宗鏡錄 64.11

64.11

Answer: As stated previously, if one posits self and other, both are lost with respect to the source. These are all distinctions of the conscious mind based on worldly truth. A verse in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: 'Cognition of another's mind regarding its object / does not perceive and know it as it truly is, / because it is not an object apart from consciousness; / only a Buddha knows it as it truly is.' Cognition of another's mind does not know truly, because through one's own internal mind, one falsely discriminates, taking it to be another's mind; this is because one's own mind and manovijñāna are admixed. Like that true fruit-substance of the Buddha-ground, the supremely wondrous realm where speech does not reach, only a Buddha can know it; other people do not know it. Because those worldly people with cognition of another's mind do not know those two dharmas as they truly are, they falsely discriminate the realms of grāhaka and grāhya. This is consciousness-only; its immeasurable and boundless, extremely profound realm cannot be measured by the mind-consciousness. The above is explained according to the Faxiang school. If explained according to the Faxing school, former masters of virtue said: 'Those who know another's mind all know it as it truly is, because they examine the reality of things and perceive the reality of principle. Neither can it be perceived outside the mind, nor is it that there is no object to be known. If the characteristics of self and other are eliminated, then one is of the same single substance as the minds of sentient beings; therefore, there is nothing outside the mind. Because the objective realm is not destroyed, one is capable of knowing.' Furthermore, regarding another's mind, Sthiramati said: 'The Buddha's cognition, in cognizing another's mind, cognizes and reaches the substantive cause; all others merely transform an image. If cognizing the substantive cause meant reaching a dharma outside the mind, it would destroy consciousness-only.' Now, because we subsume objects into mind alone, we do not destroy objects; because grāhaka and grāhya are both obliterated, their subsistence is not obstructed. In ultimate-truth mind-only, they are neither one nor different. At the very moment of cognizing the other, it is precisely oneself. Taking the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind as the cognized object (ālambana), not the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind; taking the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind as the cognizing subject, not the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind. Fused in this manner, they are neither one nor different. If, apart from the Buddha, there were separate sentient beings, one would further need to transform an image, which on the contrary would lose the true meaning of consciousness-only. The explanation says: 'Subsuming objects into mind without destroying objects' indicates the existence or non-existence of mind and objects. Those [who say] reaching the substantive cause feared destroying mind-only; since it does not destroy objects, what harm is there in reaching it, and what fault is there in not destroying it? For one who is without mind is without mind toward the myriad things, yet the myriad things have never been non-existent. The gain in this lies in the spirit's tranquility; the loss lies in considering things empty, meaning that things are truly existent. If mind-only destroys objects, then the gain lies in the emptiness of objects, and the loss lies in the existence of mind. Therefore, because objects are transformed by mind, we speak of mind-only; what is transformed is not non-existent, so why must it be destroyed? If based on conditioned arising having no svabhāva, then both mind and object are obliterated; hence we borrow mind to dispel the object, and when the object is dispelled, mind is obliterated: it is not that mind alone subsists. As for 'because grāhaka and grāhya are both obliterated, their subsistence is not obstructed,' the above non-destruction of objects temporarily dispels the ailment of fearing substantive causes; now, in order to dispel the principles of emptiness and existence, mind and objects are both permitted to subsist and be obliterated. Mind and object are empty because they depend on each other; they exist because they arise in mutual dependence through conditions. Existing is subsistence; being empty is obliteration. Emptiness and existence interpenetrate; subsistence and obliteration are both preserved. Saying 'In ultimate-truth mind-only, they are neither one nor different' directly brings forth the principle of complete-part mind-only. Although the first explanation above possesses the meaning of mind-only, it still pertains to arising-and-ceasing mind-only. Although the second meaning obliterates both without entanglement, it has not yet stated that mind and object subsume each other. Now, clarifying complete-part consciousness-only, it says 'in ultimate-truth mind-only.' Being identical in the ultimate truth, they are not different; not destroying grāhaka and grāhya, they are not one. Because they are not one, there are cognizing subject and cognized object, and the meaning of cognizing the other is established. Because they are not different, cognizing subject and cognized object are equal, and the meaning of mind-only is established. Saying 'at the very moment of cognizing the other, it is precisely oneself' concludes that reaching the substantive cause has no fault of being outside the mind; because it is identical to oneself, consciousness-only is not lost. Saying 'taking the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind' directly demonstrates the characteristics of another's mind in terms of dharmatā. This consists of two pairs of phrases: the former pair clarifies the cognized object, and the latter pair clarifies the cognizing subject. Now, first saying 'the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind' clarifies the cognized object: sentient beings' mind is identical to the Buddha's mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next saying 'not the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind': this phrase clarifies that sentient beings' mind and the Buddha's mind are not identical. Because they are not identical, there is the meaning of a cognized object; because they are not different, the meaning of mind-only is not destroyed. Saying 'as the cognized object' concludes the mental cognizing and excludes it from being the cognizing subject. Next, discerning the cognizing subject, saying 'taking the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind': this phrase clarifies the cognizing subject: the Buddha's mind is identical to the sentient beings' mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next saying 'not the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind': this clarifies that the Buddha's mind and the sentient beings' mind have the meaning of not being one. Because they are not one, it is the cognizing subject; because they are not different, the meaning of consciousness-only is not destroyed. Saying 'as the cognizing subject' concludes the cognizing subject and excludes it from being the cognized object. To further illustrate with an analogy: just as water blends with milk, the milk is what is blended, analogized to the sentient beings' mind being the cognized object; the water is what blends, analogized to the Buddha's mind being the cognizing subject. Because these two are blended together, they are as if of one flavor; yet when the king of geese sips it, the milk is exhausted while the water remains, so one knows they are not one. However, this water is called water identical to milk, and this milk is called milk identical to water. Although the two are identical, they have the meaning of not being one. Therefore, the analogy should say: taking the milk identical to water, not the water identical to milk, as what is blended; taking the water identical to milk, not the milk identical to water, as what blends. The meaning can be understood. Saying 'Fused in this manner, they are neither one nor different' concludes the correct meaning. Saying 'If, apart from the Buddha...' concludes with a critique of Dharmapāla. Saying 'which on the contrary would lose the true meaning of consciousness-only' is because he did not know that the external substantive cause is precisely the Buddha's mind. Furthermore, all Buddha-Tathāgatas, in accordance with the many thoughts and minds, are able to comprehend them instantly with their mental consciousness. As the Diamond Sūtra says: 'As many sentient beings as there are in all those world realms, with their various minds, the Tathāgata knows them all.' A verse in the Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'Having diligently practiced and learned for immeasurable kotis of kalpas, / he attained this unsurpassed bodhi cognition. / How could he not, in a single thought-moment, / skillfully know the minds of all sentient beings?' This is the mind's perfect confrontation: in a single thought-moment, the Tathāgata responds simultaneously and instantaneously to all, with not a single one to which he does not respond; hence it is called 'perfect confrontation.' Only by comprehending that mind is non-mind can one respond universally. If the mind resides in existence or non-existence, then obstruction is formed. Therefore the Diamond Sūtra says: 'All minds spoken of by the Tathāgata are all non-minds; this is called mind.'