大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.60

3.60

論。五者名為至不斷故　釋曰。此亦事識細分之位。此細事識法執相應執無斷故名相續識。若謂此二是事識者。寧意識中方立名耶。答。以彼亦麁有通別名。通名事識。別名智等。如三細相名亦通別。通名黎耶。別名業等。下意識中方立名者。增顯更說影顯前故。如現境相說為黎耶。而賴耶名亦通業識。又依我見立意識名。豈意識名唯屬我見。許則二乘應離意識。寧說二乘意識熏習。又此黎耶所現境相既是此中所分別事。此於彼境染淨苦樂覺念分別。寧非事識。不爾此是何識所收。不應說是七八二識。末那不緣外境相故。本識不起染淨相故。故屬屬事識其理必然。不可難言此二亦我執。雖同事識麁細各別故。如業轉現同本識體。業識未有能所相故。若如所難二執無別。便與諸教極相違故。故此但是細分法執同名事識。於理無違故。故此但是細分法執同名事識。於理無違。若爾寧說事識熏習能受凡夫業繫苦相。答。此事識者通法我相。彼就具足二相處說故。事識熏習凡夫苦。若二乘人唯有法執。雖有熏習無業繫苦。已斷我相發業用故。如八九地離現見染。豈得說無本識心耶。此亦如是。故唯法執亦名事識。於理無違。若爾六染為是識體。為是事識體應心所。答。是事識體非謂心所。說是所起事識心故。說為不斷相應染等。與染心所相應義故。說意識者。即相續識。故知諸染無別體。故但名為意及意識等。非是相應心所義故。事識心所即未無明。乃是能起見愛惑故。此六不攝見愛煩惱。皆是見愛所起識故。隨業用別假立多名。如業轉現但一識故。由與彼等心所相應而於一識開此諸相。非謂諸相即是心所。

The treatise says: "Fifth is called [the continuing consciousness], because ... without interruption."

Exposition: This is also the subtle stage of phenomenal consciousness. Because this subtle phenomenal consciousness is associated with attachment to dharmas and its grasping is uninterrupted, it is called the continuing consciousness.

If one claims that these two are phenomenal consciousness, why is their name established only within mental consciousness? Answer: Because they are also coarse, they have general and specific names. The general name is phenomenal consciousness; the specific names are cognition, etc. Just as the three subtle marks also have general and specific names: the general name is ālayavijñāna; the specific names are karma, etc. That their names are established below within mental consciousness is to further illuminate and state them, shadowing and revealing what came before. For example, the mark of manifesting objects is called ālayavijñāna, yet the name ālaya also extends to the karmic consciousness. Furthermore, establishing the name "mental consciousness" based on the view of self—how could the name "mental consciousness" belong only to the view of self? If that were accepted, the two vehicles should be free from mental consciousness; why then speak of the perfuming of mental consciousness in the two vehicles? Moreover, since the marks of objects manifested by this ālayavijñāna are precisely the phenomena discriminated here, when this [consciousness] cognizes and discriminates defilement, purity, suffering, and pleasure regarding those objects, how could it not be phenomenal consciousness? Otherwise, under which consciousness would this be subsumed? It should not be said to be the seventh or eighth consciousnesses: the manas does not take external marks of objects as its object, and the fundamental consciousness does not give rise to marks of defilement and purity. Therefore, that it belongs to phenomenal consciousness is inevitable in principle.

One cannot object that these two are also grasping of self. Although they both belong to phenomenal consciousness, their coarseness and subtlety are each distinct, just as karma, manifestation, and appearance share the substance of the fundamental consciousness, yet the karmic consciousness does not yet have active and passive marks. If, as in the objection, the two graspings were not distinct, it would greatly contradict the various teachings. Therefore, this is merely subtle attachment to dharmas and is equally called phenomenal consciousness; this is without contradiction in principle. Therefore, this is merely subtle attachment to dharmas and is equally called phenomenal consciousness; this is without contradiction in principle.

If so, why is it said that the perfuming of phenomenal consciousness can experience the suffering marks of being bound by karma for ordinary beings? Answer: This phenomenal consciousness extends to both marks of dharma and self. That [statement] is made regarding the locus where both marks are complete; hence the perfuming of phenomenal consciousness brings suffering to ordinary beings. In the case of people of the two vehicles, they have only attachment to dharmas; although they have perfuming, they lack the suffering of karmic bondage, because they have already severed the mark of self and its function of initiating karma. Just as on the eighth and ninth grounds one is free from the defilements of appearance and manifestation, could one say that the mind of the fundamental consciousness is absent? This is also like that. Therefore, having only attachment to dharmas is also called phenomenal consciousness; this is without contradiction in principle.

If so, are the six defilements the substance of consciousness, or are they the mental factors that correspond to the substance of phenomenal consciousness? Answer: They are the substance of phenomenal consciousness, not mental factors. Because they are spoken of as the arising mind of phenomenal consciousness, they are called the uninterrupted associated defilement, etc., in the sense of being associated with defiled mental factors. What is called mental consciousness is precisely the continuing consciousness. Hence we know that the various defilements have no separate substance; thus they are merely called manas, mental consciousness, and so forth, and not in the sense of associated mental factors. The mental factors of phenomenal consciousness are secondary avidyā, which are indeed the afflictions of view and attachment that can arise. These six do not subsume the afflictions of view and attachment, because they are all consciousnesses arisen from view and attachment. In accordance with distinct karmic functions, multiple names are provisionally established, just as karma, manifestation, and appearance are only a single consciousness. Because it is associated with those mental factors, these various marks are opened within a single consciousness; it does not mean that the various marks are themselves mental factors.