大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.53

3.53

論。此義云何至說有無明　釋曰。次下別釋。於中有三。先釋依心。次釋意轉。後意識轉。此初也。上言依心意等轉者。義云何耶。故此釋也。依阿黎耶識者。是上依心是生滅因。即阿黎耶二義之中本覺義也。說有無明者是生滅緣。即二義中不覺義也。依此因緣意意識轉。故言以依黎耶識等。前標文略。但言依心。今此別釋具顯因緣。故說依心及無明也。問。前說依覺有不覺力動靜心體方成黎耶。如何今說識有無明。有義。此中阿黎耶者即是本覺不生滅心。以此本覺不自知義說有無明。不覺而起即業識等前七識也。故前後說亦不相違。有義。不能違論說故說二和合方成黎耶。有覺不覺二義別故。若如所說。生不生滅覺不覺義應無別故。若爾便無和合之義。寧說和合成此識耶。應知依識有無明者。識有二義。謂覺不覺。前別就本故云依覺有不覺動而成識。今就和合總聚而說故言依識有無明也。有義。此釋理亦未圓。今此意顯真心為因無明為緣成黎耶識。應說依真有無明動成業轉現阿黎耶識寧却就識說有無明。然後復言成業識等。許則便有兩熏本識。應知此中黎耶識者唯取真心隨緣之義。此隨緣義難名目故。或就未起起說依覺有不覺。或約已起故言依識有無明。要就二名方盡其義。是故前後綺互言耳。然起未起雖義有殊。皆與無明為依止故。故於二處皆說無明。非總聚中而無無明。但非就於總聚而說唯依體說有無明也。問。若謂黎耶有無明者。如何會通諸論所說。謂瑜伽等皆說賴耶白淨無記一向捨受。若有無明則成雜染。豈堪受彼染淨熏耶。答。諸論且約麁義而說以為初入大乘人故。而實此識有本無明。今且略以三義明之。一迷無相不證真故。不爾此識應緣真諦。則一眾生半迷半悟故。二於果位鏡智俱故。若因位無明餘識相應者。應果位鏡智餘無漏識起。以於二位相敵對故。三於因位性無記故。若一向淨唯名為善。則屬真心。一向染者則名不善。唯屬妄心。二心和合非定染淨方成無記。若無無明。何以簡染成無記耶。由此三義故知此識定有無明。然其無明有麁有細。麁在事識。細在本識。論許無明在事識者。且約麁相說麁相說麁無明。不妨細者亦在本識。若爾如何受熏持種。既有無明違善熏故。答。雖有無明性非不善。受善等熏於理何失。若無無明一向清淨。如何受彼不善熏耶。故受熏者要有無明。不應舉彼七識為難。以其無明麁細異故。況受熏體唯是真如。是故賴耶受熟識者。但是如染淨分位引迴心者。假就麁相言彼受熏不違教理。若爾佛位亦應受熏。以有受熏真如體故。此難不然。無無明故。離和合相淳淨明故。既無能熏非所熏故。由此汝宗佛應受熏。有淨能所可熏體故。不可說言滿故不熏。以非質礙能所熏故。

Treatise: "What does this mean? [...] it is said that there is avidyā." Commentary: Next is the specific explanation. In this there are three parts: first, explaining "relying on the mind"; second, explaining the evolving of the manas; third, the evolving of the mental consciousness. This is the first.

It was stated above that they "evolve dependent upon the mind, manas, etc."; what does this mean? Hence this is explained. "Relying on the ālayavijñāna" is the aforementioned "relying on the mind," which is the cause of arising and ceasing—that is, the meaning of original awakening between the two aspects of the ālayavijñāna. "It is said that there is avidyā" is the condition of arising and ceasing—that is, the meaning of non-awakening between the two aspects. Relying on these causes and conditions, the manas and mental consciousness evolve; therefore it says, "Because of relying on the ālayavijñāna, etc." The preceding introductory text was brief, only stating "relying on the mind"; now this specific explanation fully reveals the causes and conditions, hence it speaks of relying on the mind and avidyā.

Question: Previously it was said that relying on awakening there is the power of non-awakening that stirs the quiescent mind-substance, only then forming the ālayavijñāna. Why does it now say that the consciousness has avidyā?

There is an interpretation: The ālayavijñāna here is just the unarising and unceasing mind of original awakening; because this original awakening does not know itself, it is said that there is avidyā. Arising from non-awakening is the karmic consciousness, etc., the preceding seven consciousnesses. Thus the former and latter statements are not contradictory.

There is an interpretation: One cannot contradict the treatise's statement; thus it is said that the integration of the two only then forms the ālayavijñāna, because there is the distinction of the two meanings of awakening and non-awakening. If it were as you said, the meanings of arising and non-arising-ceasing, and awakening and non-awakening, would have no distinction. If so, then there would be no meaning of integration; how could it be said that their integration forms this consciousness? One should know that when it says relying on consciousness there is avidyā, consciousness has two meanings: namely, awakening and non-awakening. Previously, it spoke specifically with respect to the fundamental, hence saying that relying on awakening there is the stirring of non-awakening to form the consciousness. Now, it speaks with respect to the total aggregate of integration, hence saying that relying on consciousness there is avidyā.

There is an interpretation: The principle of this explanation is also not yet complete. Now this intention is to reveal that the true mind is the cause and avidyā is the condition to form the ālayavijñāna. One should say that relying on the real there is the stirring of avidyā to form the karmic, evolving, and manifesting ālayavijñāna; why instead speak of consciousness having avidyā, and then further say that it forms the karmic consciousness, etc.? If this were conceded, then there would be two perfusions of the fundamental consciousness. One should know that "ālayavijñāna" here takes solely the meaning of the true mind following conditions. Because this meaning of following conditions is difficult to designate, it either speaks with respect to that which has not yet arisen, saying "relying on awakening there is non-awakening," or it refers to that which has already arisen, hence saying "relying on consciousness there is avidyā." It must rely on both terms to exhaust its meaning; for this reason, the earlier and later texts are phrased alternately. Although there is a difference between having arisen and not yet arisen, both serve as the basis for avidyā; therefore, avidyā is spoken of in both places. It is not that there is no avidyā within the total aggregate; but rather than speaking with respect to the total aggregate, it speaks solely of avidyā relying on the substance.

Question: If one says that the ālayavijñāna has avidyā, how does one reconcile this with what is taught in the various treatises? Treatises like the Yogācārabhūmi all state that the ālaya is purely white, morally indeterminate, and exclusively accompanied by neutral sensation. If it has avidyā, it would become defiled; how could it be capable of receiving the perfusions of both defilement and purity?

Answer: The various treatises merely speak according to the coarse meaning for the sake of those newly entering the Mahāyāna; in reality, this consciousness has fundamental avidyā. Now we will briefly clarify this with three points:
First, it is deluded about the signless and does not realize the real. Otherwise, this consciousness should take the absolute truth as its object, and then a single sentient being would be half-deluded and half-awakened.
Second, at the stage of fruition it is concurrent with the mirror cognition. If in the causal stage avidyā were associated with the other consciousnesses, then at the stage of fruition the mirror cognition would arise in the other untainted consciousnesses, because in the two stages they directly oppose each other.
Third, in the causal stage its nature is morally indeterminate. If it were exclusively pure, it would be called only wholesome and would belong to the true mind; if it were exclusively defiled, it would be called unwholesome and would belong solely to the deluded mind. The integration of the two minds is not determinately defiled or pure, only then forming the morally indeterminate. If there were no avidyā, how could defilement be differentiated to establish the morally indeterminate?
From these three points, one knows that this consciousness definitely has avidyā. However, its avidyā has coarse and subtle aspects: the coarse is in the phenomenal consciousness, while the subtle is in the fundamental consciousness. Where the treatises allow avidyā to be in the phenomenal consciousness, they merely speak of the coarse avidyā with respect to the coarse characteristics; this does not preclude the subtle one from also being in the fundamental consciousness.
[Objection:] If so, how can it receive perfusions and maintain seeds? Since it has avidyā, it would contradict the perfusion of the wholesome.
Answer: Although it has avidyā, its nature is not unwholesome; what flaw in principle is there in receiving the perfusion of the wholesome, etc.? If it did not have avidyā and were exclusively pure, how could it receive the perfusion of the unwholesome? Therefore, that which receives perfusion must have avidyā; one should not raise an objection based on the seven consciousnesses, because their avidyā differs in coarseness and subtlety. Furthermore, the substance that receives perfusion is solely tathatā. Therefore, the ālaya receiving maturation is merely tathatā in the stages of defilement and purity; to guide those who turn their minds, it provisionally states in terms of coarse characteristics that it receives perfusion, which does not contradict teachings or reasoning.
[Objection:] If so, the Buddha stage should also receive perfusion, because it possesses the substance of tathatā that receives perfusion.
This objection is incorrect: because there is no avidyā, it is free from the characteristics of integration and is purely and brightly immaculate. Since there is no perfusing agent, there is nothing to be perfused. Rather, according to your school, the Buddha should receive perfusion, because there is a pure perfusing agent and object, an entity that can be perfused. One cannot say that because it is full it is not perfused, since perfusing and being perfused are not physical obstructions.