大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.13

3.13

論。而實無有至同一覺故　釋曰。上寄四相釋成義言。此顯始覺不異本覺。而實等者。初標不異。雖曰始得無念之覺。而覺四相方名始覺。然所覺相本來無起待。何不覺始覺別耶。以四相下後以釋成。以彼四相無別自體可辨前後故言俱時。依於一心麁細之念故說覺時而有前後。言而有即前後也。非謂四相而俱是有。既離心外皆無自性。無有俱時前後可立。是故說言皆無自立。既本離心皆無自性。由此不離本覺真體故。言本來平等同一覺也。此總意云。既覺四相說為始覺。所覺無故能覺亦無。故無始覺異於本覺。或此真顯始不異本。謂前所說四種覺相離於本覺皆不可得。故新論云。如是知已則知始覺不可得。以於一心前後同時皆不相應無自性故不異本覺。若作此釋於理無違。令新舊論不相乖返。依此義故楞伽經云。十地即十地無所有何以等。

Treatise: Yet in truth there is no [diversity of initial awakening, because the four characteristics are simultaneous; each lacks independent existence, being originally equal and of the identical awakening].

Commentary: The preceding used the four characteristics metaphorically to explain and establish the doctrinal statements; this reveals that initial awakening is not different from original awakening. "Yet in truth" and so forth initially marks non-difference: although it is called the awakening of having initially attained non-thought, and only by awakening to the four characteristics is it named initial awakening, nevertheless the characterised objects awakened to are originally unarisen—what non-awakening could be awaited to distinguish initial awakening? "Because the four characteristics" below then explains and establishes this: because those four characteristics have no distinct self-nature whereby one could distinguish before and after, it says "are simultaneous". Based on the coarse and subtle thoughts of the one mind, it is said that the times of awakening have before and after; the word "yet" [indicates] precisely before and after. It does not mean that the four characteristics are all simultaneously existent. Since, apart from the mind, they all lack self-nature, there is no simultaneity or before-and-after that can be established. Therefore it says "each lacks independent existence". Since, fundamentally apart from the mind, they all lack self-nature, on this account they are not separate from the true substance of original awakening; hence it says "being originally equal and of the identical awakening". The overall meaning here is: since awakening to the four characteristics is spoken of as initial awakening, because what is awakened to is absent, what awakens is also absent; hence there is no initial awakening different from original awakening. Alternatively, this truly reveals that the initial is not different from the original: that is, the four kinds of awakening characteristics spoken of before, apart from original awakening, are all unattainable. Thus the New Treatise says: "Having known this, one then knows that initial awakening is unattainable." Because with respect to the one mind, before and after and simultaneity are all non-corresponding and devoid of self-nature, it is not different from original awakening. If explained in this way, it does not contravene principle, and makes the New and Old Treatises not contradict each other. Relying on this meaning, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: "The ten stages are just that the ten stages are non-existent; why?" and so forth.