廣弘明集 8.52

8.52

I answer: Those of rustic vulgarity cannot discuss the Great Way because they are stagnated in physical forms; petty men cannot debate the supreme principle because they are constrained by names. Now, Mencius regarded the sage as 'he who is first enlightened'. Among sages, could the supreme one ever surpass the Buddha? Therefore, translators of sūtras rendered 'buddha' as 'awakened' (enlightened). Awakening has three kinds: self-awakening, awakening others, and fully perfected awakening. How could Mencius's single argument encompass these three? As for bodhi, the Dà zhìdù lùn states: 'Unsurpassed wisdom, where the light of wisdom is subtly efficacious and pervasive.' Its meaning was translated as 'Way' (dào). Though the name 'Way' is identical, the meaning of the Way is entirely different. Why is this? If we discuss the Confucian lineage, the name 'Way' extends to both great and small: the Analects says, 'Even in minor Ways, there must be something worth viewing, but if pursued too far there is fear of becoming mired.' If we discuss Buddhist scriptures, the name 'Way' extends to both heterodox and orthodox: the sūtra says, 'The ninety-six [schools] are all named Ways.' Listening to the name, true and false cannot be distinguished; verifying their teachings, heterodoxy and orthodoxy naturally become distinct. The Great Way of bodhi takes the perfection of wisdom as its essence; Laozi's Way takes empty void as its manifestation. Essence and function being so vastly disparate, one certainly cannot correspond to the other. In non-Buddhist texts, 'asaṃskṛta' (wuwei) takes the cessation of affairs as its meaning; in inner scriptures, 'asaṃskṛta' means being free from the activities of the three characteristics [of conditioned phenomena]. The names are identical, but the realities are different; they were never alike from the start. Hence we know that borrowing terms of this land to translate the principles of that realm is merely lodging words to speak of reality—what doubt could there be? In accordance with this principle, Confucius and Laozi are not buddhas. How do we know this is so? Formerly, the Grand Steward of Shang asked Confucius, saying, 'Is the master a sage?' He replied, 'Qiu has broad knowledge and a strong memory; I am not a sage.' He asked again, 'Were the Three Kings sages?' He replied, 'The Three Kings were good at employing wisdom and courage; whether they were sages is not known to Qiu.' He asked again, 'Were the Five Emperors sages?' He replied, 'The Five Emperors were good at employing benevolence and trustworthiness; whether they were sages is not known to Qiu.' (He asked again, 'Were the Three Sovereigns sages?' He replied, 'The Three Sovereigns were good at employing timeliness; whether they were sages is not known to Qiu.' The Grand Steward was greatly astonished and said, 'If so, then) who is a sage?' Confucius showed a solemn expression, paused awhile, and said, 'Among the people of the Western regions there is a sage. He does not govern, yet there is no disorder; he does not speak, yet he is spontaneously trusted; he does not transform, yet [the Way] is spontaneously practiced. Vast and boundlessly expansive! The people are unable to find a name for him.' If Laozi were truly a sage, why did Confucius not say so? Examining it in this light, reason dictates that it must refer to the Buddha. (The Laozi Xisheng jing says, 'Among the supreme arts of the world, the Buddha's art is foremost.' Also, the Xisheng xuanjing says, 'My master's transformation derived from Tianzhu; he skillfully entered nirvāṇa.' Furthermore, the Fuzi states, 'The master of Laozi was named Śākyamuni.' Directly consulting Daoist texts, they all take the Buddha as master.)