宗鏡錄 89.29

89.29

Answer: They are neither identical nor distinct, neither existent nor non-existent, but merely manifested according to one's own mind in response to karmic causes. Master An said: 'The two lands, the pure and the defiled, are differentiated by four propositions: 1. A single substance is not established, for pure and defiled wax and wane. 2. Distinct substances are not established, for the one principle is completely equal. 3. Having no substance is not established, for conditioned arising [produces] myriad forms. 4. Having a substance is not established, for when one searches for their origin, it is dark and quiescent.' Therefore, a verse of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'Not knowing that it is solely a manifestation of mind, / they consequently divide it into two views; / if one truly knows only mind, / discrimination will not arise.' A verse of the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: 'This mind has two natures, / like a mirror holding manifold images, / or like water manifesting the moon. / One with cataracts sees hair-nets, / hair-nets, necklaces, and pearls; / none of these exist at all, / but merely appear like this / from eyes diseased with cataracts. / Bottles and garments are one's own consciousness; / sentient beings are likewise so. / Falsely clinging to self and person, / not knowing, they constantly grasp. / Sentient beings, bottles, and the like, / various shapes and forms, / though differing as internal and external, / all arise from the mind. / Relying on the ālayavijñāna, / which holds all seeds, / mind appears as objective realms; / therefore the world is spoken of. / The world is not made by a creator, / by karma, or by minute atoms; / it is only the ālaya / that transforms and appears like objective realms.' Qingliang's Commentary says: 'These four propositions distinguishing the two lands, pure and defiled, above are an exclusive refutation of errors. In reality, they are both distinct and identical, both existent and non-existent. If they mutually contrast and negate each other, then identity and difference are both abandoned, and existence and non-existence are both quiescent. If they are completely interfused without obstruction, then they are both one and many, both non-existent and existent. Existence is the existence of non-existence; non-existence is the non-existence of existence. The many is the many that is identical to the one; the one is the one that is identical to the many. Existence and non-existence constitute the non-obstruction of phenomenon and principle; the one and the many further constitute the non-obstruction of phenomenon and phenomenon. Because of this manifold layering, in the lands of the Huayan treasury, the dharmadhātu is seen in each and every particle of dust. Furthermore, the non-duality of the dependent and primary [retributions] is completely interfused in four propositions: 1. The Buddha's body is itself the land, because the Buddha's substance is precisely the Dharma-nature land. Casting aside the other to follow oneself, the Buddha's substance is empty, so outside the land there is no Buddha, because the Dharma-nature is non-dual. 2. The land is itself the Buddha's body, because the land's substance is precisely the Dharma-nature body. Casting aside oneself to follow the other, the land's substance is empty, so outside the Buddha there is no dharma, because the nature is non-dual. Because the nature is non-dual, the nature interfuses with characteristics, so the body and the land are mutually identical. 3. Both, meaning there is both body and land, because characteristics are not destroyed. If there were no body and land, there would be nothing to be mutually identical. 4. Annihilation of both, meaning because the Buddha is the land, he is not the Buddha; because the land is the Buddha, it is not the land, as they mutually negate each other.'