宗鏡錄 84.2

84.2

Now, that the deluded mind is illusory and provisional is equally deduced by all the sages. Because this attachment is stubborn and solid, one must cite [the teachings] in detail. Furthermore, according to the sūtras and treatises, there are three kinds of provisionality: First is the provisionality of causal formation: depending on confrontation with an objective realm beforehand, the mind then arises. Second is the provisionality of continuity: the initial thought arises dependent on the realm, subsequent discriminations arise, thought-moment by thought-moment in unbroken succession, until an affair is accomplished. Third is the provisionality of relativity: as in speaking of the mind having arising in contrast to the unarisen nature of empty space; or positing an existent mind in contrast to a non-existent mind, like short relative to long, or near relative to far. These three are not real, hence they are called provisional. Therefore, mutually different characteristics do not exist in one another. As a verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "In difference there is no characteristic of difference; nor is there one in non-difference. Because there is no characteristic of difference, there is no difference between this and that." For instance, long differs from short: within long there is no characteristic of short; long has nothing to contrast with, so there is no long. Within short there is no characteristic of long; short has nothing to contrast with, so there is no short. Within long there is no characteristic of long; short has nothing to contrast with, so there is no short. Within short there is no characteristic of short; long has nothing to contrast with, so there is no long. Since neither long nor short exists, who speaks of difference? Furthermore, the Śataśāstra says: "If there were really a characteristic of long, it would either exist in the long, or exist in the short, or exist in both together; all of these are unfindable. Why? Within the long there is no characteristic of long, because it is caused by the other—because it is long caused by the short. Within the short there is also no characteristic of long, because their natures are mutually contradictory. If there were long within the short, it would not be called short. Nor is there long within both together, because both have faults. Since the characteristic of long does not exist, the characteristic of short is likewise. If there is neither long nor short, how can they be relative to one another?" Therefore, refuting difference is called "non-difference"; it does not mean there is difference or non-difference. This doubly extinguishes [extremes] to tally with nature. If analyzed in terms of "dual manifestation": the above merely manifested reality, which is purely nature and not difference; now both nature and characteristics are complete, hence it is called "dual manifestation." That is, because substance is one, it is not different; because characteristics are differentiated, it is not non-different. This raises both affirmations to manifest both negations. This is precisely neither one nor different, yet both one and different; refutation and illumination are unhindered, nature and characteristics interpenetrate. Long and short being so, the myriad phenomena are all likewise. If one uses the initial mind to refute these three provisionalities, a single thought is unarisen, and one gains entry into the contemplation of emptiness. Contemplation of emptiness is the root of all contemplations. From this, one next enters the contemplation of the provisional: through being unable to grasp the provisional, one enters emptiness; again, through being unable to grasp emptiness, one enters the provisional. Being neither empty nor provisional, one subsequently enters the contemplation of the middle, up to transcending contemplation. Therefore, the Śamatha-vipaśyanā broadly refutes [it]: examining by the four propositions, it is unfindable; deducing horizontally and vertically, there is no arising; nature and characteristics are both empty, and names and words are also tranquil. If an arising thought-moment contains these three provisionalities, one should contemplate this single thought-moment: If the mind arises from itself: the preceding thought-moment is the faculty, and the subsequent thought-moment is consciousness; does the mind arise from the faculty, or does the mind arise from consciousness? If the faculty can produce consciousness: does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness, or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness? If the faculty had consciousness, then faculty and consciousness would coexist simultaneously, and furthermore there would be no producer and produced. If the faculty lacked consciousness yet could produce consciousness, all things without consciousness cannot produce consciousness; since the faculty lacks consciousness, how could it produce consciousness? If [one argues that] although the faculty lacks consciousness, it possesses the nature of consciousness and thus can produce consciousness: does this nature of consciousness exist or not exist? If it exists, it is already consciousness, coexisting in the faculty; why call it a nature? If the faculty lacks the nature of consciousness, it cannot produce consciousness. Furthermore, are the nature of consciousness and consciousness one or different? If one, the nature is consciousness itself, without producer or produced. If different, it is still arising from another, not the mind arising from itself. If one says that the mind does not arise from itself, but that dust arrives to arouse the mind and thus the mind arises, citing the sūtra: "With conditions, thought arises; without conditions, thought does not arise"—if so, the dust is outside the mind and comes to arouse internal consciousness, then the mind arises from another. Now deduce this dust: does it produce mind because it is mind, or does it produce mind because it is not mind? If the dust were mind, it would not be called dust, nor would it be outside the mind, and so it would be the same as arising from self; moreover, two minds would coexist, so there would be no producer and produced. If the dust is not mind, how could it produce mind? As refuted above. If there is a productive nature within dust and therefore it produces mind: does this nature exist or not exist? If the nature exists, the nature and dust coexist, and likewise there is no producer and produced. If it does not exist, non-existence cannot produce. If mind arises because faculty and dust combine: does the combination produce mind because faculty and dust each have mind, or does the combination produce mind because they each lack mind? If they each had mind, then when combined two minds would arise, falling into "nature of another." If they each lacked it, when combined it would also not exist. Furthermore, if faculty and dust each have the nature of mind and upon combining the mind arises: one should examine this nature, whether it exists or not, as refuted before. If mind exists through faculty and dust being separate: this is arising without cause and condition; does this separation exist, or does this separation not exist? If this separation exists, it still arises from conditions; how can it be called separation? If this separation does not exist, how can non-existence produce? If one says that this separation has a productive nature: does it exist or not exist? If the nature exists, it still arises from conditions and is not called separation. If the nature does not exist, how can non-existence produce? Deductions through such four propositions reveal that mind is ultimately unarisen. This is called the contemplation of entering emptiness from the provisional. If one does not awaken, one turns to enter the provisionality of continuity to refute it. Why? Although through the provisionality of causal formation the mind's arising is unfindable under the fourfold refutation, now one manifestly sees the mind arising and ceasing thought-moment by thought-moment in unbroken succession; how could it be unarisen? Regarding these thought-moments: does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment ceases, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment does not cease, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment both ceases and does not cease, or does the subsequent thought-moment arise when the preceding thought-moment neither ceases nor does not cease? If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment does not cease, then a thought-moment produces a thought-moment by itself, two arisings coexist, and there is also no producer and produced. If the preceding thought-moment has a productive nature that produces the subsequent thought-moment: does this nature exist or not exist? If it exists, it is not a nature; if it does not exist, it does not produce, as refuted before. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment ceases: non-ceasing producing is called self-nature; now, producing due to cessation—when non-ceasing is viewed in contrast to cessation, is it not the nature of another? Within the cessation of the nature of another, does it arise because there is arising, or does it arise because there is no arising? If there is arising, that is arising; arising and cessation are mutually contradictory, and furthermore if arising produces arising, why speak of cessation producing? If cessation has no arising, how can non-existence produce? If cessation has a productive nature, this nature is refuted as before. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment both ceases and does not cease: what ceases already belongs to cessation, and what does not cease already belongs to non-cessation. If non-cessation combined with cessation can produce, that is production from both; both are mutually contradictory, and how can contradictory things produce? Furthermore, if each has production, there are two faults; if each has no production, combined they also do not produce. If there is a productive nature within both cessation and non-cessation: does it exist or not exist? If the nature definitely exists, why speak of cessation and non-cessation? If the nature definitely does not exist, why speak of cessation and non-cessation? This does not avoid the fault of annihilation or permanence, and falls back into the fault of both. If the subsequent thought-moment arises when the preceding thought-moment neither ceases nor does not cease: does this neither-cessation-nor-non-cessation exist or not exist? If it exists, it is not causeless. If it does not exist, a causeless non-existence cannot produce. If causelessness has a productive nature, this nature is itself a cause; why call it causeless? If it does not exist, non-existence cannot produce. Deductions through such four propositions in search of the mind in the provisionality of continuity find nothing; there are no four real natures, but merely the name "mind." This word abides neither inside, outside, nor between the two; it does not eternally exist by itself. Continuity lacking nature is the refutation of nature in conventional truth, called emptiness of nature. Continuity lacking name is the refutation of the provisional in ultimate truth, called emptiness of characteristics. Nature and characteristics are both empty, extending to the formation of the eighteen emptinesses. If one cannot enter, one still posits an existent mind in contrast to a non-existent mind, and the delusion of relativity arises. This differs from the above. The provisionality of causal formation takes the two dharmas of faculty and dust combining as the cause. The provisionality of continuity vertically takes the mental faculty's before and after as continuity, vertically contemplating arising and cessation; this is distinct cessation, and distinct cessation is narrow. Now, the provisionality of relativity contrasts with universal cessation, so this meaning is broad. As for universal cessation: like the three unconditioned states, they are not altogether cessation, yet they can be unarisen. Speaking of the arising of mind in contrast to the unarisen state of empty space is precisely the provisionality of relativity. Now examine this mind: does the mind arise in contrast to the unarisen, does the mind arise in contrast to the existent, does the mind arise in contrast to both arising and unarisen, or does the mind arise in contrast to neither arising nor unarisen? If the mind arises in contrast to the unarisen: does this unarisen exist, or does this unarisen not exist? If there is an arising to be contrasted with, it is still contrasting with existence; why speak of contrasting with non-existence? Existence contrasting with existence is arising from self. If this unarisen does not exist, what does non-existence contrast with? If the mind arises merely by contrasting with this non-existent non-existence, all non-existent non-existences should also produce mind; non-existence viewed in contrast to existence means non-existence is arising from another. Furthermore, although the unarisen does not exist, if there is a productive nature, and through contrasting with this nature one knows there is mind: is this nature already arisen or not yet arisen? If already arisen, arising is just arising; why call it a nature? If the nature has not yet arisen, how can what has not yet arisen produce? If the mind arises in contrast to arising: arising again contrasts with arising, just as long should contrast with long; since there is no such principle, why contrast with arising to produce mind? If mind arises because of contrasting with both arising and the unarisen, like obtaining long by contrasting with short: this falls into two faults; if each exists, two arisings coexist; if each lacks it, arising is completely unfindable, as refuted before. If mind arises in contrast to neither arising nor the unarisen: the treatise says, arising from causes and conditions is still unfindable, how much more so without causes and conditions? Furthermore, does this causelessness exist or not exist? If it exists, it still contrasts with existence; if it does not exist, it still contrasts with non-existence; why call it causeless? If one says there is a nature: does the nature exist or not exist? If the nature exists, is it arisen or not arisen? If arisen, it is already arising; why call it a nature? If not arisen, how can it produce? Deductions through such four propositions in search of mind in the provisionality of relativity find nothing; no real nature arises, there is merely a name. The arising of a name, as soon as it arises, is unarisen. Furthermore, seeking aggregates, sense bases, and elements within nature and characteristics is unfindable, which is emptiness of dharmas. Seeking person, self, knower, and seer within nature and characteristics is unfindable, which is called emptiness of sentient beings, extending to the eighteen emptinesses and so forth. The Fuxing ji explains the refutation of arising from self under the provisionality of causal formation, saying: 'The preceding thought-moment is the faculty, and the subsequent thought-moment is consciousness': the faculty has no separate substance, but still refers to the immediately preceding cessation of mind as its substance. The faculty is called the producer; due to the cessation of the preceding mind, the subsequent mental consciousness is produced. Thus the Kośa says: 'Because the collection of the six consciousnesses immediately ceasing constitutes the mind.' 'Collection' means substance. At the moment of immediately preceding cessation, it serves as the substance of the mental faculty. At that time, the five consciousnesses also rely on the immediately ceasing mind as their immediate condition, and employ the five material faculties as their remote conditions, thus producing the five consciousnesses. When the five consciousnesses are immediate and discrimination arises, that is called mental consciousness. Now, the meaning of this text is not the five consciousnesses, but the sixth consciousness, which, taking existent views as mental objects, is then called consciousness. It is precisely this consciousness that is examined and interrogated against the faculty; hence it says: 'Does the faculty produce consciousness because it has consciousness, or does the faculty produce consciousness because it lacks consciousness?'