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宗鏡錄 66.28

English (machine translation) 66.28

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English

66.28

Answer: The six dusts are not distinct; it is merely that illusory resemblances have differences. These very resemblance-characteristics arise because of deluded clinging. Therefore, both the resemblance and the clinging arise solely from delusion, as in the analogy of the hungry ghost seeing the water of the Gaṅgā as fire, and so forth. This arises merely from one's own citta; externally it is not real existence. It is also said: whenever there is seeing self and seeing other, all are one's own deluded citta manifesting itself, like confusing east for west. Yet the deluded person's 'west' is not apart from the awakened person's 'east'; it is only because the deluded person is deluded that they do not see the awakened person's 'east'. It does not mean that at the place where the deluded one sees west, there is no east. If one were to say that at the place where the deluded one sees west there is no real east, then seeing west would be awakening, not delusion, because without the awakened person's east, there would be nothing to be deluded about. Since we know that what is called 'west' is really east, why would the person be apart from east? Know with confidence that sentient beings are not apart from the Buddha realm, and the Buddha realm is not apart from the realm of sentient beings. It is only because of delusion, blind and foolish, that right before their eyes they do not know how to see it—a profound cause for sorrow! As the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: 'The non-Buddhist Śreṇika said: "Gautama, if there is no self, who sees and who hears?" The Buddha said: "Good son, internally there are the six sense-bases; externally there are the six dusts. When the internal and external unite, the six kinds of consciousness are produced. These six kinds of consciousness acquire their names from causes and conditions. Good son, it is like a single fire: because it depends on wood, it is called a wood fire; because it depends on grass, it is called a grass fire. Sentient beings' manovijñāna is also like this: depending on the eye, depending on visible form, depending on light, and depending on attention, it is named eye-consciousness. Good son, such eye-consciousness is not in the eye, nor even in the attention; when these four things unite, this consciousness is therefore produced. The manovijñāna is also like this. If it is produced due to the union of causes and conditions, the wise should not say that seeing is the self, nor even that touching is the self. Good son, therefore I say that eye-consciousness up to manovijñāna, and all dharmas, are like an illusion. How are they like an illusion? Originally nonexistent, they now exist; having existed, they return to nonexistence. In this way, the internal and external six sense-bases are designated sentient beings, self, person, and man. Apart from the internal and external sense-bases, there are no separate sentient beings, self, person, or man." He also said: "Gautama, as you have said, when the internal and external unite, who produces the sound saying, 'I act, I experience'?" The Buddha said: "Śreṇika, from craving and avidyā as causes and conditions, karma is produced. From karma, existence is produced. From existence, immeasurable mental factors are produced. When citta arises, there are vitarka and vicāra. Vitarka and vicāra move the wind [element]. The wind follows the citta, striking the throat, tongue, teeth, and lips. Sentient beings with inverted thoughts produce sound in speech: 'I act, I experience; I see, I hear.' Good son, it is like a bell at the top of a banner: because of wind as a condition, it produces sound. If the wind is great, the sound is great; if the wind is small, the sound is small. There is no agent."' The Śataśāstra also says: 'If the self were existent, it should be like visible form and so forth, produced from conditions; having been produced, it must certainly return to cessation, and thus it would not be permanent. If it were not produced from conditions, it should be like a rabbit's horn, lacking superior substance and function; how could it be called a self? Moreover, because it ceases from moment to moment, it is not permanent; because it continues in resemblance, it is not severed. In this way, disciples of the Buddha distance themselves from the two extremes, awakening to and entering into dependent origination, abiding in the wondrous middle principle.'

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