藥師經疏 1.11

1.11

經。復次至破於正見　二治破戒文分為八。一常虧清禁。二不願多聞。三恃己陵他。四緣茲遇難。五殃神長劫。六由昔聞名。七願遂應時。八勤修勝業。此到初也。謂先於如來法中白四羯磨受別解脫戒名受持學問。破戒者新翻名尸羅。舊譯為清涼。謂身語業有缺有穿名為破戒。破行者依瑜伽論二十二說。謂威儀路戒所作事。或善品加行處所不成就軌則。不隨順世間。違越世間。不隨順毘奈耶。違越毘奈耶。云何名為於威儀路不成就軌則。乃至違越毘奈耶。謂所不應行。即如是行為諸世間之所譏毀。亦為貞良善士。謂持律者之所訶責。如行既然。於行住坐臥亦爾。云何名為於所作事不成就軌則。乃至違越毘奈耶。謂於所作若衣服事或盪鉢事等諸所不應作。即如是作為諸世間之所譏毀。亦為貞良善士。謂持律者之所訶責。云何名為於諸善品加行處所不成就軌則。乃至違越毘奈耶。謂受持讀誦修敬師長宣白請問。繫念思惟種種善品。非加行中所不應作。即如是作為諸世間之所譏毀亦為貞良善士。謂持律者之所訶責。如是名為而破於行破於正見者。謂聞大乘空相應經不善其義而惡趣空。依瑜伽論七十五說。於大乘中或有一類。惡趣空故作如是言。由世俗故一切皆有。由勝義故一切皆有無應告。彼言長老何者世俗何者勝義。如是問已彼若答言。若一切法皆無自性是名勝義。若於諸法無自性中。自性可得。是名世俗。何以故。無所有中建立世俗假設名言而起說故應告。彼曰汝何所欲名言世俗為從因有自性可得為唯名言世俗說有。若名言世俗從因有者。名言世俗從因而生而非是有不應道理。若唯名言世俗說有名言世俗無事而有不應道理。又應告言長老何緣諸可得者。此無自性。如是問已彼若答言顛倒事故。復應告言。汝何所欲此顛倒事為有為無。若言有者。說一切法由勝義故皆無自性不應道理。若言無者。顛倒事故諸可得者此無自性不應道理。寶積經說。若說諸法皆無性者。我說彼為不可治者。如是名為而破正見。

Sūtra: “Furthermore […] up to: breaking right view.” / Second: curing the breaking of precepts. The text is divided into eight: first, constantly deficient in pure prohibitions; second, not desiring broad learning; third, relying on oneself and disparaging others; fourth, encountering disasters due to this; fifth, suffering distress for long eons; sixth, having heard the name formerly; seventh, wishes fulfilled in due time; eighth, diligently cultivating superior karma. This comes to the first. / That is, previously having received the prātimokṣa precepts within the Tathāgata's teaching through the motion and three proclamations (jñapti-caturtha-karman) is called ‘upholding the trainings’. ‘Breaking the precepts’: The new translation renders this śīla, while the old translation called it ‘coolness’. When physical or verbal karma is deficient or breached, this is called breaking the precepts. / ‘Breaking conduct’: According to the twenty-second fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it means: “Regarding deportment, precepts, duties performed, or the locus of preparation for wholesome qualities, one does not accomplish the rules of deportment, does not accord with the world but transgresses against the world, does not accord with the Vinaya but transgresses against the Vinaya. / What is called failing to accomplish the rules of deportment, up to transgressing against the Vinaya? That which should not be done is done just so, becoming mocked and disparaged by worldly people, and also reproved by virtuous and good persons—namely, vinaya-holders. As it is with walking, so it is with standing, sitting, and lying down. / What is called failing to accomplish the rules regarding duties performed, up to transgressing against the Vinaya? Regarding duties performed, whether matters of robes or washing bowls, doing that which should not be done, becoming mocked and disparaged by worldly people, and also reproved by virtuous and good persons—namely, vinaya-holders. / What is called failing to accomplish the rules regarding the locus of preparation for wholesome qualities, up to transgressing against the Vinaya? Regarding receiving, upholding, reciting, practicing respect toward teachers and elders, announcing, inquiring, fastening mindfulness, and contemplating various wholesome qualities—doing that which should not be done in non-preparations, becoming mocked and disparaged by worldly people, and also reproved by virtuous and good persons—namely, vinaya-holders. Such is called ‘breaking conduct’.” / ‘Breaking right view’: Hearing the Mahāyāna sūtras associated with emptiness, not understanding their meaning well, one wrongly grasps emptiness. According to the seventy-fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: “Within the Mahāyāna, there may be a class of people who, because of wrongly grasping emptiness, speak thus: ‘From [the standpoint of] conventional truth, all exists; from [the standpoint of] ultimate truth, all exists and does not exist.’ One should say to them: ‘Venerable one, what is conventional and what is ultimate?’ After asking this, if they answer: ‘If all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature, this is called ultimate. If within the lack of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, intrinsic nature is apprehensible, this is called conventional. Why? Because within non-existence, one establishes convention and sets up conventional designations to give rise to discourse.’ One should say to them: ‘What do you hold: does conventional designation exist from a cause with an apprehensible intrinsic nature, or is it stated to exist merely as conventional designation? If conventional designation exists from a cause, that conventional designation is born from a cause yet is not existent—this does not stand to reason. If it is stated to exist merely as conventional designation, that conventional designation exists without any real basis—this does not stand to reason.’ Furthermore, one should say to them: ‘Venerable one, due to what condition are those things that are apprehensible devoid of intrinsic nature?’ After asking this, if they answer: ‘Because of inverted matters,’ one should again say to them: ‘What do you hold: does this inverted matter exist or not exist? If you say it exists, stating that all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature from [the standpoint of] ultimate truth does not stand to reason. If you say it does not exist, then stating that because of inverted matters, those things that are apprehensible are devoid of intrinsic nature does not stand to reason.’ The Ratnakūṭa Sūtra states: ‘If one says that all dharmas are devoid of nature, I say that person is incurable.’ Such is called ‘breaking right view’.”