Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

宗鏡錄 71.15

English (machine translation) 71.15

Language
English

71.15

Answer: The commentary states: 'It is bearing its own image.' It must be that when the cognizing citta cognizes an object, it bears the object's own image; this phenomenon possessing substance is then an object-condition. As for the rest that do not bear its own image, although they are existent phenomena, they do not serve as object-conditions. Just as when the eye-consciousness cognizes an object, the own-image of form that it bears—this phenomenon possessing substance is the object-condition belonging to the eye-consciousness. The rest that do not bear its own image, although they are existent phenomena, are not object-conditions of the eye-consciousness. As it is with the eye-consciousness, so it is with the other consciousnesses. 'Bearing' and 'own-image' each have two meanings. First, the two meanings of 'bearing': one is grasping-and-bearing (saṃsṛṣṭa-bhāva), in which the cognizing citta immediately cleaves to the substance of the object and cognizes it; second is transforming-and-bearing (pariṇāma-bhāva), in which the cognizing citta transforms and raises up a nimittabhāga and cognizes it. 'Own-image' also has two meanings: first, the image as substantive nature (dravyasvarūpa); second, the image as perceptual form (ākāra). When non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) cognizes tathatā, it cognizes by grasping and bearing the substantive nature, and this is an object-condition; also, the two internal divisions cognizing each other and the self-witnessing [cognizing] the darśanabhāga are grasping-and-bearing. When the darśanabhāga of defiled cittas and caittas, or of pure subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), gives rise to a darśanabhāga to cognize an object, it cognizes by transforming and bearing the perceptual form, and this is an object-condition. That is, if a phenomenon is a condition, and bears its own image, it is an object; possessing both of these meanings is called the meaning of an object-condition. Furthermore, to differentiate phenomena and discern the fruit: first citing Ci'en's interrogation, 'In what does the condition cause arising? What bears its own image?' The commentary answers, 'Citta or associated [factors].' This discerns the fruit of the object-condition. Taking the object as a condition is the cause; the attained cittas and caittas that arise are the fruit. 'Citta' refers to the eight consciousness-kings. 'Or associated [factors]' refers to the fifty-one caittas; because they are undetermined—some arising and some not arising—it says 'or'. Thus it excludes and does not establish matter (rūpa), the unassociated (viprayukta-saṃskāra), the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), and so forth, as object-conditions, for they are not mental phenomena and have no cognitive deliberation.

Linked texts (1)