集沙門不應拜俗等事 1.38

1.38

二難　省示猶復。未釋所疑。因來告復粗有其難。夫情敬之理。豈容有二。皆是自內以及外耳。既入於有情之境則不可得無也。若如來言。王者同之造化。未有謝惠於所稟措感於理本。是為功玄理深莫此之大也。則佛之為化。復何以過茲。而來論云。津塗既殊則義無降屈。宗致既同則長幼成序。資通有係則事與心應。若理在己本德深居極。豈得云津塗之異而云降屈耶。宗致為是何耶。若以學業為宗致者。則學之所學。故是發其自然之性耳。苟自然有在所由而稟。則自然之本居可知矣。資通之悟。更是發鎣其末耳。事與心應。何得在此而不在彼　又云。周孔之化救其甚弊。故盡於一生而不開萬劫之塗。夫以神奇為化則其教易行。異於督以仁義盡於人事也。是以黃巾妖惑之徒。皆赴者如雲。若此為實理。行之又易。聖人何緣捨所易之實道。而為難行之末事哉。其不然也。亦以明矣。將以化教殊俗。理在權濟。恢誕之談。其趣可知　又云。君臣之敬理盡名教。今沙門既不臣王侯。故敬與之廢。何為其然。夫敬之為理。上紙言之詳矣。君臣之敬。皆是自然之所生。理篤於情本。豈是名教之事耶。前論已云。天地之大德曰生。通生理物存乎王者。苟所通在斯。何得非自然之所重哉　又云。造道之倫必資功行。積行之所因。來世之關鍵也。擬心宗極不可替其敬。雖俯仰累劫而非謝惠之謂。請復就來旨而借以為難。如來告。以敬為行首。是敦敬之重也。功行者當計其為功之勞耳。何得直以珍仰釋迦而云莫尚於此耶。惠無所謝。達者所不惑。但理根深極情敬不可得無耳。臣之敬君。豈謝惠者耶。

Second Objection:

Having examined your reply, my doubts remain unresolved. Following upon your letter, I roughly state my objections again. In the principle of sentiment and reverence, how could there be two different standards? Both arise from within and extend outward. Once one has entered the realm of sentient beings, they cannot be absent. If, as you say, the sovereign is equal to the Creation, and no one has ever thanked the source for the gifts bestowed or directed their gratitude to the root of principle, this means that his merit is mysterious and his principle profound, with none greater than this. How then could the Buddha's transformation surpass it? Yet your discourse says: "Because their paths are different, in principle there is no lowering or yielding. Their shared purpose being identical, seniors and juniors are properly ordered; and because their transmission and advancement are tied together, their actions correspond to their minds." If principle resides in one's own root, and profound virtue abides in the ultimate, how can one speak of a difference in paths and call it lowering or yielding? What is this shared purpose? If study and practice are taken as the shared purpose, then that which is studied only brings forth one's spontaneous nature. If the spontaneous nature has a source from which it is received, then the root of this spontaneity can be readily known. The realization gained from instruction and advancement merely burnishes its branches. If actions correspond to minds, how could this apply here but not there?

Furthermore, you say that the transformations of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius remedied acute decline, hence being exhausted in a single lifetime without opening up the path of myriad kalpas. Now, when transformation is conducted through the miraculous and marvelous, the teachings are easy to practice, unlike urging through benevolence and righteousness and exhausting human affairs. This is why practitioners of Yellow Turban delusions gathered like clouds. If this were the true principle and also easy to practice, why would the sages abandon the true way that is easy, to engage in the non-essential affairs that are difficult to practice? That this is not so is also quite clear. It must be that teachings are adapted to different customs, and their principle lies in expedient salvation; the purport of these extravagant assertions can easily be grasped.

Furthermore, you say that the reverence between ruler and minister is fully encompassed by the Teaching of Names, and now that śramaṇas do not serve kings and lords as subjects, reverence toward them is accordingly abrogated. Why should this be so? The principle of reverence has already been detailed in my previous letter. Reverence between ruler and minister is naturally generated; its principle is rooted in the source of human feeling—how could it be a mere contrivance of the Teaching of Names? My former discourse already stated: "The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is called life." Sustaining life and ordering all things rests with the sovereign. If what sustains life lies here, how could it not be honored by nature?

Furthermore, you say that those who cultivate the Way must rely on practice and merit, that it is the basis of accumulating practice and the key to future lives; that directing one's mind to the supreme ultimate, one must not neglect reverence toward it; and that though bowing down through repeated kalpas, this cannot be called merely repaying kindness. Let me draw upon your own words to raise an objection. According to your letter, taking reverence as the foremost practice is the height of esteeming reverence. But practice and merit should be calculated by the toil of performing them; how can you simply value and admire Śākyamuni and say nothing surpasses this? That kindness is not thanked is understood by the perceptive; it is simply that the root of principle is profound and ultimate, so sentiment and reverence cannot be absent. When ministers revere their ruler, is it merely to thank him for kindness?