弘明集 12.75

12.75

You also say: “The teachings of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius remedied acute corruptions, hence they were restricted to a single lifetime and did not open up the path of myriad kalpas.” Now, transforming [people] through the miraculous and extraordinary makes a teaching easy to propagate, unlike exhorting with benevolence and righteousness, which is thoroughly restricted to human affairs. This is why the likes of the bewitched Yellow Turban rebels gathered like clouds. If this were the genuine truth and so easy to practice, for what reason would the sages have abandoned the easy, real Dao to engage in secondary matters that are difficult to practice? That this is not so is abundantly clear. Converting and teaching strange customs relies upon expedient salvation through extravagant, baseless talk; its purport can well be known. You also say: “The respect between ruler and subject finds its rationale fully in the teaching of names. Since śramaṇas do not serve kings and nobles as subjects, respect is abolished along with it.” Why should that be so? As for the principle of respect, it was stated in detail in my previous letter. The respect between ruler and subject is entirely born of what is natural; its principle is deeply rooted in the fundamental sentiments—how could it be merely a matter of the teaching of names? The previous treatise already said: “The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is called life; the continuity of life lies with the ruler.” If that which gives continuity resides in him, how could it not be revered by nature itself? You also say: “Those who cultivate the Dao must rely upon meritorious practice. The accumulation of practice is the pivot of future lifetimes. When directing one's mind toward the ultimate origin, one's respect cannot be discarded; though one bows and prostrates for accumulated kalpas, it is not a matter of thanking for favors.” Allow me to take up your stated intent and use it to present a challenge. According to your letter, respect is the foremost among practices; this is to prize respect heavily. As for meritorious practice, one ought to calculate the labor of one's achievement; how could one merely revere and admire Śākyamuni and claim that nothing surpasses this? That no favors are to be thanked is something the enlightened do not doubt, but because the root of the principle is exceedingly deep, the respect of natural feeling cannot be dispensed with. How could a minister's respect for a ruler merely be to thank him for favors?