of consciousness-only. The explanation says: 'Subsuming objects into mind without destroying objects' indicates the existence or non-existence of mind and objects. Those [who say] reaching the substantive cause feared destroying mind-only; since it does not destroy objects, what harm is there in reaching it, and what fault is there in not destroying it? For one who is without mind is without mind toward the myriad things, yet the myriad things have never been non-existent. The gain in this lies in the spirit's tranquility; the loss lies in considering things empty, meaning that things are truly existent. If mind-only destroys objects, then the gain lies in the emptiness of objects, and the loss lies in the existence of mind. Therefore, because objects are transformed by mind, we speak of mind-only; what is transformed is not non-existent, so why must it be destroyed? If based on conditioned arising having no svabhāva, then both mind and object are obliterated; hence we borrow mind to dispel the object, and when the object is dispelled, mind is obliterated: it is not that mind alone subsists. As for 'because grāhaka and grāhya are both obliterated, their subsistence is not obstructed,' the above non-destruction of objects temporarily dispels the ailment of fearing substantive causes; now, in order to dispel the principles of emptiness and existence, mind and objects are both permitted to subsist and be obliterated. Mind and object are empty because they depend on each other; they exist because they arise in mutual dependence through conditions. Existing is subsistence; being empty is obliteration. Emptiness and existence interpenetrate; subsistence and obliteration are both preserved. Saying 'In ultimate-truth mind-only, they are neither one nor different' directly brings forth the principle of complete-part mind-only. Although the first explanation above possesses the meaning of mind-only, it still pertains to arising-and-ceasing mind-only. Although the second meaning obliterates both without entanglement, it has not yet stated that mind and object subsume each other. Now, clarifying complete-part consciousness-only, it says 'in ultimate-truth mind-only.' Being identical in the ultimate truth, they are not different; not destroying grāhaka and grāhya, they are not one. Because they are not one, there are cognizing subject and cognized object, and the meaning of cognizing the other is established. Because they are not different, cognizing subject and cognized object are equal, and the meaning of mind-only is established. Saying 'at the very moment of cognizing the other, it is precisely oneself' concludes that reaching the substantive cause has no fault of being outside the mind; because it is identical to oneself, consciousness-only is not lost. Saying 'taking the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind' directly demonstrates the characteristics of another's mind in terms of dharmatā. This consists of two pairs of phrases: the former pair clarifies the cognized object, and the latter pair clarifies the cognizing subject. Now, first saying 'the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind' clarifies the cognized object: sentient beings' mind is identical to the Buddha's mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next saying 'not the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind': this phrase clarifies that sentient beings' mind and the Buddha's mind are not identical. Because they are not identical, there is the meaning of a cognized object; because they are not different, the meaning of mind-only is not destroyed. Saying 'as the cognized object' concludes the mental cognizing and excludes it from being the cognizing subject. Next, discerning the cognizing subject, saying 'taking the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind': this phrase clarifies the cognizing subject: the Buddha's mind is identical to the sentient beings' mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next saying 'not the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind': this clarifies that the Buddha's mind and the sentient beings' mind have the meaning of not being one. Because they are not one, it is the cognizing subject; because they are not different, the meaning of consciousness-only is not destroyed. Saying 'as the cognizing subject' concludes the cognizing subject and excludes it from being the cognized object. To further illustrate with an analogy: just as water blends with milk, the milk is what is blended, analogized to the sentient beings' mind being the cognized object; the water is what blends, analogized to the Buddha's mind being the cognizing subject. Because these two are blended together, they are as if of one flavor; yet when the king of geese sips it, the milk is exhausted while the water remains, so one knows they are not one. However, this water is called water identical to milk, and this milk is called milk identical to water. Although the two are identical, they have the meaning of not being one. Therefore, the analogy should say: taking the milk identical to water, not the water identical to milk, as what is blended; taking the water identical to milk, not the milk identical to water, as what blends. The meaning can be understood. Saying 'Fused in this manner, they are neither one nor different' concludes the correct meaning. Saying 'If, apart from the Buddha...' concludes with a critique of Dharmapāla. Saying 'which on the contrary would lose the true meaning of consciousness-only' is because he did not know that the external substantive cause is precisely the Buddha's mind. Furthermore, all Buddha-Tathāgatas, in accordance with the many thoughts and minds, are able to comprehend them instantly with their mental consciousness. As the Diamond Sūtra says: 'As many sentient beings as there are in all those world realms, with their various minds, the Tathāgata knows them all.' A verse in the Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'Having diligently practiced and learned for immeasurable kotis of kalpas, / he attained this unsurpassed bodhi cognition. / How could he not, in a single thought-moment, / skillfully know the minds of all sentient beings?' This is the mind's perfect confrontation: in a single thought-moment, the Tathāgata responds simultaneously and instantaneously to all, with not a single one to which he does not respond; hence it is called 'perfect confrontation.' Only by comprehending that mind is non-mind can one respond universally. If the mind resides in existence or non-existence, then obstruction is formed. Therefore the Diamond Sūtra says: 'All minds spoken of by the Tathāgata are all non-minds; this is called mind.'

64.12

The Huayan lun asks: "What is meant by the buddhas knowing the proper and improper times of sentient beings' minds?"

64.13

The answer says: "Because the tathāgata's mind and the minds of all sentient beings are fundamentally not different, and are one mind and one wisdom, through this they know the proper and improper times. The buddhas have awakened and share it with sentient beings; sentient beings are deluded and consider themselves separate. All buddhas achieve correct awakening through the mind and wisdom of all sentient beings; all sentient beings are deluded about the buddhas' wisdom and become sentient beings. When reaching buddhahood, they merely become the buddha of the principle to which sentient beings are blind; the Dharma-doors they preach merely liberate the sentient beings within sentient beings' minds who are deluded about the buddha. Because of this non-difference, they know sentient beings' minds."

64.14

It also asks: "Why did the great assembly not ask for themselves in speech? Why did they harbor doubts silently in thought? Why did they not praise and invite [the Buddha] with speech themselves? Why did clouds of offerings emit sounds to invite the Buddha?"

64.15

The answer says: "This reveals that the Buddha attained the dharmadhātu mind, sharing the same mind with all sentient beings; because their minds are not different, he knew the doubts in their minds. That the offerings spoke verses reveals that all phenomena are fundamentally the substance of the dharmadhātu. Because the dharmadhātu is inconceivable, all phenomena are inconceivable; this reveals that for the noble assembly, mind and object are non-dual. Because ordinary beings are deluded about the dharmadhātu, they themselves perceive mind and object as two, and thus inverted [views] arise." It also says: "Mind has no inside, outside, or in-between; the myriad phenomena and self and other are of the same substance. The one is not one; the other is not other. Therefore we know that ordinary beings and sages share the same true mind: sentient beings falsely create separation and do not know it, whereas the buddhas accord with their sameness and suddenly realize it. Just as the mirror's face reflects while the mirror's back is dark, yet both are one bronze substance though differentiated as bright and obscure; and just as river water is clear while river mud is turbid, both residing in one nature of wetness though having muddy and pellucid [aspects]—the ordinary mind and the noble mind can be compared to this purport."

64.16

Question: When sentient beings perceive the Buddha's body, it is a transformation of consciousness. Just so, when the Buddha takes as object the bodies and lands of sentient beings who are to be transformed, of what are they a transformation?

64.17

Answer: If sentient beings see the Buddha, this is an objective form (nimittabhāga) transformed by defiled evolving consciousness, subsumed under form of common outflow (niṣyanda-rūpa). If the Buddha takes sentient beings as object, it is transformed by undefiled wisdom, subsumed under form produced by meditative absorption. Although consciousness and wisdom differ, neither departs from the objects of their own minds; both, by the power of the sovereign condition, cause the other's mind to manifest. As the Yitian chao says: "Relying on the Mahāyāna school, it is generally stated with respect to other bodies and insentient phenomena: when one takes another's body as object with one's own mind, one does not directly take that other as object; one only takes the nimittabhāga transformed by one's own consciousness as the direct object of perception. Although this form that is the nimittabhāga arises by relying on the other's body as the substantive basis, it does not arise depending on that other's consciousness; because it arises from the seeds within one's own consciousness, this nimittabhāga is subsumed under form of common outflow, as it belongs to the same category as the forms of the five sense data. Relying on the other as the substantive basis, it then transforms the reflected image—this is the sovereign condition. That this transformed nimittabhāga arises from one's own seeds is the meaning of the cause condition. This demonstrates that one's own mind takes the other's body as object and possesses it relying on the locus of current activities; this is the establishment of current activity with respect to the other's body. Because it arises from the seeds of one's own mind, it is also established in dependence on seeds; in terms of attainment, this is the establishment of seeds. By this principle, when sentient beings see the Buddha's physical body, the Buddha's body taken as object is only transformed by defiled consciousness of one's own; because it arises from one's own seeds, it is subsumed under form of common outflow. Taking the pure land transformed by the Buddha as object is also like this. When the Buddha takes the physical bodies of sentient beings to be transformed and defiled lands as objects, the transformed nimittabhāga are all undefiled, lacking the functions of real sentient beings such as abandoning defilement. Like an image in a mirror, it is entirely the clear mirror; it is subsumed under undefiled form produced by meditative absorption and is also included under form of common outflow. This is because it belongs to the same category as the external five sense data, because it is transformed by the Buddha's consciousness, and because it arises from pure seeds within the immaculate consciousness."

64.18

Question: If we discuss the one mind having no external objects, it has already been answered clearly as in the previous nine challenges; then there is no form before the eyes and no sound outside the ears. Are what are seen and heard right now one, or are they two? Furthermore, are they existent, or are they nonexistent? If one says they are one, that destroys subject and object; if one says they are two, that contradicts your own school. If one says they are existent, sense faculties and sense objects are constantly empty; if one says they are nonexistent, present perception is not confused. How can they be harmonized to accord with this purport?

64.19

Answer: Just as the one great earth produces various kinds of sprouts, in like manner the mind of the eight consciousnesses manifests various phenomena. What is observed is the nimittabhāga of the ālayavijñāna; what can see is the darśanabhāga of the eye consciousness. Although subject and object are divided, neither departs from consciousness; both are direct perception (pratyakṣa) without entangling nominal designations, and are thus neither existent nor empty, neither one nor two. If one falls into inferential cognition (anumāna) and grasps them as external dusts, feelings of oneness and duality arise, and mental thoughts of inside and outside are generated. A verse from the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: / "Just as the earth is without conceptual discrimination, / Yet the myriad things depend on it to arise, / The ālayavijñāna is also like this, / The locus of reliance for the myriad objects. / Just as a person uses his own hand / To stroke his own body, / And as an elephant with its trunk / Takes water to wash and bathe itself, / Or again as infants / Put their fingers in their mouths, / In this way, within one's own mind, / A manifest object is in turn taken as an object by oneself. / These objects of the mind / Pervade the three realms of existence. / Those who have long cultivated contemplative practice / Are able to thoroughly penetrate that / The various internal and external worlds / Are all only manifestations of mind." / A verse in the Avataṃsakasūtra says: / "Just as in the deep great ocean / Precious jewels cannot be exhausted, / And within it are fully manifested / The shapes and reflections of sentient beings; / In the ocean of profound causes and conditions, / Merits are completely inexhaustible, / And within the pure dharmakāya / There is no reflection that does not appear." / The Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra says: "Furthermore, the practitioner contemplates internally in mind, accords with the correct Dharma, and observes the practice of phenomena, up to: 'How is it that the foolish, deluded ordinary beings of the world, having seen forms with their eyes, either generate greed, generate anger, or generate delusion? When those ordinary beings see a friend or see a woman, greed arises in their minds; if they see something different, then anger arises. Seeing others endowed [with desirable traits], they are veiled by greed and anger; because with their eyes they do not see forms as they truly are, delusion obscures their minds. Foolish ordinary beings have only conceptual discrimination: when seeing forms with the eyes, they are veiled by greed, anger, or delusion. People deceived by attachment discriminate in their own minds: "This is I; this is mine," and are tainted and attached like this. For example, it is like a dog gnawing on a bone stripped of meat; its saliva mixes with it, and it hopes to obtain its marrow. In this way, blood flows from between the greedy dog's teeth; having obtained its taste, it thinks it is the juice of the bone, not knowing that its own blood has such a taste. Because it craves the taste, without realizing it, it gradually eats its own tongue, and still craves that taste; because it is veiled by greed, it thinks it is the taste of the bone juice. Foolish ordinary beings are also like this: with false discrimination, eye consciousness sees forms, and they crave, attach, rejoice in, and deliberate upon them. Placing the dry bone of form into the mouth of the eye, the sense object is like the teeth, gnawing it in this way; the defiled mind is like the saliva, and the blood of craving flows out. Craving the taste of the blood, they consider the form beautiful and take pleasure in form, just like that dog. The foolish ordinary person whose eye consciousness sees form like a bone falsely discriminates like a dog gnawing a bone. Contemplating in this way, the eyes seeing forms is just like a dry bone. In this way all foolish ordinary beings are deceived and deluded by false discrimination.'" It also says: "King Yama spoke verses rebuking negligent sinners, saying: / 'If one belongs to wrong views, / That person is not clever or wise. / All practices leading to hell / Are deceived by the enemy that is the mind. / The mind is the foremost enemy; / This enemy is the most vicious. / This enemy can bind a person / And send them to Yama's domain.' / Therefore we know that all places of suffering are fundamentally trapped by craving and desire. If a greedy thought arises in a flash, one is incinerated by the fire of the five desires; as soon as a conceptual thought emerges, one is bound by the wheel of the three realms. For example, when Śakra defeated the asuras in battle, he built the Hall of Victory. The seven-jeweled multistoried pavilion was adorned and wondrous: the beams, pillars, and brackets each left room for a single thread, not touching each other yet able to support one another. The marvelous power of heavenly merit could be like this. Maudgalyāyana flew there, and Śakra led Maudgalyāyana to view the hall. The celestial maidens were all ashamed before Maudgalyāyana and all hid, not coming out. Maudgalyāyana thought that Śakra was attached to pleasure and did not cultivate the root of the path; he then miraculously manifested fire, burning down the Hall of Victory so that it collapsed in a blazing inferno. He then extensively preached impermanence for Śakra. Śakra rejoiced, and later the hall stood solemnly as before, without the color of ashes or smoke." The explanation says: "Because Śakra relied on his heavenly merit and was attached to conditioned phenomena, Maudgalyāyana displayed an expedient door to show the state of impermanence."

64.20

Question: Since the heavenly hall collapsed in a blazing inferno, why did it stand solemnly as before without the color of ashes or smoke?

64.21

Answer: This fire was not the fire of Maudgalyāyana's supernatural powers; it was the fire in Śakra's mind. Therefore the Lotus Sūtra says: "Grasping and craving what one loves, one is thereby burned." Since with a mind of greedy attachment he subsequently saw the palace incinerated, once he awakened to the matter of impermanence, the fire of greedy desire silently dissolved away. Therefore he immediately saw the hall and palace standing as before, without the color of ashes or smoke. Because Maudgalyāyana served as the sovereign condition, he saw himself being burned; however, the hall was fundamentally not burned. Thus we know that delusion and awakening are only mind; concealment and manifestation rest with oneself. All other instances of seeing and hearing are also like this. Furthermore, a sūtra says: "Evil arises from the mind, and conversely harms oneself; just as rust forms on iron and destroys its shape, or a tree heavily laden with flowers and fruits snaps its own branches, or a viper holding venom harms its own body." Only now do we know that from beginningless time down to the present day, throughout the four deportments and during the twelve periods of the day, it has all been using mind to grasp mind, using consciousness to take consciousness as object. Ultimately, internally and externally, there is not a single particle of dust as an opposite or an antidote that can be grasped or abandoned. How lamentable are the deluded, inverted people of the world! Turning their backs on awakening to join with dust, in their daily mental actions they injure others and harm those beings, enriching and sustaining their own bodies; all of this is entrapping and injuring themselves without knowing or realizing it. Not having plumbed this purport, self and objects are difficult to forget; once one directly realizes this source, self and other have nowhere to lodge.

64.22

The Śataśāstra asks: "Since sky-flowers do not exist, they cannot be seen; since a vase is presently seen, one should know the vase exists."

64.23

The answer says: "It is not seen. Why is it not seen? In what you call present seeing, is it seen by the eye, or is it seen by consciousness? If it is seen by the eye, a dead person has eyes and should also see. If it is seen by consciousness, a blind person has consciousness and should also see. If the sense faculty and consciousness individually and separately do not see, in combination they also do not see. For example, just as one blind person cannot see, a crowd of blind people also cannot see. The five sense faculties are also like this; the four natures are all empty. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'Because phenomena such as form are not made large and not made small, the minds of ordinary beings make them large or small according to their thoughts. When a person is in an urgent situation, their mind shrinks; when they are peaceful, secure, wealthy, and joyful, their mind becomes broad and expansive. Again, as in the eight liberations, external forms become large or small according to the mind.' Therefore the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'Prajñāpāramitā has nothing heard and nothing seen, because phenomena are inert.' Therefore, within the realm of ordinary beings, observing characteristics is originally false; within the domain of sages, observing the nature is originally true. Because of observing characteristics, one cannot attain nonexistence; because of observing the nature, one cannot attain existence. Because of being unable to attain nonexistence, it is like only seeing the waves and not seeing the water; because of being unable to attain existence, it is like only seeing the water and not seeing the waves. Furthermore, it is like telling a person with cataracts that there are no flowers in the sky, or telling a delirious patient that there are no ghosts before their eyes: it is a waste of words, and they will never believe and accept it. One must wait until the eyes are clean and the mind is at peace, and then naturally there is no seeing."

64.24

Record of the Mirror of the Source, Fascicle Sixty-Four

64.25

Printing blocks carved under the Superintendent of the Branch Office Tripiṭaka in the Wushen year.

Linked texts (1)

宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese