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宗鏡錄 84.22

English (machine translation) 84.22

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English

84.22

Answer: True and false, inner and outer, are distinguished only in terms of worldly words. Therefore, citta is neither inner nor outer, yet inner and outer are citta. The substance is neither true nor false, yet true and false are the substance. Relying on the inner, the outer is established, thereby forming antidotes; provisionally using the false, the true is revealed—this is not without reason. The Sūtra on the Expedients for Progressing Toward the Mahāyāna says: 'The meaning of citta has two kinds of characteristics: the first is the internal characteristic of citta, and the second is the external characteristic of citta. The internal characteristic is twofold again: first, the true; second, the false. That which is called "the true" refers to the fundamental characteristic of the substance of citta: such-like and undifferentiated, pure and perfect, unimpeded and unhindered, subtle, secret, and difficult to see; because it pervades all places and is constantly imperishable, establishing and generating all dharmas. That which is called "the false" refers to the arising of thoughts and discrimination, perception, objectifying cogitation, recollection, and such matters; although continuous and capable of producing all various objects, inside it is illusory and untrue, devoid of reality and invisible. That which is called "the external characteristic of citta" refers to all dharmas, various objects, and so forth: wherever there is thought, objects appear before one. Hence one knows that there is an internal citta and distinctions within the internal citta. Thus one should know that internal conceptualization serves as the cause and the substance, while external conceptualization serves as the effect and the function. Based on such meanings, therefore I say that all dharmas are called citta. Furthermore, one should know that the external characteristics of citta are like the various objects seen in a dream: they are made solely by mental imagination, with no real external matters. All objects are likewise so, because they are all seen in the dream of the consciousness of avidyā and made by conceptualization. Furthermore, one should know that because the internal citta does not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, all objects seen and cognized also do not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment in accordance with citta. This is the so-called: "Because citta arises, various dharmas arise; because citta ceases, various dharmas cease." Yet the characteristics of arising and ceasing have only names and are truly unobtainable. For citta does not go out to objects, nor do objects come into citta; like an image in a mirror, there is neither coming nor going. Therefore, seeking determined characteristics of arising and ceasing among all dharmas is completely unobtainable. This means that all dharmas are ultimately devoid of substance, originally constantly empty, and truly neither arise nor cease. When all dharmas are thus truly unarisen and unceasing, there are no differentiated characteristics of any objects; tranquil and of a single flavor, it is called tathatā, the supreme truth, the intrinsically pure citta. That intrinsically pure citta is clear and perfect, because it is devoid of conceptual characteristics. Being devoid of conceptual characteristics, it is nowhere absent in all places; being nowhere absent, it is able to support and establish all dharmas.' Hence a verse in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: 'Just as gold and the color of gold / Have no difference in their nature, / So it is with dharmas and non-dharmas: / Their essential nature has no difference.' It also says: 'The equality of kṣetras does not conflict with the equality of sentient beings; the equality of sentient beings does not conflict with the equality of kṣetras. The equality of all sentient beings does not conflict with the equality of all dharmas; the equality of all dharmas does not conflict with the equality of all sentient beings. The equality of the limit of detachment from desire does not conflict with the equality of the stable abiding of all sentient beings; the equality of the stable abiding of all sentient beings does not conflict with the equality of the limit of detachment from desire. The past does not conflict with the future; the future does not conflict with the past. The past and future do not conflict with the present; the present does not conflict with the past and future. The equality of the world does not conflict with the equality of the Buddha; the equality of the Buddha does not conflict with the equality of the world. Bodhisattva practice does not conflict with all-knowledge; all-knowledge does not conflict with bodhisattva practice.' Explanation: How are kṣetras and sentient beings equal? Because they each lack substance, none of them is established [as real]. If viewed within their own class, it is like kṣetras viewed with kṣetras being equal; if viewed across different classes, it is like kṣetras viewed with sentient beings being equal. By the principle of a single naturelessness, extending to citta and objects, self and other, sameness and difference, high and low, the ten directions and the three times—all are entirely equal. Furthermore, phenomenon and phenomenon do not conflict; principle and principle do not conflict. That phenomenon and phenomenon do not conflict has briefly three causes: first, the interpenetration of the dharmatā; second, the approach of mutual dependency through dependent origination—these two are the meaning of the non-obstruction of phenomena and phenomena. Third, speaking directly of the same single condition, which penetrates both phenomena and principle: just as observing a single leaf fall, one knows that throughout the world it is the same autumn. Because unruined phenomena and unchanging nature both share the same single dependent origination. That principle and principle do not conflict also has two approaches: first, the naturelessness of kṣetras is identical to the naturelessness of sentient beings; second, because principle is identical, there is nothing to identify with and nothing to conflict with.

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