大乘百法明門論開宗義決 1.101

1.101

不緣相分識中種子及相應法等者。謂經論中皆說末那唯是內緣不取外境。若取賴耶所有相分。相分即是外六塵境。即應末那有緣外失。種子雖在賴耶識中是識相分。若緣種子。與緣外相有何差別。是故不緣識中種子。賴耶心所雖不離心。曾無處說緣相分故。但說末那唯緣識蘊故。是故不緣賴耶心所。若爾何故經論皆說此末那識我我所執。疏中所言有處說執我我所者。正釋此難。如文應知。

Regarding "not taking as objects the nimitta-bhāga, seeds in the consciousness, and associated dharmas, etc.": Both sūtras and śāstras say that manas exclusively takes internal objects and does not apprehend external objects. If it took the nimitta-bhāga of the ālaya, the nimitta-bhāga would be the external six sense-objects, and manas would incur the fault of taking external objects. Although seeds reside in the ālayavijñāna, they are the nimitta-bhāga of consciousness; if it took seeds as object, what difference would there be from taking external characteristics? Therefore, it does not take seeds in the consciousness as object. Although the caittas of the ālaya are not separate from the mind, nowhere has it ever been said that they take the nimitta-bhāga as object, but only that manas takes the vijñāna-skandha alone as object. Therefore, it does not take the caittas of the ālaya as object. If so, why do sūtras and śāstras all say that this manas consciousness grasps at self and what belongs to self (ātman and ātmīya)? What the commentary states about "in some places it is said to grasp self and what belongs to self" precisely resolves this objection, as should be understood from the text.