御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 1.8.4

1.8.4

由此應說於大乘中宗分有二。 一勝義皆空宗。 二應理圓實宗。 初宗即是龍猛菩薩。 下至清辯論師。 依無相教。 說勝義中一切皆空。 世俗是有。 掌珍。 頌云。 真性有為空如幻緣生故無為無有實不起似空花。 乃至不立三性。 唯識等後宗。 即是慈氏如來。 乃至護法菩薩。 依深密等顯了言教。 說勝義諦。 非空非不空。 辯中邊論慈尊頌云。 虛妄分別有於此二都無此中唯有空於彼亦有此故說一切法非空非不空。 有無及有故。 是則契中道。 三性之中。 遍計性無依圓。 是故有二宗別。 問。 所言勝義及世俗諦。 其相如何。 答。 還依二宗。 所說有異。 且勝空宗真勝義諦一切都空。 世俗諦中。 可有色心修斷等。 法如經說云。 凡所有相。 皆是虛妄。 此世俗諦。 諸相非相則見如來。 此勝義諦。 四生三界。 所有眾生。 是世俗諦。 實無眾生得滅度者。 是勝義諦。 應理宗說。 真俗二諦。 二義不同。 一依人辯諦。 二約法辯諦。 二種二諦。 俱通空有。 且依人者。 涅槃經云。 上智所知名勝義。 中智所知名世俗。 二智所知通空有。 故知二諦空有。 俱通言依法者。 法有勝劣。 互相形待。 而為真俗。 此有四重。 一虛實二諦。 瓶軍林等。 虛為世俗。 蘊處界等。 實為勝義。 二理事二諦。 蘊等事法。 麁為世俗。 四諦道理細為勝義。 三淺深二諦。 四諦安立淺為世俗。 二空真如深為勝義。 四詮旨二諦。 二空真如帶詮世俗。 一真法界亡詮勝義。 總有五法。 初軍林等俗而非真。 後真法界真而非俗。 中間三法亦真亦俗。 互相形故。 廣如唯識第九。 顯揚第六。 大論等說。 然初一種。 世間共執以為實有。 我法性故空而非有。 餘之四法。 通是依他圓成性。 故有而非空。 故說二諦。 體通空有。 非如前說。 勝義皆空。 既知二宗所說二諦。 次應徵問空有所由。 勝空者曰。 大經說云。 設有一法過涅槃者。 我亦說為如幻如化。 般若云。 色即是空。 空即是色。 受相行識。 亦復如是。 此經亦云。 般若波羅蜜即非般若波羅蜜。 乃至無法可說等。 准此等教。 諸法皆空。 又立理云。 法若有體。 自可能生。 既藉眾緣。 明知非有。 如結手巾為兔等像。 無兔等性。 應理者曰。 即准此經。 福聚無量如何非有。 又說如來有五眼等。 又發阿耨菩提者。 於法不說斷滅相等。 又復經云。 有為無為名為有。 我及我所名為無。 又云。 無我無造受者善惡之業。 亦不亡等。 雖說藉緣。 豈幻化體。 都無所有。 由應理者。 亦以幻化。 喻依他故。 星翳燈幻喻有為故。 又說眾生我。 皆令入無餘涅槃。 滅度若皆空者。 何假令空花而般於涅槃。 勝空者云。 此等諸文。 皆據俗諦。 非真空中。 有造修等。 應理難曰。 汝之俗諦。 與勝義諦。 為一為異。 若言一者。 有空相違。 不見苦樂。 及冷熱等得為一故。 若言異者。 二諦本俱。 如何一有而一非有彼。 答。 二諦其體無別。 俗諦體有。 可苦樂等。 非同體過。 二諦相對。 妄情是有。 真理皆空。 今隨妄情。 說俗諦有。 就實而談。 俗諦亦空。 難曰。 世俗妄故。 令捨俗諦。 入真空者。 豈無諸法斷滅相過。 答。 體既是無。 可斷滅故。 言不說法斷滅相。 此與應理。 解釋全別。 問。 依勝空說。 妄有真無。 二諦體一。 未審應理所說二諦。 為一為異。 答。 應理所說。 非一非異。 何以故。 義用別故非一。 無別體故非異。 即如瓶軍林等五法相望展轉皆爾。 既非一異。 翻此即說。 或異或一。 皆無有妨。 仁王經云。 有無本自二。 譬如牛二角。 照解見無二。 二諦常不即。 解心見無二。 求二不可得。

From this it should be stated that within the Mahāyāna, the tenets are divided into two: first, the tenet that the ultimate is entirely empty; second, the tenet that the rational is completely real. The first tenet begins with Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna and extends down to Master Bhāviveka. Relying on the teaching of signlessness, they state that in the ultimate truth everything is empty, while in the conventional it exists. The verse in the *Karatalaratna* says: 'In their true nature conditioned things are empty, like illusions, because they are born from conditions; unconditioned things are devoid of reality, not arising, like sky-flowers.' Thus they do not establish the three natures, Vijñaptimātra, and so forth. The latter tenet begins with the Tathāgata Maitreya and extends down to Bodhisattva Dharmapāla. Relying on explicit teachings such as the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, they state that the ultimate truth is neither empty nor non-empty. In the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, Lord Maitreya's verse says: 'Unreal conceptualisation exists; the duality does not exist in this. Here there is only emptiness; in that there is also this. Therefore all phenomena are stated to be neither empty nor non-empty, because of existence, non-existence, and existence; thus it accords with the Middle Way.' Among the three natures, the parikalpita nature is non-existent, while the paratantra and pariniṣpanna are existent; hence there is the distinction of the two tenets. Question: What are the characteristics of the so-called ultimate and conventional truths? Answer: Depending on the two tenets, what is stated differs. First, according to the Ultimate Emptiness school, in the true ultimate truth everything is completely empty, while within the conventional truth there may be form, mind, cultivation, abandonment, and so forth. As the sūtra says: 'All marks whatsoever are unreal and false'—this is the conventional truth; 'If one sees that all marks are not marks, then one sees the Tathāgata'—this is the ultimate truth. 'All sentient beings among the four types of birth and the three realms' is the conventional truth; 'In reality there is no sentient being who attains extinction' is the ultimate truth. The Rationalist school states: Regarding the two truths, ultimate and conventional, there are two distinct senses: first, distinguishing the truths on the basis of persons; second, distinguishing the truths in terms of phenomena. Both kinds of two truths encompass both emptiness and existence. First, regarding the basis of persons, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* says: 'What is known by superior wisdom is called the ultimate; what is known by middling wisdom is called the conventional.' What is known by the two kinds of wisdom encompasses both emptiness and existence; hence we know that both truths encompass both emptiness and existence. With respect to what is based on phenomena, phenomena have superior and inferior aspects that are mutually relative, thereby forming the ultimate and the conventional. There are four levels of this: 1. The two truths of the unreal and the real: pots, armies, forests, and the like are unreal and are the conventional; the aggregates, sense-bases, elements, and the like are real and are the ultimate. 2. The two truths of fact and principle: factual phenomena such as the aggregates are coarse and are the conventional; the principle of the Four Truths is subtle and is the ultimate. 3. The two truths of the shallow and the deep: the established Four Truths are shallow and are the conventional; the tathatā of the two emptinesses is deep and is the ultimate. 4. The two truths of signifier and signified: the tathatā of the two emptinesses endowed with expression is the conventional; the one true dharmadhātu with expression eradicated is the ultimate. In total there are five phenomena: the first, the army, forest, and so forth, is conventional and not ultimate; the last, the true dharmadhātu, is ultimate and not conventional; the three middle phenomena are both ultimate and conventional, because they are mutually relative. This is explained extensively in the ninth fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, the sixth fascicle of the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra*, and so forth. However, the first category is mutually grasped by the worldly as truly existent; being of the nature of self and phenomena, it is empty and not existent. The remaining four phenomena universally belong to the paratantra and pariniṣpanna natures; hence they are existent and not empty. Therefore it is said that the essence of the two truths encompasses both emptiness and existence; it is not as said previously, that the ultimate is entirely empty. Having understood the two truths stated by the two schools, we should next examine the grounds for emptiness and existence. The Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness says: The Great Sūtra says: 'Even if there were a phenomenon surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still declare it to be like an illusion, like a phantom.' The *Prajñāpāramitā* says: 'Form is emptiness, emptiness is form; sensation, perception, formations, and consciousness are also like this.' This sūtra also says: 'The Prajñāpāramitā is just not the Prajñāpāramitā,' up to 'there is no phenomenon that can be spoken,' and so forth. Based on these teachings, all phenomena are empty. Moreover, establishing it through reasoning, they say: If a phenomenon possessed an essence, it would naturally be able to produce itself. Since it relies on multiple conditions, we clearly know it is not existent, just like tying a handkerchief into the shape of a hare: it lacks the nature of a hare. The Rationalist says: Based on this very sūtra, the accumulation of merit is immeasurable; how could it be non-existent? It also says that the Tathāgata possesses the five eyes and so on; furthermore, one who resolves upon anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi does not assert the mark of annihilation with respect to phenomena, and so on. Furthermore, a sūtra says: 'Conditioned and unconditioned are called existent; the self and what belongs to the self are called non-existent.' It also says: 'There is no self and no maker or experiencer, yet the karma of good and evil does not perish,' and so forth. Although they are said to rely on conditions, how could the essence of an illusion or phantom be completely non-existent? This is because the Rationalist also uses illusions and phantoms as metaphors for the paratantra, and uses stars, cataracts, lamps, and illusions as metaphors for conditioned things. It also says: 'All sentient beings, I cause them to enter nirvāṇa without remainder.' If extinction were entirely empty, what need would there be to cause sky-flowers to enter into nirvāṇa? The Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness says: All these passages are based on the conventional truth; it is not that within true emptiness there are making, cultivation, and so on. The Rationalist objects: Is your conventional truth one with or different from the ultimate truth? If you say they are one, existence and emptiness are contradictory, for we never see suffering and pleasure, or cold and heat, being able to be one. If you say they are different, the two truths are fundamentally concomitant; how could one exist while the other does not? They answer: The two truths have no difference in their essence. The essence of the conventional truth exists and can have suffering, pleasure, and so on; it does not incur the fault of an identical essence. Relative to each other, under delusional attachments there is existence, while in true principle all is empty. Now, following delusional attachments, we say the conventional truth exists; speaking in terms of reality, the conventional truth is also empty. The objection is raised: Because the conventional is delusional, you cause one to abandon the conventional truth and enter true emptiness; does this not incur the fault of the mark of annihilation of all phenomena? They answer: Since the essence is already non-existent, how could it be annihilated? Hence it says one does not speak of the mark of annihilation of phenomena. This interpretation is completely different from that of the Rationalist. Question: According to the Proponent of Ultimate Emptiness, the delusional exists and the true is non-existent, and the two truths have one essence. It is not yet clear whether the two truths stated by the Rationalist are one or different. Answer: What the Rationalist states is that they are neither one nor different. Why? Because their meaning and function are distinct, they are not one; because they have no separate essence, they are not different. Just as among the five phenomena of pots, armies, forests, and so on, when viewed reciprocally it is always so. Since they are neither one nor different, turning this around, to say they are either different or one presents no obstacle whatsoever. The *Renwang Jing* says: 'Existence and non-existence are fundamentally two, / just like the two horns of an ox; / when illuminating understanding sees them, there is no duality. / The two truths are constantly not identical; / the understanding mind sees no duality, / and in seeking for duality, it cannot be found.'