大乘百法明門論開宗義記 1.9

1.9

雖所計殊分二十部。於中類束以為六宗。一我法俱有宗。謂犢子部等許有五蘊十二處等及依蘊等別有我故。二有法無我宗。一切有部等說。三世蘊等而皆實有。補特加羅實我無故。三法無去來宗。大眾部等說。蘊處戒等現法即有。去來蘊等皆是無故。四現通假實宗。說假部等說現在蘊實積聚法故。處界則假和合法故。五從妄真實宗。說出世部等執。出世可實非虛妄故。世間非實皆虛妄故。六諸法假名宗。一說部等執。世出世間亦皆非實。但是假名無性相故。此等皆依初時教起。故所執宗為小乘矣。後大乘宗而有二種。一勝義皆空宗。即十二門論智度中百般若燈論掌珍論等。依般若等無相空教。說一切法不離二諦。若世俗門諸法皆有。乃至許有我法心境。與諸小乘義無差別。若勝義門諸法皆空。乃至不立唯識真如。與應理宗所說全別。然其二諦其體不異。以從緣生說名世俗。即緣無性名勝義空。故說二諦體無差別。由迷勝義執有世俗。縱勤修行終滯生死。由悟勝義了世俗空。故能不著速證涅槃。故說般若為究竟理。遣一切相無所得故。解深密等為不了義。不遣依圓有所存故。彼經自說為了義者。以對淺根義易了故。非理究竟名為了義。二應理圓實宗。即攝大乘論瑜伽顯揚雜集唯識中邊等論。依深密等諸了義經。說一切法世俗勝義不一不異。非有非空。具如五法前後相望立為四重世俗勝義。一虛實二諦。瓶軍林等虛為世俗。蘊處界等實為勝義。二理事二諦。蘊等事法麁為世俗。四諦道理細為勝義。三淺深二諦四諦安立淺為世俗。二空真如深為勝義。四詮旨二諦。二空真如帶詮世俗。一真如法界亡詮勝義。相對立故非一。無別體故非異。妄所執故非有。體不無故非空。故說深密為極究竟。得中道故。般若等經為非了義。就偏說故。此中具說二種宗義。若說法性圓融法門即為三宗。如起信疏。今此論者即大乘中應理圓實究竟宗收。前明百法顯有依他圓成。後說二空顯無遍計所執。既離二邊契會中道。二邊既離中道亦亡。心無所依都無所得。由無所得無所不得。是謂究竟圓實宗也。辯所宗竟。

Although their tenets differ and divide them into twenty schools, they may be classified into six doctrines: First, the doctrine that both self and dharmas exist. That is, the Vātsīputrīyas and others maintain that the five aggregates, twelve sense-bases, and so forth exist, and that based on the aggregates and so forth a separate self exists. Second, the doctrine that dharmas exist but the self is non-existent. That is, the Sarvāstivādins and others state that the aggregates and so forth of the three times all truly exist, but a real self in the sense of a pudgala does not exist. Third, the doctrine that dharmas lack past and future. That is, the Mahāsāṃghikas and others state that the aggregates, sense-bases, realms, and so forth exist only as present phenomena, while past and future aggregates and so forth are all non-existent. Fourth, the doctrine that the present encompasses both the conventional and the real. That is, the Prajñaptivādins and others state that the present aggregates are real, as they are accumulated dharmas, whereas the sense-bases and realms are conventional, as they are composite dharmas. Fifth, the doctrine that the supramundane is real while the mundane is false. That is, the Lokottaravādins and others hold that the supramundane can be real because it is not illusory, while the mundane is not real because it is entirely illusory. Sixth, the doctrine that all dharmas are merely nominal designations. That is, the Ekavyāvahārikas and others hold that both the mundane and supramundane are not real either, but are merely nominal designations, lacking both real nature and real marks. These are all based on the teachings of the initial period; hence the doctrines held by them are of the Hīnayāna. Later, the Mahāyāna doctrine divided into two kinds: First, the doctrine that all is empty in the ultimate truth. This is represented by treatises such as the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra, the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the Śataśāstra, the Prajñāpradīpa, and the Karatalaratna. Relying on the signless, empty teachings of the Prajñāpāramitā and so forth, it states that all dharmas are not separate from the two truths. In terms of the conventional gate, all dharmas exist, even to the extent of allowing that self, dharmas, mind, and objects exist, which does not differ in meaning from the Hīnayāna schools. In terms of the ultimate gate, all dharmas are empty, to the extent that neither consciousness-only nor tathatā is established, which is completely different from what is taught by the Yuktivāda school. However, the substance of the two truths is not different: arising from conditions is called conventional truth, while the lack of intrinsic nature in conditions is called the emptiness of ultimate truth. Therefore, the substances of the two truths are said to have no difference. Because of being confused about the ultimate truth, one grasps at the conventional as existent; even if one strives in cultivation, one remains trapped in saṃsāra. Because of awakening to the ultimate truth, one understands that the conventional is empty; thus one can be unattached and swiftly realize nirvāṇa. Therefore, it is taught that the Prajñāpāramitā is the definitive principle, since it eliminates all signs and leaves nothing to be attained. The Saṃdhinirmocana and other sutras are considered of non-definitive meaning, because they do not eliminate the dependent and perfected natures, leaving something remaining. That sutra itself claims to be definitive because it was taught for those of shallow faculties, being easy to understand; it was not because its principle is ultimate that it is called definitive. Second, the doctrine of the rational, perfect, and real. This is represented by treatises such as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra, Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, and Madhyāntavibhāga. Relying on definitive sutras such as the Saṃdhinirmocana, it states that for all dharmas, the conventional and the ultimate are neither identical nor different, neither existent nor empty. Fully according to the five dharmas, comparing earlier and later stages, it establishes four tiers of conventional and ultimate truths: 1. Conventional and ultimate truths of the false and real: vases, armies, forests, and so forth are false and thus conventional; the aggregates, sense-bases, realms, and so forth are real and thus ultimate. 2. Conventional and ultimate truths of phenomena and principle: phenomenal dharmas such as the aggregates are coarse and thus conventional; the principle of the four noble truths is subtle and thus ultimate. 3. Conventional and ultimate truths of the shallow and deep: the established four noble truths are shallow and thus conventional; the tathatā of the two types of emptiness is deep and thus ultimate. 4. Conventional and ultimate truths of expression and signified meaning: the tathatā of the two types of emptiness as expressed by words is conventional; the single tathatā as the realm of reality that transcends expression is ultimate. Being established in mutual relation, they are not identical; having no separate substance, they are not different. Being falsely grasped, they are not existent; their substance not being non-existent, they are not empty. Therefore, it is said that the Saṃdhinirmocana is the most definitive, because it grasps the middle way, whereas sutras such as the Prajñāpāramitā are of non-definitive meaning, because they teach from a one-sided perspective. Here, two doctrinal lineages are fully explained. If one explains the doctrine of the unimpeded interpenetration of the dharma-nature, there are three lineages, as in the Commentary on the Awakening of Faith. The present treatise is subsumed under the Mahāyāna doctrine of the rational, perfect, and real, which is definitive. In the first part it clarifies the hundred dharmas, revealing the existence of the dependent and perfected natures; in the second part it explains the two types of emptiness, revealing the non-existence of the imagined nature. Since it departs from the two extremes and accords with the middle way, and since once the two extremes are departed from, the middle way also vanishes, the mind has nothing upon which to rely and has nothing whatever to attain. Because there is nothing to attain, there is nothing that is not attained. This is called the definitive, perfect, and real doctrine. Clarification of the doctrinal tenets is concluded.