宗鏡錄 84.4

84.4

Answer: There are two senses: first, moment-by-moment ceasing; second, moment-by-moment arising. Because these two exist, from cessation arising is attained. Fearing the arising of the nihilistic view, this must therefore be posited. Now, in order to refute it, it must therefore be interrogated. Although arising and ceasing are different, both sense-faculty and consciousness are one's own mind. Arising from faculty or arising from consciousness both belong to self-nature. Within self-nature, mutually interrogating faculty and consciousness, they cannot be found. Furthermore, mind and consciousness are both posited as 'mind' in relation to dust [objects]. If the faculty possesses consciousness, there are two flaws: namely, the co-occurrence of faculty and consciousness, and the co-occurrence of agent and object, which entails the fault of endless generation after generation. If there is no agent and object, the meaning of generation is not established; how could one speak of generation? Furthermore, only immediate cessation is called generating consciousness; if the faculty possesses consciousness, arising and ceasing are mutually contradictory, hence both entail error. If the faculty lacks consciousness, it is assimilated to that which lacks consciousness, [yet is supposed to] be able to generate consciousness. Furthermore, interrogating whether it has the nature of consciousness—this is a concessive refutation: if it is existent, it still matches existence, likewise resulting in concurrent arising; if it is non-existent, it still matches non-existence, identical to arising from insentient things. Furthermore, interrogating the nature of consciousness as one or different: if it is one, whenever one speaks of 'nature', it can only generate afterwards; since consciousness and its nature are one, there is no agent and object. If it is different, if it is different from consciousness, it is identical to external objects; if an object can generate consciousness, it is identical to other—how can it be considered self? Next, refuting other-nature: although one says that the mind does not arise from itself, but that external dust comes to stimulate the mind, dust in relation to the faculty is called 'other'. First interrogating whether this is mind, there are three flaws: first, the flaw that dust is not mind, so that mind is not called dust; second, the flaw that dust is not thought-organ, [which] externally matches self-arising; third, the flaw of concurrent arising. If dust is not mind, one may allow dust to generate [mind]; if dust is mind, it turns out that mind generates mind in the locus of mind, which is called concurrent arising. If a seed generates a sprout, then there is agent and object; if a seed again generates a seed, then two seeds arise concurrently—what agent and object could there be? If dust is not mind, then it is identical to the previous meaning in the faculty lacking consciousness, and interrogating the thought-organ is also like this; hence it is said to be refuted as before. That dust has the nature of consciousness can be understood by analogy with the above. Refuting arising from both: falling into self-nature and other-nature is called arising from both. Now it is refuted: if self and other each lack arising, their combination also lacks [arising], just as two [grains of] sand lack oil, and their combination also lacks it. Refuting uncaused arising is also like this. Concluding into the two emptinesses of nature and characteristics: merely lacking the attachment to nature is called emptiness of nature. Once nature is refuted, there are only the internal and external characteristics of form and mind; since they do not abide in the four propositions of non-existence, characteristics are also unobtainable, called emptiness of characteristics. That it is not within, without, or in between means: within is merely the cause, without is merely the condition, and in between is both; that which is constantly self-existent is merely uncaused. Because these attachments are absent, there are no four natures. As for these two emptinesses, although spoken of before and after, the meaning is not at different times. Further, through the two truths they are concluded into the two emptinesses: if there is grasping at nature, it is worldly but not a truth; once grasping at nature is refuted, it is called the conventional truth. Hence it is said that the conventional truth refutes nature. Once grasping at nature is refuted, there are only names, which are called conventional designation; designation is characteristic. In order to empty characteristics, one contemplates dharmatā; contemplating principle and realizing the real is called the ultimate truth refuting characteristics. Emptiness is not before and after; the two truths are simultaneous. It is only to distinguish nature and characteristics that they are spoken of sequentially. Furthermore, there are the four phases of mind: first, not yet moving; second, about to move; third, presently moving; fourth, having moved. Fu Dashi's verse says: / Acting alone, / I ask what is attached in my mind? / Examining the four phases, all are unarisen; / How could a thousand entanglements and ten thousand burdens bind me? / Explanation: The two phases of mind, not yet arisen and about to arise, belong to the future; where in the future is there a mind? The one phase of mind presently arising belongs to the present; since the present does not abide, where is there a mind? Moreover, it belongs to the time of arising: because of the unarisen and the already arisen, the time of arising is posited; since the unarisen and the already arisen are both without arising, the time of arising is also without arising, just as with the already gone, the not yet gone, and the time of going, all lack the dharma of going, as refuted in the Madhyamakaśāstra. The one phase of mind that has already arisen belongs to the past; since the past has already passed away, where is there a mind? Therefore the Diamond Sūtra says: 'The past mind cannot be obtained, the future mind cannot be obtained, and the present mind cannot be obtained.' Since the three periods of time are all empty, how could the one mind exist? Because the fundamental mind that is the locus of reliance does not even exist, how could all the myriad dharmas that are the branch-and-leaf reliers be real? Hence it is said: 'How could a thousand entanglements and ten thousand burdens bind me?' Thus one knows that by merely understanding that one thought is empty, the various dust objects are naturally broken down. Since that which is relied upon does not exist, how could the relier be produced? It is like the source being exhausted and the stream drying up, or the root being endangered and the leaves withering. Therefore Ānanda grasped at seven locations without foundation, from which we know that false doctrines are hard to sustain; the Second Patriarch sought [mind] directly without it arising, which proves that only by understanding emptiness does one awaken. The broad summary of patriarchs and buddhas points only to this source. Since the mind that can arise is unobtainable, the realm that is generated is also unobtainable. Because mind cannot be obtained, the self is eliminated; because the realm cannot be obtained, dharmas perish. If one can make both person and dharmas empty, the marvelous principle of the one mind is revealed. Only because mind and dust confront each other are the myriad dharmas crisscrossing; when realm and wisdom are as one, the thousand distinctions suddenly fall silent. Only in this way can one open up and awaken to the true mind of original enlightenment and spiritual wisdom, without abiding and without reliance, pervading the dharmadhātu. The Guǎng bǎilùn says: 'The sūtra says: Not the slightest dharma with self-nature can be obtained; there is only that which can construct, and that which can construct is mind and mental factors.' It also says: 'The three realms are only mind.' Sūtras such as these are limitless in number. Therefore, that all dharmas are established by the principle of consciousness-only—how could it not be certain? Grasping that all dharmas truly are only consciousness is also an inversion. Since the realm does not exist, how could consciousness exist? When the sūtra speaks of consciousness-only, it is to cause one to contemplate consciousness and abandon those external dusts. Once external dusts are abandoned, the deluded mind accordingly ceases. Because the deluded mind ceases, one realizes and meets the middle way. Hence a sūtra verse says: / Not understanding that the realm is only mind, / One generates diverse conceptualizations; / Having understood that the realm is only mind, / Conceptualizations do not arise. / If one knows that the realm is only mind, / One then abandons the characteristics of external dust; / From this, conceptualizations cease, / And one awakens to equal, true emptiness.