大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.3

3.3

論。此義云何至是不覺故　釋曰。下寄四相釋成其義。於中有二。初正寄四位顯其四相。後引經釋成心源無念。初顯四相。即分為四。此初覺相也。此義云何者問覺不覺義。下舉四相而釋其義。舉前三位未至心源。釋非究竟。舉後一位覺至心源。釋究竟覺。今應先明四相之義。然後依義釋文顯相。然四相義釋者煩多。論意難知。今數四說。此中有義。所說四相即依動念剎那而說。心隨妄動名生。生已逕停名住。住已衰變名異。異已遷謝名滅。然生已至滅。滅已復生。總攝四相名為生滅。是故但名生滅門耳。覺此四相故有四位。四位逆次覺四相也。故說凡夫能覺知等。有義。此說其理不成。若念遷謝名滅相者。即凡夫念應永不滅。覺滅相已則不滅故。異住等相為難亦然。若凡夫位雖覺滅相滅相仍在。應至佛位雖覺生相生相猶存。所起覺相何成利益。又既自說生已至滅滅已復生。既覺滅相不滅故不生不生故不滅。即應凡夫位離生滅念。住異等相為難亦爾。故此所說理必不成故。四相者應依識辨。謂由無明違平等性起業轉現三種生相。相心今生成黎耶識。故業轉現皆名生相。雖此一心為生。所生而亦非是我我所相。無明與前生相和合。迷所生心無我我所。復能發起我癡我見我慢我愛四種住相。相前生心。今至住位起我我所。內緣而住。即所相心成第七識能相。四惑而為住相。無明與彼住相和合。不覺所計我我所空。復能發起六種異相。謂貪嗔癡慢疑惡見。相前住心今至異位。外向攀緣成六異識。故六煩惱名為異相。無明復與異相和合。不覺外塵違順性離。由是發起七支惡業。能滅異心墮於惡趣。故彼七支名為滅相。能相四相所至之位取境別相皆為心所。由本無明違平等性之所起故。所相之心所至之位取境通相而為心王。由從本心諸法總源之所起故。皆依心起名俱時有。有麁細故覺時差別。有義。此說理亦未然。別有能相所相法者。是小乘宗非大乘故。大乘四相但是假立於起有為無功德故。此中四相雖說虛妄。因緣所起非假說故。若由無明起業轉現相。心今作業轉等者。即業轉現皆應有二能相二義異故。心若不作業轉等者。如何能成黎耶生相。無三分心不成識故。又如何言能相。四相所至之位皆為心所。業轉現三非心所故。又若業等皆生相者。三細唯應佛地所斷。如何唯說斷業相耶。應八九地非斷轉現說。是生相唯佛斷故。細中之麁應非轉現說。是菩薩所知境故。細中之細應皆三種許。是生相佛所知故。又業初起可名為生。轉現後起寧生相攝。非由本識攝及是不相應。則今轉現皆生相攝。轉現非是初生心故。若說業識非是已生故兼轉現皆生相者。則我癡等非是已住故兼四惑為住相耶。彼既不然。此云何爾。彼異滅等為難亦然。若我癡等為住相者。末那唯應四惑相應。唯許四惑為住相故。便違論說慧等俱起。既說法身能覺住相。法身唯應能斷末那。即不斷染現色。能見皆應不斷。非四惑故。便違論說。法身菩薩離六染中間四染。既此所離非我癡等。彼住相非謂四惑。若貪等六名異相者。計名執取何所攝耶。非於貪等能攝彼二執惑。行相極差別故。若斷貪等名離異相。即此二染二乘不斷。便違論說。執相應染二乘解脫究竟離故。又應意識唯貪等俱說。六異相起意識故。便違論說觸等俱起。故知異相非謂貪等。若七支惡是滅相者。即未覺時常起惡業永世惡趣。以未覺時有彼七支諸過惡故。生人天者應離滅相。離七支惡生人天故。善惡二趣皆有異熟。豈惡趣業獨名滅相。故知滅相非七支惡。既此所說不應正理。由此四相非同前說。今以二門略辨其義。一辨明。二別說。初總明者。心性本來離生滅念。而有無明動心令作生住異滅。故名相無別四相而作能相心。既由無明鼓心令動遂有微著不同。而先後際異。先際名為生相。後際最麁名為滅相。即彼中際名住異相。二別明者。對位分相。即九相中前之八相。生一住四異二滅一生相。一者即初業相。謂由無明動彼淨心至此最微動念之位動念初起名為生相。論說佛地斷微細念。細中之細是佛境界。故知唯業是生相也。住相四者。謂次四相。所謂轉現智相續相。前二本識。麁分之位。是法我執所住之境。後二事識。細分之位。是法我執能住之心。無明與前生相和合轉彼靜心。乃至此位行相猶細。但是能所別法執□住未別異故。故下論說法身菩薩覺於念住。麁中之細細中之麁菩薩境界界此四相總名住相。異相二者。謂次二相即是執取計名字相。無明與前住相和合轉彼靜心至此事識麁分之位。行相稍麁。依於異根取別異境起異執故。故下論說新發意菩薩覺於念異捨麁分別。麁中之麁凡夫境界。此麁中麁既是意識。意識即攝此二相故。故此二相總名為異。滅相一者。即起業相。即由無明轉彼靜心至此後際周盡之位。能令靜心□於六道如□伎人作牛馬等。故下論說造種種業受果不自在故。以此九相數處得名。或開九相。或本事識。意意識。或為六染。或名二礙。或辨麁細。故今細位說為四相。即指九染。非謂別指我癡等也。有義。此說亦未應理。既說四相皆非能相。不應起業。是其滅相能□靜心是能滅故。四相何不攝。業繫苦亦名所起之妄相故。既生異滅無別能所。寧住相有能所四耶。應生異滅皆有能所。彼既不然。此云何爾。或住異滅皆名異住。隨應皆有別異。執著能成能住異趣身故。彼既不爾。此云何然。若許皆通。便成難□。故此四相不應立也。若以論說念無異相念無住相必應立者。何不具言念無滅等。況新論說中間二相不言住異故不為證。下言心相生住異滅者。此義殊故不為證。謂顯九相皆有生等。得無念者知此九相生起逕停衰變謝滅皆依心起無有自性。非謂別配前之八相。亦非四位別覺四相不同。初師不應為難。又言。四相俱時等者。謂即指其始覺四位。謂顯始覺有四位相。而釋經中四種禪義。非謂安立無明四相。新論但言如是知已則知始覺不可得。以於一心前後同時皆不相應無自性故。謂由無明起麁細念念起皆有生住異滅。而諸凡夫都不覺知念之起滅而受輪迴。今以本覺內外熏力覺念淺深有四位相。何要強立無明四相。若謂障謂二義相成勿違古人。故論立者。生一住四異三滅一。生一住四義如前釋。異相三者兼起業相。起善惡等別異業故。由其異業令趣別故。是麁中麁。意識攝故。皆三賢等所知境故。滅相一者。即業繫苦。靜心□為趣生相故。此是無明所起相故。是最後際終盡處故。至此方成流轉苦故。此釋雖勝第三師義。而於至難亦未能淨。後有智者辨而通之。然此四相唯一夢心。皆因根本無明之力。是故經云。無明住地其力最大。論說無明能生染法。正謂此也。雖復如是從微至著辨四階降。然至始終意無前後。麁細鎔融唯一心故。故說四相俱時而有。若未達心源。隨行淺深覺有前後。若達心源者。一念四相俱時而知。是故經云。菩薩知終而不知始。諸佛如來始終俱知。依此義說始謂生相終謂滅相。既因無明不覺之力起生相等種種夢念動惡心源轉至滅相流轉生死備受諸苦。今由本覺內熏為因善發聞熏而為外緣。體用融通同一熏故。益彼真如解性之力。損彼無明迷闇之相。漸白心源始覺滅相終覺生相。朗然方悟。覺了心源本無所動今無所靜。平等。平等住一如床。無本始覺二相之異。即經所說夢渡河喻意在於此。舉而說之。上辨四相。下釋論文。既前三義不應正理。是故釋文但依正義。即此第一覺相之中□下四義。一能覺人。二所覺相。三覺利益。四覺分齊。下三覺相其義亦然。如凡夫人者。是能覺人。在十千劫十信位中。以是位前都未覺念未離分別。故名凡夫。覺知前念起惡者。明所覺相。謂此位中心如輕毛隨風東西數有進退。前念不覺於身起彼常樂等總而生惑著。即知所起心是惡也。能止後念令不起者。辨覺利益。既覺前惡後。即於身起彼無常無我等相。而生厭離欣樂涅槃。不生滅著顛倒心也。雖復名覺即是不覺者。能覺分齊。覺惡能止雖復名覺。而不覺知舉體是真妄生厭離。即是不覺。故經說云。說身無常而亦不說厭離於身我。今為汝說勝三修法。此即順於四相義解。或此位中未達空理。不知一心本無動念。見有所起念念差別。前念不覺起煩惱。念後起厭心而欲除滅。覺念是惡隨復名覺不覺念無則是不覺。故經說為愚夫所以行禪。七卷經云。漸次增勝無想滅定名愚夫禪。此釋稍好。二論會同故。新論云。前念不覺起於煩惱。後念制伏令不更生。此雖名覺即是不覺。

[Regarding the text of the] treatise: "What does this mean? […] because this is non-awakening": The commentary states: Below, it draws upon the four characteristics to explain and establish their meaning. There are two parts to this: first, it directly draws upon the four stages to reveal the four characteristics; second, it quotes sūtras to explain and establish that the source of the mind is without thought. The first part, revealing the four characteristics, is divided into four. This is the first, the characteristic of awakening. "What does this mean?" questions the meaning of awakening and non-awakening. Below, it adduces the four characteristics to explain their meaning. It adduces the first three stages as not having reached the source of the mind to explain that they are not ultimate. It adduces the latter one stage as having awakened so as to reach the source of the mind to explain ultimate awakening. Now one should first clarify the meaning of the four characteristics, and thereafter explain the text and reveal the characteristics according to that meaning.

Yet explanations of the meaning of the four characteristics are vexingly numerous, and the intention of the treatise is difficult to know. Now I shall recount four explanations.

Here, there is an opinion: The four characteristics spoken of are spoken of precisely with reference to a single moment of active thought. The mind moving in accord with delusion is called "arising." Having arisen, passing through an interval of pause is called "abiding." Having abided, decaying and transforming is called "changing." Having changed, passing away into succession is called "ceasing." Yet, having arisen, it reaches ceasing; having ceased, it arises again. Comprehensively subsuming the four characteristics, it is called "arising and ceasing"; therefore it is named merely the "gate of arising and ceasing." Awakening to these four characteristics, there are consequently four stages; the four stages awaken to the four characteristics in reverse order. Therefore it speaks of "ordinary persons being able to become aware," and so forth.

There is an opinion: The reasoning of this explanation is not established. If a thought's passing away into succession is called the characteristic of ceasing, then an ordinary person's thoughts ought never to cease, because once having awakened to the characteristic of ceasing, it would not cease. The refutation regarding the characteristics of changing, abiding, and so on, is also like this. If in the stage of an ordinary person, although they awaken to the characteristic of ceasing, the characteristic of ceasing still remains, then upon reaching the stage of Buddhahood, although one awakens to the characteristic of arising, the characteristic of arising would still persist; what benefit would the arisen characteristic of awakening achieve? Moreover, since [the proponent] himself says that having arisen, it reaches ceasing, and having ceased, it arises again—once one has awakened to the characteristic of ceasing, because it does not cease, therefore it does not arise; and because it does not arise, therefore it does not cease; thus an ordinary person in their stage ought to be free from thoughts of arising and ceasing. The refutation regarding the characteristics of abiding, changing, and so on, is also like this. Therefore, the reasoning of what is stated here is certainly not established.

Therefore, the four characteristics should be distinguished on the basis of consciousness: that is, due to avidyā contradicting samatā, it produces the three kinds of characteristics of arising—karma, manifestation, and appearance—which characterise the mind so that it now arises and becomes the ālayavijñāna; thus karma, manifestation, and appearance are all named the characteristic of arising. Although this one mind constitutes the produced of arising, it is not yet the characteristic of self and what belongs to self. Avidyā unites with the former characteristic of arising; deluded regarding the produced mind, taking it to be free of self and what belongs to self, it can further give rise to the four kinds of characteristics of abiding: self-delusion, self-view, self-pride, and self-love. These characterise the former arising mind so that it now reaches the stage of abiding, giving rise to self and what belongs to self, abiding by internally conditioning them; that is, the characterised mind becomes the seventh consciousness, while the active characterisers, the four afflictions, constitute the characteristic of abiding. Avidyā unites with that characteristic of abiding; not awakening to the emptiness of the self and what belongs to self that are imputed, it can further give rise to the six kinds of characteristics of changing: namely, craving, anger, delusion, pride, doubt, and evil views. These characterise the former abiding mind so that it now reaches the stage of changing, outwardly grasping conditions and forming the six changing consciousnesses; therefore the six afflictions are named the characteristic of changing. Avidyā again unites with the characteristic of changing; not awakening to the fact that external dust-objects, whether disagreeable or agreeable, are divorced from [inherent] nature, because of this it gives rise to the evil karma of the seven branches, which can extinguish the changing mind and cause one to fall into the evil destinies; therefore those seven branches are named the characteristic of ceasing.

In the stages reached by the four active characterising characteristics, those that apprehend particular characteristics of objects are all cetasikas, because they are produced by fundamental avidyā contradicting samatā. The characterised mind in the stages it reaches, which apprehends common characteristics of objects, constitutes the primary mind, because it is produced from the fundamental mind, the universal source of all phenomena. They are all produced relying on the mind and are said to exist simultaneously. Because there are coarse and subtle [distinctions], there are differences in the times of awakening.

There is an opinion: The reasoning of this explanation is also not yet correct. For there to be separate dharmas of active characterisers and characterised objects belongs to the Hīnayāna tenets and not the Mahāyāna, because the four characteristics in the Mahāyāna are merely nominal designations, lacking efficacious merit in bringing about conditioned things. Although the four characteristics here are said to be false, because they are produced by causes and conditions they are not merely figurative. If, due to avidyā producing karma, manifestation, and appearance, they characterise the mind so that it now performs karma, manifestation, and so forth, then karma, manifestation, and appearance ought each to have two active characterisers, because the two meanings differ. If the mind does not perform karma, manifestation, and so forth, how could it form the arising characteristic of the ālaya? For without the mind of three divisions, a consciousness is not formed. Moreover, how can one say that the stages reached by the four active characterising characteristics are all cetasikas? For karma, manifestation, and appearance are not cetasikas. Furthermore, if karma and the others are all characteristics of arising, the three subtle [aspects] ought only to be severed at the Buddha-ground; why then does it only speak of severing the characteristic of karma? It would follow that on the eighth and ninth grounds one would not sever manifestation and appearance, since it is said that the characteristic of arising is severed only by a Buddha. The coarsest among the subtle ought not to be manifestation and appearance, since it is an object known by bodhisattvas; the subtlest among the subtle ought to be all three kinds, since it is acknowledged that the characteristic of arising is known by a Buddha. Moreover, when karma first arises, it may be called arising; but manifestation and appearance arise later—how could they be subsumed under the characteristic of arising? It is not because they are subsumed under the fundamental consciousness and are non-associated that manifestation and appearance are both subsumed under the characteristic of arising, for manifestation and appearance are not the initially arising mind. If one says that because the karmic consciousness is not what has already arisen, it concurrently includes manifestation and appearance as characteristics of arising, then would self-delusion and the others, because they are not what has already abided, concurrently include the four afflictions as the characteristic of abiding? Since that is not so, how could this be so? The refutation regarding changing, ceasing, and the others is also like this.

If self-delusion and the others constitute the characteristic of abiding, then the manas ought to be associated only with the four afflictions, because it is only acknowledged that the four afflictions constitute the characteristic of abiding; this would then contradict the treatise's statement that wisdom and the others arise concurrently. Since it says that the dharmakāya can awaken to the characteristic of abiding, the dharmakāya ought only to be able to sever the manas; that is, without severing the defilement of manifesting forms, the capacity to see ought likewise not to be severed, because it is not the four afflictions; this would then contradict the treatise's statement that a bodhisattva of the dharmakāya is free from the middle four defilements among the six defilements. Since what is freed from here is not self-delusion and the others, that characteristic of abiding does not refer to the four afflictions. If craving and the other six are named the characteristic of changing, under what are the attachment to names and the characteristic of grasping subsumed? It is not that craving and the others can subsume those two grasping afflictions, because their cognitive forms are extremely different. If severing craving and the others is called being free from the characteristic of changing, then these two defilements would not be severed by the two vehicles; this would then contradict the treatise's statement that the defilement associated with grasping is completely freed from by the liberation of the two vehicles. Furthermore, it would follow that the mental consciousness is associated only with craving and the others, since it is said that the six characteristics of changing give rise to the mental consciousness; this would contradict the treatise's statement that contact and the others arise concurrently. Therefore one knows that the characteristic of changing does not refer to craving and the others.

If the evil of the seven branches is the characteristic of ceasing, then when one has not yet awakened, one would constantly produce evil karma and perpetually dwell in the evil destinies, because when unawakened one has all the faults and evils of those seven branches. Those who are born as humans or devas ought to be free from the characteristic of ceasing, because being free from the evil of the seven branches, they are born as humans or devas. Both the good and evil destinies have maturation; how could karma of the evil destinies alone be called the characteristic of ceasing? Therefore one knows that the characteristic of ceasing is not the evil of the seven branches. Since what is stated here does not accord with correct reasoning, for this reason the four characteristics are not as previously explained.

Now I shall briefly distinguish their meaning by two gates: first, general clarification; second, distinct explanation.

First, general clarification: The nature of the mind is originally free from thoughts of arising and ceasing, yet there is avidyā which stirs the mind, causing it to undergo arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing; therefore they are named characteristics, and there are no separate four characteristics that serve as active characterisers. Since avidyā agitates the mind, causing it to stir, there consequently are differences between subtle and manifest, and differences between earlier and later limits. The earlier limit is named the characteristic of arising; the later limit, being the coarsest, is named the characteristic of ceasing; and that middle limit is named the characteristics of abiding and changing.

Second, distinct explanation: Dividing the characteristics according to stage, they are the first eight characteristics among the nine characteristics: one for arising, four for abiding, two for changing, and one for ceasing. The one for the characteristic of arising is the initial characteristic of karma: that is, due to avidyā stirring that pure mind to reach this stage of the most subtle stirring thought, the initial arising of the stirring thought is named the characteristic of arising. The treatise says that the Buddha-ground severs subtle thoughts, and that the subtlest among the subtle is the sphere of Buddhas; therefore one knows that karma alone is the characteristic of arising. The four for the characteristic of abiding are the next four characteristics: namely, manifestation, appearance, cognition, and continuity. The former two are the stage of the coarse division of the fundamental consciousness, being the sphere upon which attachment to dharma-self abides; the latter two are the stage of the subtle division of the phenomenal consciousness, being the mind that can abide in attachment to dharma-self. Avidyā unites with the former characteristic of arising and turns that tranquil mind; up to this stage its cognitive form is still subtle, merely being the abiding of the distinct grasping of dharma as subject and object, not yet differentiated; therefore the treatise below says that a bodhisattva of the dharmakāya awakens to the abiding of thought, the subtlest of the coarse and the coarsest of the subtle being the sphere of bodhisattvas; these four characteristics are collectively named the characteristic of abiding. The two for the characteristic of changing are the next two characteristics: that is, the characteristic of grasping and the characteristic of attachment to names. Avidyā unites with the former characteristic of abiding and turns that tranquil mind to reach this stage of the coarse division of the phenomenal consciousness; its cognitive form is somewhat coarse, relying on different sense bases to grasp distinct objects and give rise to different attachments; therefore the treatise below says that a newly resolved bodhisattva awakens to the changing of thought and abandons coarse conceptual discrimination, the coarsest of the coarse being the sphere of ordinary persons; since this coarsest of the coarse is the mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness precisely subsumes these two characteristics, therefore these two characteristics are collectively named changing. The one for the characteristic of ceasing is the characteristic of initiating karma: that is, due to avidyā turning that tranquil mind to reach this stage of the complete culmination of the later limit, it can cause the tranquil mind to [wander] in the six destinies, like […] an actor playing cows, horses, and so forth; therefore the treatise below says that through performing various karmas, one undergoes retribution without freedom. Because these nine characteristics acquire their names in several places—either expanding into nine characteristics, or fundamental consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, manas and mental consciousness, or six defilements, or two hindrances, or distinguishing coarse and subtle—therefore now these subtle stages are spoken of as the four characteristics, precisely referring to the nine defilements, and not meaning specifically self-delusion and the others.

There is an opinion: This explanation is also not yet reasonable. Since it says that none of the four characteristics are active characterisers, it is inappropriate that initiating karma is its characteristic of ceasing, for being able to […] the tranquil mind, it is an active extinguisher. Why do the four characteristics not subsume the suffering bound to karma, since it is also named a false characteristic that is produced? Since arising, changing, and ceasing have no separate subject and object, why should the characteristic of abiding have the four of subject and object? It would follow that arising, changing, and ceasing would all have subject and object. Since that is not so, how could this be so? Or changing, abiding, and ceasing might all be named different abidings, since according to circumstance they all have differences; grasping can form and abide in bodies of different destinies; since that is not so, how could this be so? If one allows that they all pervade, it would then become difficult to [maintain]. Therefore these four characteristics should not be established [in this way].

If one holds that because the treatise says "thought has no characteristic of changing" and "thought has no characteristic of abiding," they must necessarily be established, why does it not fully say "thought has no ceasing," and so forth? Moreover, the new translation speaks of the middle two characteristics without mentioning "abiding" and "changing"; hence it does not serve as evidence. What is said below about the mind's characteristics of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing does not serve as evidence because this meaning is distinct: that is, it reveals that the nine characteristics all have arising and so forth; one who attains thoughtlessness knows that these nine characteristics—arising, pausing, decaying, and passing away—all arise relying on the mind and have no self-nature; it does not mean specifically matching them with the former eight characteristics, nor does it mean that the four stages separately awaken to the four characteristics differently from the first master; one should not raise this refutation. Furthermore, regarding the statement that the four characteristics are simultaneous and so forth: this refers precisely to the four stages of initial awakening, meaning it reveals that initial awakening has the marks of four stages, thereby explaining the meaning of the four kinds of dhyāna in the sūtra, and not meaning the establishment of the four characteristics of avidyā. The new translation merely says: having known this, one then knows that initial awakening is unobtainable, because in the one mind, earlier, later, and simultaneous are all non-associated and devoid of self-nature. That is to say, due to avidyā coarse and subtle thoughts are produced, and in every thought that arises there are arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, yet ordinary persons are entirely unaware of the arising and ceasing of thoughts and undergo saṃsāra. Now, by the internal and external perfuming power of original awakening, the depth and shallowness of awakening to thoughts has the marks of four stages; why is it necessary to forcibly establish the four characteristics of avidyā?

If one says that both the meanings of hindrance and [counteraction] are accomplished together, not contradicting the ancients, then what the treatise establishes is: one for arising, four for abiding, three for changing, and one for ceasing. Arising as one and abiding as four have the meanings as explained before. Changing as three includes the characteristic of initiating karma, because it initiates various different karmas such as good and evil, and by its different karmas it causes the destinies to be differentiated; it is the coarsest of the coarse, subsumed under the mental consciousness, and the sphere known by those of the three stages of worthies and so forth. Ceasing as one is precisely the suffering bound to karma, because the tranquil mind […] becomes the characteristics of the destinies and births; this is because it is a characteristic produced by avidyā and because it is the ultimate culmination of the later limit, for only upon reaching this does it form the suffering of transmigration. Although this explanation is superior to the meaning of the third master, it is still not entirely clear regarding the most difficult points. Let later wise persons discern and resolve them.

However, these four characteristics are solely one dreaming mind, all caused by the power of fundamental avidyā. Therefore a sūtra says: "The entrenchment of avidyā has the greatest power." The treatise says that avidyā can produce defiled phenomena, which refers precisely to this. Although in this way it distinguishes four gradations from subtle to manifest, when reaching from beginning to end there is essentially no earlier or later, because coarse and subtle are fused into the one mind alone. Therefore it is said that the four characteristics exist simultaneously. If one has not reached the source of the mind, in accordance with the depth or shallowness of practice, awakening has earlier and later; if one reaches the source of the mind, in a single thought the four characteristics are known simultaneously. Therefore a sūtra says: "Bodhisattvas know the end but do not know the beginning; the Buddha Tathāgatas know both beginning and end." Relying on this meaning, it is said that the beginning refers to the characteristic of arising and the end refers to the characteristic of ceasing. Since, due to the non-awakening power of avidyā, it gives rise to various dreaming thoughts such as the characteristic of arising, stirring the source of the evil mind, turning until reaching the characteristic of ceasing, transmigrating through birth and death and undergoing all sufferings—now, with the internal perfuming of original awakening as cause, skillfully giving rise to the perfuming of hearing as external condition, substance and activity fuse together into a single perfuming; this increases the power of that nature of understanding of tathatā and diminishes that characteristic of delusion and darkness of avidyā. Gradually purifying the source of the mind, one initially awakens to the characteristic of ceasing and finally awakens to the characteristic of arising. Radiantly, one then awakens, thoroughly awakening to the source of the mind as originally without stirring and now without stillness; equally and impartially, one abides on the couch of suchness, without the difference of the two characteristics of original and initial awakening. The metaphor in the sūtra of crossing a river in a dream has its intention precisely here; it is adduced and stated.

Above, the four characteristics were distinguished; below, the text of the treatise is explained. Since the previous three meanings do not accord with correct reasoning, the explanation of the text therefore relies solely on the correct meaning. In this very first characteristic of awakening, there are four meanings below: first, the person who can awaken; second, the characteristic that is awakened to; third, the benefit of awakening; fourth, the extent of awakening. The three characteristics of awakening below also have the same meaning.

"Like an ordinary person": this is the person who can awaken. In the stage of the ten faiths over ten thousand kalpas, because before this stage they have not yet awakened to thought at all and have not separated from conceptual discrimination, they are called an ordinary person.

"Becoming aware that a previous thought has produced evil": this clarifies the characteristic that is awakened to. In this stage, the mind is like a light feather, going east and west with the wind, frequently advancing and retreating. In the previous thought, unawakened, they give rise with respect to the body to notions of permanence, pleasure, and so on, generating delusion and attachment; then they know that the mind that has arisen is evil.

"Being able to stop the subsequent thought so that it does not arise": this distinguishes the benefit of awakening. Having awakened to the previous evil, subsequently they then give rise with respect to the body to the characteristics of impermanence, non-self, and so on, generating revulsion and aspiring to nirvāṇa, not producing an inverted mind that clings to arising and ceasing.

"Although it is named awakening, it is non-awakening": this is the extent of awakening. Awakening to evil and being able to stop it, although it is named awakening, yet not knowing that its entire substance is real and falsely generating revulsion is precisely non-awakening. Therefore a sūtra says: "I speak of the body as impermanent, but I do not speak of revulsion toward the body; I now speak for you of the superior method of the three cultivations." This then accords with the explanation under the meaning of the four characteristics.

Alternatively, in this stage one has not yet penetrated the principle of emptiness and does not know that the one mind is originally without stirring thoughts; seeing what has arisen as distinct from thought to thought, the previous thought being unawakened produces afflictions, and the subsequent thought produces a mind of revulsion wishing to eradicate them; awakening to the thought as evil is accordingly named awakening, but not awakening to the non-existence of thought is then non-awakening. Therefore a sūtra speaks of this as "the dhyāna practiced by foolish persons." The seven-fascicle sūtra says: "Gradually increasing in excellence, the cessation attainment of non-conception is named the foolish person's dhyāna." This explanation is somewhat better, because the two treatises are in agreement. The new translation says: "A previous thought being unawakened produces afflictions; a subsequent thought subdues them so that they do not arise again; although this is named awakening, it is non-awakening."