維摩經疏卷第三．第六 3.37

3.37

"Entering into all false views and not reaching the other shore" and so forth is the fourth [part], which rebukes Subhūti for not being equal toward all dharmas, reproving him so as to bring his virtues to completion. Within the text there are eleven clauses, the meaning of which is divided into three parts: first, one clause explains being identical with non-Buddhists; next, five clauses explain being identical with ordinary persons; finally, five clauses explain being identical with the hosts of Māras. The overall intent of the rebuke is: How can you maintain [distinctions of] false and right, maintain the eight difficulties, see defilement and purity, have inequality in meditative minds, grasp at [the field of] merit, hold biased views of sin and blessing, emerge from Māra's realm, differentiate yourself from Māras, feel pity for sentient beings, be attached to the Three Jewels, and up to the eleventh, realize nirvāṇa? It is now apparent that you cannot enter false [views], abide in the eight difficulties, identify with afflictions, equalize the non-contentious, and up to not grasping cessation. By this reasoning, it is known that you have not yet attained the empty, non-contentious samādhi; because you do not yet know it, he in turn instructs and rebukes you. First, "Entering into all false views and not reaching the other shore" is the first [clause], explaining being identical with non-Buddhists, shattering Subhūti's grasping at the characteristics of false and right. "The other shore" is nirvāṇa. The Hīnayāna takes false views to be wrong and the other shore to be right; thus it abandons these false views and returns to reach the other shore. A practitioner of the Mahāyāna knows that the nature of false views is empty: how could there be transcendence? Nirvāṇa is calm extinction: how could it be reached? The original nature of false views and the other shore are not different: why abandon the false and delight in the other shore? Therefore, one enters false views and does not reach the other shore. It is also said: to convert sentient beings, one enters all false views, does not abide in nirvāṇa, and does not reach the other shore. From here on, the second part explains being identical with ordinary persons, within which there are five points: first, shattering the characteristic of escaping the eight difficulties; second, shattering the characteristic of grasping at defilement and purity; third, shattering inequality in the meditative mind; fourth, shattering the characteristic of the field of merit; fifth, shattering the characteristic of grasping at sin and blessing. "Abiding in the eight difficulties and not attaining the absence of difficulties" is the first, shattering the grasping at the characteristics of the eight difficulties. Whoever sees difficulties as difficulties will inevitably abandon difficulties and seek the absence of difficulties. If one can avoid treating difficulties as difficulties, one can abide in difficulties; because one does not consider them difficulties, one does not attain the absence of difficulties. The nature of difficulties is inherently empty: how could one abandon them and only then attain the absence of difficulties? It is also said: to transform [others], one dwells among them and abides in the eight difficulties, not being attached to bodhi and not abiding in the absence of difficulties. "Being identical with afflictions and departing from pure dharmas" is the second, shattering the grasping at the characteristics of defilement and purity. To convert sentient beings, one identifies with afflictions; not being attached to nirvāṇa, one departs from pure dharmas. Alternatively, it is said: the two vehicles eliminate defilement and grasp purity, so that purity turns back into defilement; a bodhisattva realizes that defilement is non-defilement, so that what is defiled is ever pure; therefore one identifies with afflictions and departs from purity. Thus the Viśeṣacintā-brahma-paripṛcchā Sūtra states: "Sometimes defiled dharmas are spoken of as pure, and pure dharmas are spoken of as defiled. Why are pure dharmas spoken of as defiled? Because one is greedily attached to pure dharmas. Why are defiled dharmas spoken of as pure? Because one does not see defiled dharmas." Furthermore, a later passage of the [Vimalakīrti] sūtra says: "If one sees the true nature of defilement, there are no characteristics of purity." "You attain the non-contentious samādhi, and sentient beings also attain it" is the third, shattering inequality in the meditative mind. Non-contention is twofold: first, phenomenal non-contention: using the power of samādhi to safeguard sentient beings so that contention does not arise. Subhūti said: "If someone dislikes my sitting, I will immediately stand for them; if they dislike my being here, I will immediately depart far away. Never will I give rise to contention." Second, principle non-contention: the dharmatā of tathatā is without opposition and without contention. Only by realizing the principle can one attain phenomenal non-contention. Subhūti and all living beings are equal in the principle of emptiness: why should Subhūti alone attain non-contention while living beings do not? This clarifies that their nature is originally equal; hence it is said, "sentient beings also attain it." "Those who give to you are not called fields of merit" is the fourth, shattering the grasping at the characteristics of merit. Subhūti's view was: "When I receive their gifts, I cause them to attain great merit; therefore I am called a [field of] merit; when ordinary persons receive gifts, they cannot cause them to obtain great merit and are not fields of merit." You and ordinary persons are equal in single emptiness: how could ordinary persons not be fields of merit, while you are a field of merit? Furthermore, contemplating that other and self are not different, who is the one of merit, and who is the field? Hence it is said: "Those who give to you are not called fields of merit." Yuán said: "Those who lack goodness to benefit others are worldly sinners; making offerings to them brings no merit. Making offerings to you resembles that; it generates no virtue, hence it is called not a field of merit." The proverb says: "Giving based on characteristics is not called an equal field of merit." "Those who make offerings to you falling into the three evil destinies" is the fifth, shattering the view of the characteristics of sin and blessing. Mǎn said: "The harm of the five heinous sins versus the benefit of making offerings." Subhūti thought that those who made offerings to him would attain birth in the heavens; now he is rebuked in reverse: "That nature is empty and equal, and good and evil are not two: how could practicing good alone lead to birth in heaven, while committing sins leads into the evil paths? If the five heinous sins can cause falling [into evil paths], making offerings should also cause falling. Since making offerings does not cause falling, the five heinous sins also do not cause falling. This can be called both good and evil being obliterated, their nature being empty and equal." Thus a later passage of the sūtra states: "If one penetrates the nature of sin, it is not different from blessing." The proverb says: "Making offerings while grasping at characteristics, though one may gain a little merit, will ultimately lead to falling into the evil paths." From here on, the third part explains being identical with the hosts of Māras, in five clauses: first, shattering emerging from Māra's realm; second, shattering being different from Māras; third, shattering pitying sentient beings; fourth, shattering attachment to the Three Jewels; fifth, shattering attaining nirvāṇa. Within the former, "Becoming a companion to Māra" is the first, shattering emerging from Māra's realm. Subhūti thought: "I am a noble one who has emerged from Māra's realm." Now he is conversely made to share in Māra's deeds. "Hosts of Māras" refers to the various Māra kings. Māra is entirely preoccupied with disorder; performing deeds identical to Māra's is called "sharing one hand"—just as worldly people say of making things similarly that they were "made by a single hand." Māra can disturb and harass, which is called toil; being a partner to him is called becoming a toiling companion. The nature of Māra is inherently empty: why need one abandon him and not dwell together? Once one has attained right view, one is not different from a companion in the toil wrought by Māra. "You being not different from the defilements and toils of the hosts of Māras" is the second, shattering being different from Māras. Since you are his companion, how could you be different? You and the hosts of Māras are equal in single emptiness, without two characteristics: how could you not be equal? "Bearing a mind of enmity toward all sentient beings" is the third, shattering pitying sentient beings. Māra can harm their life of wisdom, which is the worst of enmities. Giving rise to that mind of loving-kindness is the meaning of a friend. Sentient beings are empty in nature; enemies and friends are equal. Since you can give rise to loving-kindness within equality, why not act as an enemy? Furthermore, Hīnayāna practitioners merely speak of the emptiness of persons to teach and transform sentient beings, thereby harming the dharmakāya and wisdom-life of the Mahāyāna in others, which is termed enmity. "Slandering the Buddha, disparaging the Dharma, and not entering the Saṅgha" is the fourth, shattering attachment to the Three Jewels. You, Subhūti, are only able to recite [praises of] the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha and delight in being counted among the assembly, which is precisely grasping at the characteristics of the Three Jewels. Since within equality you can praise them, why not slander them? Since you cannot slander them, how can you praise them? Thus the Wuxing Jing states: "Hearing the sound of praising the Buddha, one rejoices; hearing the sound of disparaging the Buddha, one is obstructed. One should know that this person does not study the Buddha's teaching." The sūtra says: "The sounds of non-Buddhists and the sound of the Buddha are equal." It also says: "What the Buddha speaks and false speech are both without distinction." It also says: "Slandering the Buddha and disparaging the Dharma occurs because Subhūti does not penetrate that the Three Jewels are like empty space; thus grasping at characteristics to praise them opposes the true essence, making him precisely a person who slanders the Buddha, disparages the Dharma, and does not enter the ranks of the Saṅgha." Thus the Prajñā Sūtra says: "If one sees me by form or seeks me by sound, this person walks a false path and cannot see the Tathāgata." "Ultimately not attaining extinction" is the fifth, shattering the characteristic of realizing nirvāṇa. Sentient beings are empty in nature, with none who attain extinction; yet now you grasp at nirvāṇa, which is merely possessing characteristics, and you do not attain nirvāṇa. Thus the Buddhapiṭaka-sūtra says: "If a person sees a definitive characteristic of nirvāṇa, you should know that this person is called a non-Buddhist with evil false views." Furthermore, a later passage of the [Vimalakīrti] sūtra says: "All sentient beings are precisely the characteristic of nirvāṇa, not to be extinguished again." It is simply because the empty nature of sentient beings is itself nirvāṇa; how could one use nirvāṇa to further realize nirvāṇa? It is also said: because Subhūti's mind was narrow and inferior, he could not realize the great nirvāṇa; hence he does not attain extinction. It is also said: Subhūti thought, "I am a noble one who has realized nirvāṇa." Now he conversely rebukes him: within equal emptiness, one is free from attainment and non-attainment; if you attained it, you should also not attain it; since there is no non-attainment, there is also no attainment. "Only then may you take food" concludes the exhortation. If you can now eliminate the preceding [dualisms of] gain and loss and vacantly penetrate their dismantling, you will be a field of merit, and only then may you take food. Why so? Abandoning evil and following good is common human inclination. Yet when right and wrong occupy the mind, one is not yet free from encumbrances. Therefore, one who views them equally regards preserving good as an affliction and so abandons good to seek the fundamental; regarding abandoning evil as an encumbrance, one confronts evil and returns to the source. Thus evil has the efficacy of eradicating encumbrances, and good has the merit of non-defilement. Therefore, one knows that agreeing with good is not yet an attainment, and agreeing with evil is not yet a loss. Vimalakīrti's intended meaning seems to be like this.