大乘百法明門論開宗義記 1.32

1.32

Treatise: (1) acquisition, (2) life faculty, (3) commonality of kind, (4) state of an ordinary person, (5) absorption without ideation, (6) absorption of cessation, (7) state without ideation, (8) collection of names, (9) collection of sentences, (10) collection of phonemes, (11) arising, (12) aging, (13) abiding, (14) impermanence, (15) continuity of flow, (16) fixed differentiation, (17) correspondence, (18) velocity, (19) sequence, (20) direction, (21) time, (22) number, (23) concord, and (24) discord. Tankuang explains: This discriminates and lists them according to their number. What is termed 'acquisition' (prāpti) means attainment. Explaining its full meaning according to the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, it states: based on all attainable dharmas of sentient beings, what was previously acquired and not lost is called 'acquisition'. This acquisition or attainment is of three kinds: (1) Attainment as seeds: defiled dharmas, all indeterminate dharmas, and inherently acquired wholesome dharmas that become manifest without exertion—where defilements have not yet been subdued by śamatha, indeterminate dharmas have not yet been perpetually destroyed by the noble path, and inherently acquired dharmas have not yet been impaired by wrong view—whether they are active or inactive, all are called attained, because their functions can still occur so long as they have not been impaired or subdued. (2) Attainment as mastery: this refers to wholesome dharmas produced by exertion, and a portion of dominant seeds of indeterminate dharmas. 'Wholesome dharmas of exertion' refers to all worldly and transworldly merits of listening, reflecting, and cultivating; because one has mastery over the practice of such exertion, attaining these wholesome dharmas is called 'mastery', and hence wholesome dharmas of exertion and so forth are called attainment as mastery. (3) Attainment as manifestation: this refers to the manifests of the aggregates, bases, and elements, whether wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate; if they are severed, impaired, or subdued, they are certainly not attained; because they are not yet impaired or subdued, they are all able to manifest; this very manifestation is called attainment. The first two are explained in terms of seeds, while this one is described in terms of manifestation. Therefore, acquisition or attainment is of three kinds. As for what is termed the 'life faculty' (jīvitendriya), the Cheng weishi lun says: the vipākavijñāna is the substance of rebirth in the destinies, because it is the all-pervading, constant, continuous vipāka fruit. This [consciousness] can sustain the sense faculties, supports, and so forth, keeping them from perishing and breaking off, which is called a 'sentient being'. The state in which the vipākavijñāna has not yet relinquished its appropriation and has not broken off or perished is called the 'life faculty'. This consciousness is directly produced from its own seeds; based on the seeds directly producing this consciousness, by virtue of the functional distinction drawn out by karma, a determinate duration of abiding is nominally designated as the 'life faculty'. Because apart from this, no life faculty can be found, both the karmadhāraya and tatpuruṣa compounds are valid interpretations. As for 'commonality of kind' (nikāyasabhāga), according to the Cheng weishi lun, 'common' (nikāya) means manifold, 'similar' (sa-) means resemblance, and 'part/cause' (-bhāga) means cause. Based on the resemblance in the bodily types of various sentient beings, giving rise to identical cognition and linguistic designation is called 'commonality of kind'. Or again, 'part' is simply the meaning of 'category', meaning that the manifold kinds of humans, devas, and so forth are similar; 'the common manifold is itself the part' is a karmadhāraya compound. As for the 'state of an ordinary person' (pṛthagjanatva), all noble ones are called 'of identical birth', whereas ordinary foolish beings are called 'different births' (pṛthagjana). Due to the two kinds of hindrances severed by seeing, ordinary foolish beings are caused to be born with different views, born in different destinies, and born into different categories. The state in which the seeds of the two hindrances have not yet been perpetually destroyed and can hinder the noble path is called the 'state of an ordinary person'. It is 'the birth that is different' or 'the nature of an ordinary person', both being tatpuruṣa compounds. Due to this nature, one does not obtain noble dharmas; hence in the Hīnayāna, it is designated separately as 'non-acquisition' (aprāpti). As for 'absorption without ideation' (asaṃjñisamāpatti), the Cheng weishi lun explains: there are non-Buddhists who grasp the heaven without ideation as nirvāṇa; loathing this ideation as being like an ulcer or boil and a cause of saṃsāra, they cultivate this absorption preceded by the mental attention to ideation of liberation. Because when cultivating the absorption they loathe ideation in the preparatory stages of the absorption, they cause this mental ideation to become progressively subtle and faint. When the mind is progressively faint, it perfumes the vipākavijñāna, forming extremely powerful seeds of loathing the mind and so forth. Because these seeds impair and subdue the seeds of mental ideation, they cause the non-constant mental ideations not to arise. Based on this phase, this absorption is nominally designated. With the cessation of ideation as primary, it is called the 'absorption without ideation'. As for the 'absorption of cessation' (nirodhasamāpatti), the Cheng weishi lun says: practitioners of the two vehicles, seeing that the arising of coarse and moving minds necessarily involves distress and anxiety, loathe the coarse and moving citta and caittas; preceded by the mental attention to ideation of cessation, relying on the Peak of Existence, they take wandering contemplation of the uncontaminated as the preparatory practice, enter, and check citta and caittas, causing citta and caittas to become progressively subtle and faint. When the mind is progressively faint, it perfumes the vipākavijñāna, forming extremely powerful [seeds of] loathing the mind and so forth. The force of these seeds is able to impair and subdue both constant and non-constant citta and caitta dharmas. Based on this phase, this absorption is nominally designated. Because the absorption is able to cause both constant and non-constant minds and so forth to cease entirely, it is called the 'absorption of cessation'. As for the 'state without ideation' (āsaṃjñika), it is the substance of the vipāka fruit of the heaven without ideation; hence the Cheng weishi lun calls it vipāka. Seeking the fruit without ideation, one enters the absorption without ideation; because this absorption is wholesome, its seeds are also wholesome. The seeds perfumed and accomplished by this summon that vipāka fruit. Relying on this, coarse and moving ideations and so forth do not operate; based on this phase, that name is established. At the time of the cause, because ideations and so forth do not operate due to absorption, it is called the 'absorption without ideation'; at the time of the fruit, because ideations and so forth do not arise due to retribution, it is called the 'state without ideation'. Therefore, the entities of the state and the absorption are completely different. 'The state of non-ideation' is a tatpuruṣa compound. As for what is termed 'collection of names' (nāmakāya), in Sanskrit it is nāma, translated here as 'name' (ming), which has the sense of 'resorting to', because it resorts to the intrinsic nature of the dharma being expressed. Therefore the Cheng weishi lun says: 'A name expresses intrinsic nature.' The Pañcaskandhakaśāstra says: 'A name is an augmented expression for the intrinsic nature of dharmas, such as speaking of things like humans, devas, eyes, and ears.' If there is only one name, it is constantly called a 'name'; if there are two names, it forms a 'collection of names'; three names and above are 'a collection of many names'. It is 'the collection of names', hence a tatpuruṣa compound. Sentences, phonemes, and so forth below should be understood accordingly, because 'collection' (kāya) simply has the meaning of an assembly. As for what is termed 'collection of sentences' (padakāya), in Sanskrit it is pada, translated here as 'footprint' (ji). Just as seeing an elephant's footprint indicates that there is an elephant, so four padas indicate that there is an extensive text; translating it obliquely according to the meaning, it is rendered as 'sentence' (ju). The Cheng weishi lun and other texts say: 'A sentence expresses the meaning of distinction.' The Pañcaskandhaka and other texts say: 'A sentence is an augmented expression for the distinctions among dharmas, such as saying that all conditioned things are impermanent, and so forth.' As in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and other texts, there are five kinds of sentences; now according to the Mahāyāna, there are two kinds of sentences: (1) The sentence complete in gathering dharmas: this corresponds to what is subsumed under the intermediate sentence in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*; merely gathering various names, neither long nor short, completing eight syllables constitutes a single sentence; it does not depend on the completeness of the sense, but takes the completion of the syllables. (2) The sentence complete in revealing meaning: this subsumes the remaining four sentences of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*; without a fixed number of syllables, according to whether it is short or long, revealing the meaning completely is called a single sentence; hence there are distinctions of short, long, preceding, and succeeding sentences. As for what is termed 'collection of phonemes' (vyañjanakāya), it refers to letters/syllables. In Sanskrit it is vyañjana, translated here as 'phoneme/grapheme' (wen), which is refined language. Saying akṣara is translated here as 'letter/syllable' (zi), which is conventional language. Fearing that some might fail to realize that phonemes and letters are one, the Cheng weishi lun says: 'Vyañjana is simply letters/syllables.' These are what the preceding names and sentences rely upon, because by relying on letters/phonemes there are names and sentences; therefore the Cheng weishi lun says: 'They are the support of the two.' When ancient translators translated it as 'flavor' (wei), it was because vyañjana designates four dharmas: phoneme/letter, physical form, fan, and flavor; because the word is the same, they mistakenly translated it as 'flavor'. If according to the Hīnayāna, all of these have separate real entities, their nature being solely indeterminate and solely contaminated. Now in the Mahāyāna school, these three are all nominally designated upon sounds and have no separate entity. If speaking according to what they express, they nominally pervade the three natures; if speaking according to what they rely on, they are all identical with sound. As for what is termed 'arising' (jāti), it is the phase when dharmas first become manifest. The Pañcaskandhakaśāstra says: 'In a commonality of kind, what previously did not exist now existing is the intrinsic nature of arising.' The Cheng weishi lun says: 'Arising indicates an existent dharma, because it previously was not existent.' As for what is termed 'aging' (jarā), it has the sense of difference, because the alteration of conditioned things is called aging. The Cheng weishi lun says: 'This very continuity undergoing transformation is called difference.' As for what is termed 'abiding' (sthiti), the Pañcaskandhakaśāstra says: 'It is the brief pausing of conditioned things in their arising phase.' The Cheng weishi lun and other texts say: 'Having arisen, continuing in similarity is called abiding.' As for what is termed 'impermanence' (anitya), the Pañcaskandhakaśāstra and other texts also call it 'cessation' (nirodha). Conditioned things, having arisen, are momentarily existent and then become non-existent again; unlike the unconditioned, they are not permanently existent; unlike a rabbit's horns, they are not permanently non-existent. Being existent, they are not permanently existent; being non-existent, they are not permanently non-existent; therefore conditioned dharmas are called impermanent. It is not that impermanence is established only at the phase of non-existence; it is spoken of as the characteristic of cessation to indicate this subsequent non-existence. The ten kinds below this are not established by the Hīnayāna; being subsumed as they are under the six causes and four conditions, they are therefore not mentioned among the unassociated [dharmas]. The Cheng weishi lun also does not explain them. As for what is termed 'continuity of flow' (pravṛtti), it refers to the cause and effect of conditioned dharmas continuing in succession without interruption. The Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'It refers to the uninterupted nature of the succession of cause and effect of conditioned things.' As for what is termed 'fixed differentiation' (pratiniyama), from beginningless time the seeds of cause and effect are determinately distinct without any state of confusion. Therefore the Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'It refers to the individually determinate nature of causes and effects.' As for what is termed 'correspondence' (yoga), it is the non-contradictory nature of these causes and effects from beginningless time. Therefore the Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'The mutually conforming nature of the causes and effects of conditioned things.' As for what is termed 'velocity' (jāva), it is the nature of the causes and effects of conditioned things flowing in rapid succession. Therefore the Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'It refers to the rapid flowing nature of conditioned things.' As for what is termed 'sequence' (anukrama), it has the sense that cause and effect do not operate simultaneously. Therefore the Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'It refers to the one-by-one sequential nature of conditioned things.' As for what is termed 'direction' (deśa), it is the demarcation of material forms. The Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'It refers to the demarcated nature of the sensory spheres of material forms.' The Yogācārabhūmi speaks of three: above, below, and across. As for what is termed 'time' (kāla), it has two meanings: (1) based on the force of the solar disc rising and setting, distinctions of periods of time are established and indicated; (2) based on the force of the arising and perishing of conditioned things, conventional distinctions are established and indicated. Relying on this, the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of three times: past, future, and present. As for what is termed 'number' (saṃkhyā), the Pañcaskandhakaśāstra says: 'It refers to the successive increment and measure of conditioned things.' The Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'It refers to the individually distinct nature of one, ten, a hundred, and a thousand in conditioned things.' As for what is termed 'concord' (sāmagrī), the Pañcaskandhakaśāstra says: 'It refers to the occasion of the meeting of conditions of conditioned dharmas.' The Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra also says: 'The nature of the meeting of conditions of conditioned things.' As for 'discord' (asāmagrī), the Pañcaskandhakaśāstra says: 'It refers to the estrangement of the cause and effect of conditioned things.' The Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra says: 'The discordant nature of the conditions of conditioned things.' Although the non-concurrent formations discussed above have different names and numbers amounting to twenty-four, they are nominally established in summary based on eight phases, as taught in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and other texts: (1) Establishing one kind based on the phases of increase and decrease of the wholesome and unwholesome: namely, acquisition, because this is nominally established based on the phase in which material forms, citta, and caittas of the three natures can be attained. (2) Establishing three kinds based solely on phases where the mind does not divide: namely, the two absorptions and the non-ideational vipāka, because they are nominally established due to the phase wherein the sixth and seventh consciousnesses are cut off and ceased by the seeds of loathing the mind. (3) Establishing one kind based on the phase of the duration of abiding of material forms and mind: namely, the life faculty, because it is nominally established based on the vipāka seeds causing consciousness to sustain the body during the period it abides in appropriation. (4) Establishing one kind based on the phase of similarity of material forms and mind: namely, commonality of kind, because this is nominally established based on sentient beings among the five destinies of humans, devas, and so forth being non-different according to their kind. (5) Establishing four kinds based on the phases of the flow of material forms and mind: namely, the four characteristics, because they are nominally established to indicate that conditioned dharmas originally did not exist and now exist, already existed and now do not exist, and so forth. (6) Establishing three kinds based on the phases of verbal expression of material forms and mind: namely, names, sentences, and phonemes, because these are nominally established based on vocal inflections that express and evoke dharmas with material form and mind. (7) Establishing one kind based solely on the phase of non-attainment of the mind: namely, the state of an ordinary person, because it is nominally established based on the seeds of the afflictions of view causing the mind and caittas not to attain noble dharmas. (8) Establishing ten kinds based on the phases of cause and effect of material forms and mind: namely, continuity of flow and so forth, because these are nominally established according to the phases of various aspects of the force of cause and effect. It should be understood that four kinds are established relying solely on mind, while twenty are nominally stated relying generally on material forms and mind. Due to this, they also generally exist in both ordinary and noble phases. Hence a sutra cited in the Cheng weishi lun says: 'A person achieves the wholesome and unwholesome; a noble one achieves the ten dharmas of the non-learner.' It also says: 'An ordinary person does not achieve noble dharmas; arhats do not achieve afflictions.' The words 'achieve' and 'not achieve' reveal acquisition and non-acquisition. It also speaks of 'falling into the commonality of the noble', and because the absorption of cessation is attained by noble ones, and dharmas such as cause and effect generally apply to both ordinary and noble beings. Among the five aggregates, all are subsumed under the saṃskāraskandha, because it is taught that these are all non-concurrent formations. They are also subsumed under the dharma-āyatana and dharmadhātu, because what is not subsumed by the others is subsumed here. The meanings of the remaining approaches should be reflected upon in accordance with reason.