大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Tankuang of the Ximing Monastery in the capital.

Treatise: "Furthermore, by awakening the mind... [up to] is not ultimate awakening." / Commentary: Below, the two awakenings are broadly explained. Herein there are two [parts]: first, clarifying initial awakening; later, revealing original awakening. In the former there are also three [parts]: [first,] generally marking the causal and fruition, complete and incomplete awakenings; next, broadly relying on the four characteristics to explain and establish its meaning; later, revealing that initial awakening is not different [from original awakening]. This is the first [part]. / As for the phrase "source of the mind", it has three meanings: original awakening as tathatā is the source of the defiled mind; the subtle thoughts of the characteristic of karma are the source of all defiled minds; the deluded mind of vast consciousness is the source of all sensory objects. The first two admit of two interpretations; the last one is solely a karmadhāraya compound. What is awakened here is explained based on the first two, because the movement and stillness of the true and deluded are extremely subtle. Awakening to the mind of original awakening, originally it is unmoved, and now it has nothing stilled; manifesting karma and awakening to the karmic consciousness, originally it is unarisen, and now it has nothing ceased. One who awakens to this source is called "ultimate awakening"; that is, the stage of Buddhahood. The path of initial awakening is perfected, identical with original awakening; because it is the complete awakening. Even if one has some awakening, if one has not reached this source, it is not ultimate awakening; that is, the preceding stages. Because beginning and end are identical with the origin, it is not the ultimate awakening.

3.3

[Regarding the text of the] treatise: "What does this mean? […] because this is non-awakening": The commentary states: Below, it draws upon the four characteristics to explain and establish their meaning. There are two parts to this: first, it directly draws upon the four stages to reveal the four characteristics; second, it quotes sūtras to explain and establish that the source of the mind is without thought. The first part, revealing the four characteristics, is divided into four. This is the first, the characteristic of awakening. "What does this mean?" questions the meaning of awakening and non-awakening. Below, it adduces the four characteristics to explain their meaning. It adduces the first three stages as not having reached the source of the mind to explain that they are not ultimate. It adduces the latter one stage as having awakened so as to reach the source of the mind to explain ultimate awakening. Now one should first clarify the meaning of the four characteristics, and thereafter explain the text and reveal the characteristics according to that meaning.

Yet explanations of the meaning of the four characteristics are vexingly numerous, and the intention of the treatise is difficult to know. Now I shall recount four explanations.

Here, there is an opinion: The four characteristics spoken of are spoken of precisely with reference to a single moment of active thought. The mind moving in accord with delusion is called "arising." Having arisen, passing through an interval of pause is called "abiding." Having abided, decaying and transforming is called "changing." Having changed, passing away into succession is called "ceasing." Yet, having arisen, it reaches ceasing; having ceased, it arises again. Comprehensively subsuming the four characteristics, it is called "arising and ceasing"; therefore it is named merely the "gate of arising and ceasing." Awakening to these four characteristics, there are consequently four stages; the four stages awaken to the four characteristics in reverse order. Therefore it speaks of "ordinary persons being able to become aware," and so forth.

There is an opinion: The reasoning of this explanation is not established. If a thought's passing away into succession is called the characteristic of ceasing, then an ordinary person's thoughts ought never to cease, because once having awakened to the characteristic of ceasing, it would not cease. The refutation regarding the characteristics of changing, abiding, and so on, is also like this. If in the stage of an ordinary person, although they awaken to the characteristic of ceasing, the characteristic of ceasing still remains, then upon reaching the stage of Buddhahood, although one awakens to the characteristic of arising, the characteristic of arising would still persist; what benefit would the arisen characteristic of awakening achieve? Moreover, since [the proponent] himself says that having arisen, it reaches ceasing, and having ceased, it arises again—once one has awakened to the characteristic of ceasing, because it does not cease, therefore it does not arise; and because it does not arise, therefore it does not cease; thus an ordinary person in their stage ought to be free from thoughts of arising and ceasing. The refutation regarding the characteristics of abiding, changing, and so on, is also like this. Therefore, the reasoning of what is stated here is certainly not established.

Therefore, the four characteristics should be distinguished on the basis of consciousness: that is, due to avidyā contradicting samatā, it produces the three kinds of characteristics of arising—karma, manifestation, and appearance—which characterise the mind so that it now arises and becomes the ālayavijñāna; thus karma, manifestation, and appearance are all named the characteristic of arising. Although this one mind constitutes the produced of arising, it is not yet the characteristic of self and what belongs to self. Avidyā unites with the former characteristic of arising; deluded regarding the produced mind, taking it to be free of self and what belongs to self, it can further give rise to the four kinds of characteristics of abiding: self-delusion, self-view, self-pride, and self-love. These characterise the former arising mind so that it now reaches the stage of abiding, giving rise to self and what belongs to self, abiding by internally conditioning them; that is, the characterised mind becomes the seventh consciousness, while the active characterisers, the four afflictions, constitute the characteristic of abiding. Avidyā unites with that characteristic of abiding; not awakening to the emptiness of the self and what belongs to self that are imputed, it can further give rise to the six kinds of characteristics of changing: namely, craving, anger, delusion, pride, doubt, and evil views. These characterise the former abiding mind so that it now reaches the stage of changing, outwardly grasping conditions and forming the six changing consciousnesses; therefore the six afflictions are named the characteristic of changing. Avidyā again unites with the characteristic of changing; not awakening to the fact that external dust-objects, whether disagreeable or agreeable, are divorced from [inherent] nature, because of this it gives rise to the evil karma of the seven branches, which can extinguish the changing mind and cause one to fall into the evil destinies; therefore those seven branches are named the characteristic of ceasing.

In the stages reached by the four active characterising characteristics, those that apprehend particular characteristics of objects are all cetasikas, because they are produced by fundamental avidyā contradicting samatā. The characterised mind in the stages it reaches, which apprehends common characteristics of objects, constitutes the primary mind, because it is produced from the fundamental mind, the universal source of all phenomena. They are all produced relying on the mind and are said to exist simultaneously. Because there are coarse and subtle [distinctions], there are differences in the times of awakening.

There is an opinion: The reasoning of this explanation is also not yet correct. For there to be separate dharmas of active characterisers and characterised objects belongs to the Hīnayāna tenets and not the Mahāyāna, because the four characteristics in the Mahāyāna are merely nominal designations, lacking efficacious merit in bringing about conditioned things. Although the four characteristics here are said to be false, because they are produced by causes and conditions they are not merely figurative. If, due to avidyā producing karma, manifestation, and appearance, they characterise the mind so that it now performs karma, manifestation, and so forth, then karma, manifestation, and appearance ought each to have two active characterisers, because the two meanings differ. If the mind does not perform karma, manifestation, and so forth, how could it form the arising characteristic of the ālaya? For without the mind of three divisions, a consciousness is not formed. Moreover, how can one say that the stages reached by the four active characterising characteristics are all cetasikas? For karma, manifestation, and appearance are not cetasikas. Furthermore, if karma and the others are all characteristics of arising, the three subtle [aspects] ought only to be severed at the Buddha-ground; why then does it only speak of severing the characteristic of karma? It would follow that on the eighth and ninth grounds one would not sever manifestation and appearance, since it is said that the characteristic of arising is severed only by a Buddha. The coarsest among the subtle ought not to be manifestation and appearance, since it is an object known by bodhisattvas; the subtlest among the subtle ought to be all three kinds, since it is acknowledged that the characteristic of arising is known by a Buddha. Moreover, when karma first arises, it may be called arising; but manifestation and appearance arise later—how could they be subsumed under the characteristic of arising? It is not because they are subsumed under the fundamental consciousness and are non-associated that manifestation and appearance are both subsumed under the characteristic of arising, for manifestation and appearance are not the initially arising mind. If one says that because the karmic consciousness is not what has already arisen, it concurrently includes manifestation and appearance as characteristics of arising, then would self-delusion and the others, because they are not what has already abided, concurrently include the four afflictions as the characteristic of abiding? Since that is not so, how could this be so? The refutation regarding changing, ceasing, and the others is also like this.

If self-delusion and the others constitute the characteristic of abiding, then the manas ought to be associated only with the four afflictions, because it is only acknowledged that the four afflictions constitute the characteristic of abiding; this would then contradict the treatise's statement that wisdom and the others arise concurrently. Since it says that the dharmakāya can awaken to the characteristic of abiding, the dharmakāya ought only to be able to sever the manas; that is, without severing the defilement of manifesting forms, the capacity to see ought likewise not to be severed, because it is not the four afflictions; this would then contradict the treatise's statement that a bodhisattva of the dharmakāya is free from the middle four defilements among the six defilements. Since what is freed from here is not self-delusion and the others, that characteristic of abiding does not refer to the four afflictions. If craving and the other six are named the characteristic of changing, under what are the attachment to names and the characteristic of grasping subsumed? It is not that craving and the others can subsume those two grasping afflictions, because their cognitive forms are extremely different. If severing craving and the others is called being free from the characteristic of changing, then these two defilements would not be severed by the two vehicles; this would then contradict the treatise's statement that the defilement associated with grasping is completely freed from by the liberation of the two vehicles. Furthermore, it would follow that the mental consciousness is associated only with craving and the others, since it is said that the six characteristics of changing give rise to the mental consciousness; this would contradict the treatise's statement that contact and the others arise concurrently. Therefore one knows that the characteristic of changing does not refer to craving and the others.

If the evil of the seven branches is the characteristic of ceasing, then when one has not yet awakened, one would constantly produce evil karma and perpetually dwell in the evil destinies, because when unawakened one has all the faults and evils of those seven branches. Those who are born as humans or devas ought to be free from the characteristic of ceasing, because being free from the evil of the seven branches, they are born as humans or devas. Both the good and evil destinies have maturation; how could karma of the evil destinies alone be called the characteristic of ceasing? Therefore one knows that the characteristic of ceasing is not the evil of the seven branches. Since what is stated here does not accord with correct reasoning, for this reason the four characteristics are not as previously explained.

Now I shall briefly distinguish their meaning by two gates: first, general clarification; second, distinct explanation.

First, general clarification: The nature of the mind is originally free from thoughts of arising and ceasing, yet there is avidyā which stirs the mind, causing it to undergo arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing; therefore they are named characteristics, and there are no separate four characteristics that serve as active characterisers. Since avidyā agitates the mind, causing it to stir, there consequently are differences between subtle and manifest, and differences between earlier and later limits. The earlier limit is named the characteristic of arising; the later limit, being the coarsest, is named the characteristic of ceasing; and that middle limit is named the characteristics of abiding and changing.

Second, distinct explanation: Dividing the characteristics according to stage, they are the first eight characteristics among the nine characteristics: one for arising, four for abiding, two for changing, and one for ceasing. The one for the characteristic of arising is the initial characteristic of karma: that is, due to avidyā stirring that pure mind to reach this stage of the most subtle stirring thought, the initial arising of the stirring thought is named the characteristic of arising. The treatise says that the Buddha-ground severs subtle thoughts, and that the subtlest among the subtle is the sphere of Buddhas; therefore one knows that karma alone is the characteristic of arising. The four for the characteristic of abiding are the next four characteristics: namely, manifestation, appearance, cognition, and continuity. The former two are the stage of the coarse division of the fundamental consciousness, being the sphere upon which attachment to dharma-self abides; the latter two are the stage of the subtle division of the phenomenal consciousness, being the mind that can abide in attachment to dharma-self. Avidyā unites with the former characteristic of arising and turns that tranquil mind; up to this stage its cognitive form is still subtle, merely being the abiding of the distinct grasping of dharma as subject and object, not yet differentiated; therefore the treatise below says that a bodhisattva of the dharmakāya awakens to the abiding of thought, the subtlest of the coarse and the coarsest of the subtle being the sphere of bodhisattvas; these four characteristics are collectively named the characteristic of abiding. The two for the characteristic of changing are the next two characteristics: that is, the characteristic of grasping and the characteristic of attachment to names. Avidyā unites with the former characteristic of abiding and turns that tranquil mind to reach this stage of the coarse division of the phenomenal consciousness; its cognitive form is somewhat coarse, relying on different sense bases to grasp distinct objects and give rise to different attachments; therefore the treatise below says that a newly resolved bodhisattva awakens to the changing of thought and abandons coarse conceptual discrimination, the coarsest of the coarse being the sphere of ordinary persons; since this coarsest of the coarse is the mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness precisely subsumes these two characteristics, therefore these two characteristics are collectively named changing. The one for the characteristic of ceasing is the characteristic of initiating karma: that is, due to avidyā turning that tranquil mind to reach this stage of the complete culmination of the later limit, it can cause the tranquil mind to [wander] in the six destinies, like […] an actor playing cows, horses, and so forth; therefore the treatise below says that through performing various karmas, one undergoes retribution without freedom. Because these nine characteristics acquire their names in several places—either expanding into nine characteristics, or fundamental consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, manas and mental consciousness, or six defilements, or two hindrances, or distinguishing coarse and subtle—therefore now these subtle stages are spoken of as the four characteristics, precisely referring to the nine defilements, and not meaning specifically self-delusion and the others.

There is an opinion: This explanation is also not yet reasonable. Since it says that none of the four characteristics are active characterisers, it is inappropriate that initiating karma is its characteristic of ceasing, for being able to […] the tranquil mind, it is an active extinguisher. Why do the four characteristics not subsume the suffering bound to karma, since it is also named a false characteristic that is produced? Since arising, changing, and ceasing have no separate subject and object, why should the characteristic of abiding have the four of subject and object? It would follow that arising, changing, and ceasing would all have subject and object. Since that is not so, how could this be so? Or changing, abiding, and ceasing might all be named different abidings, since according to circumstance they all have differences; grasping can form and abide in bodies of different destinies; since that is not so, how could this be so? If one allows that they all pervade, it would then become difficult to [maintain]. Therefore these four characteristics should not be established [in this way].

If one holds that because the treatise says "thought has no characteristic of changing" and "thought has no characteristic of abiding," they must necessarily be established, why does it not fully say "thought has no ceasing," and so forth? Moreover, the new translation speaks of the middle two characteristics without mentioning "abiding" and "changing"; hence it does not serve as evidence. What is said below about the mind's characteristics of arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing does not serve as evidence because this meaning is distinct: that is, it reveals that the nine characteristics all have arising and so forth; one who attains thoughtlessness knows that these nine characteristics—arising, pausing, decaying, and passing away—all arise relying on the mind and have no self-nature; it does not mean specifically matching them with the former eight characteristics, nor does it mean that the four stages separately awaken to the four characteristics differently from the first master; one should not raise this refutation. Furthermore, regarding the statement that the four characteristics are simultaneous and so forth: this refers precisely to the four stages of initial awakening, meaning it reveals that initial awakening has the marks of four stages, thereby explaining the meaning of the four kinds of dhyāna in the sūtra, and not meaning the establishment of the four characteristics of avidyā. The new translation merely says: having known this, one then knows that initial awakening is unobtainable, because in the one mind, earlier, later, and simultaneous are all non-associated and devoid of self-nature. That is to say, due to avidyā coarse and subtle thoughts are produced, and in every thought that arises there are arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, yet ordinary persons are entirely unaware of the arising and ceasing of thoughts and undergo saṃsāra. Now, by the internal and external perfuming power of original awakening, the depth and shallowness of awakening to thoughts has the marks of four stages; why is it necessary to forcibly establish the four characteristics of avidyā?

If one says that both the meanings of hindrance and [counteraction] are accomplished together, not contradicting the ancients, then what the treatise establishes is: one for arising, four for abiding, three for changing, and one for ceasing. Arising as one and abiding as four have the meanings as explained before. Changing as three includes the characteristic of initiating karma, because it initiates various different karmas such as good and evil, and by its different karmas it causes the destinies to be differentiated; it is the coarsest of the coarse, subsumed under the mental consciousness, and the sphere known by those of the three stages of worthies and so forth. Ceasing as one is precisely the suffering bound to karma, because the tranquil mind […] becomes the characteristics of the destinies and births; this is because it is a characteristic produced by avidyā and because it is the ultimate culmination of the later limit, for only upon reaching this does it form the suffering of transmigration. Although this explanation is superior to the meaning of the third master, it is still not entirely clear regarding the most difficult points. Let later wise persons discern and resolve them.

However, these four characteristics are solely one dreaming mind, all caused by the power of fundamental avidyā. Therefore a sūtra says: "The entrenchment of avidyā has the greatest power." The treatise says that avidyā can produce defiled phenomena, which refers precisely to this. Although in this way it distinguishes four gradations from subtle to manifest, when reaching from beginning to end there is essentially no earlier or later, because coarse and subtle are fused into the one mind alone. Therefore it is said that the four characteristics exist simultaneously. If one has not reached the source of the mind, in accordance with the depth or shallowness of practice, awakening has earlier and later; if one reaches the source of the mind, in a single thought the four characteristics are known simultaneously. Therefore a sūtra says: "Bodhisattvas know the end but do not know the beginning; the Buddha Tathāgatas know both beginning and end." Relying on this meaning, it is said that the beginning refers to the characteristic of arising and the end refers to the characteristic of ceasing. Since, due to the non-awakening power of avidyā, it gives rise to various dreaming thoughts such as the characteristic of arising, stirring the source of the evil mind, turning until reaching the characteristic of ceasing, transmigrating through birth and death and undergoing all sufferings—now, with the internal perfuming of original awakening as cause, skillfully giving rise to the perfuming of hearing as external condition, substance and activity fuse together into a single perfuming; this increases the power of that nature of understanding of tathatā and diminishes that characteristic of delusion and darkness of avidyā. Gradually purifying the source of the mind, one initially awakens to the characteristic of ceasing and finally awakens to the characteristic of arising. Radiantly, one then awakens, thoroughly awakening to the source of the mind as originally without stirring and now without stillness; equally and impartially, one abides on the couch of suchness, without the difference of the two characteristics of original and initial awakening. The metaphor in the sūtra of crossing a river in a dream has its intention precisely here; it is adduced and stated.

Above, the four characteristics were distinguished; below, the text of the treatise is explained. Since the previous three meanings do not accord with correct reasoning, the explanation of the text therefore relies solely on the correct meaning. In this very first characteristic of awakening, there are four meanings below: first, the person who can awaken; second, the characteristic that is awakened to; third, the benefit of awakening; fourth, the extent of awakening. The three characteristics of awakening below also have the same meaning.

"Like an ordinary person": this is the person who can awaken. In the stage of the ten faiths over ten thousand kalpas, because before this stage they have not yet awakened to thought at all and have not separated from conceptual discrimination, they are called an ordinary person.

"Becoming aware that a previous thought has produced evil": this clarifies the characteristic that is awakened to. In this stage, the mind is like a light feather, going east and west with the wind, frequently advancing and retreating. In the previous thought, unawakened, they give rise with respect to the body to notions of permanence, pleasure, and so on, generating delusion and attachment; then they know that the mind that has arisen is evil.

"Being able to stop the subsequent thought so that it does not arise": this distinguishes the benefit of awakening. Having awakened to the previous evil, subsequently they then give rise with respect to the body to the characteristics of impermanence, non-self, and so on, generating revulsion and aspiring to nirvāṇa, not producing an inverted mind that clings to arising and ceasing.

"Although it is named awakening, it is non-awakening": this is the extent of awakening. Awakening to evil and being able to stop it, although it is named awakening, yet not knowing that its entire substance is real and falsely generating revulsion is precisely non-awakening. Therefore a sūtra says: "I speak of the body as impermanent, but I do not speak of revulsion toward the body; I now speak for you of the superior method of the three cultivations." This then accords with the explanation under the meaning of the four characteristics.

Alternatively, in this stage one has not yet penetrated the principle of emptiness and does not know that the one mind is originally without stirring thoughts; seeing what has arisen as distinct from thought to thought, the previous thought being unawakened produces afflictions, and the subsequent thought produces a mind of revulsion wishing to eradicate them; awakening to the thought as evil is accordingly named awakening, but not awakening to the non-existence of thought is then non-awakening. Therefore a sūtra speaks of this as "the dhyāna practiced by foolish persons." The seven-fascicle sūtra says: "Gradually increasing in excellence, the cessation attainment of non-conception is named the foolish person's dhyāna." This explanation is somewhat better, because the two treatises are in agreement. The new translation says: "A previous thought being unawakened produces afflictions; a subsequent thought subdues them so that they do not arise again; although this is named awakening, it is non-awakening."

3.4

Treatise: As the two vehicles [...] it is called approximate awakening. Commentary: This is the second characteristic of awakening. In "the two vehicles' insight through contemplation and so forth," these are the persons capable of awakening. The newly resolved bodhisattvas are at the stages of the three grades of worthiness. The initial mind of the ten understandings is named the dwelling of resolving the mind. It is mentioned to include those after it, hence it says "initial resolve." Attaining the gate of personal emptiness is identical to what is taught for the two vehicles. In "awakening to the changing of thoughts," this clarifies the characteristics of what is awakened to. As previously explained, the three kinds of dreams of changing arise from the sleep of avidyā upon the originally calm mind. These practitioners of the three vehicles, through their shared insight into non-self, awaken from the dream of changing so that the characteristic of changing is forever gone; this is called "awakening to the changing of thoughts, so that thoughts are without the characteristic of changing." In "having abandoned coarse discrimination and so forth," this is the benefit of awakening. Since this characteristic of changing is none other than the mental consciousness giving rise to the differing attachments to self, what belongs to self, self, and other, which discriminates the six dusts following objects, it is called the "characteristic of coarse discrimination and grasping." In "it is called approximate awakening," this is the scope of the awakening. Although they have abandoned such coarse discriminative grasping, they have not yet attained the true principle of the emptiness of dharmas; therefore, it is merely called "approximate awakening." Alternatively, in this stage, one attains the tathatā of personal emptiness, knowing that that tathatā originally has no conceptual marks and that its substance and marks are distinct from the thoughts of avidyā. Through this, one can only abandon coarse discrimination, but is not yet able to know that thought is itself thoughtlessness; because it is not true awakening, it is called approximate awakening. Therefore, a sūtra describes it as "dhyāna that observes meaning," that is, having known the personal non-self of individual and common characteristics, one adaptively observes meaning regarding the dharma-self. The former explanation conforms to the old treatise and contradicts the new treatise; the latter explanation is quite superior and harmonises both treatises well. Thus the new treatise says: "awakening to the fact that thought and thoughtlessness are distinct in substance and marks, one abandons coarse discrimination."

3.5

Treatise: As bodhisattvas of the dharmakāya [...] it is called partial awakening. Commentary: This is the third characteristic of awakening. "Bodhisattvas of the dharmakāya" are the persons capable of awakening. At the first stage, one can realise the omnipresent tathatā, manifesting the stage wherein one's own dharmakāya is all-pervading; up through the tenth stage, all equally realise this, and therefore all are called bodhisattvas of the dharmakāya. In "awakening to the abiding of thoughts," this is the characteristic of what is awakened to. The four kinds of dreams of abiding arise from the sleep of avidyā. Having attained the true, markless cognition of the emptiness of dharmas, they awaken from the dream of abiding, so that the characteristic of abiding is forever gone; this is called "awakening to the abiding of thoughts, so that thoughts are without the characteristic of abiding." In "having departed from the coarse thoughts of discrimination," this is the benefit of awakening. That is, these dream thoughts of attachment to dharmas that are departed from are called the "characteristics of coarse thoughts of discrimination." Distinct from the previous coarse grasping to personal self, it is only called "discrimination"; distinct from the subsequent subtle thoughts of the characteristic of arising, it is called "coarse thoughts." Regarding a single attachment to dharmas, two terms are spoken according to meaning. In "it is called partial awakening," this is the scope of the awakening. Although they attain such non-discriminative awakening, they have not yet departed from micro-subtle discrimination, and must still slumber in the dream of the characteristic of arising, so the path of awakening is not yet complete; thus it is called "partial." Alternatively, at this stage one attains the cognition of true realization, abandoning both the mark of thought and the mark of thoughtlessness; this is called "awakening to the abiding of thoughts, so that thoughts are without the characteristic of abiding." Through this, one is able to abandon medium discrimination; this is called "departing from the coarse thoughts of discrimination." This is the "dhyāna that takes tathatā as object" spoken of in the sūtra. Thus the Laṅkāvatāra says: "If one discriminates that non-self has two kinds, this is false thinking; if one knows it as it truly is, those thoughts do not arise—this is called dhyāna that takes tathatā as object." The former explanation conforms to the old treatise and contradicts the new treatise; the latter explanation conforms to the sūtra and also accords well with the new treatise. Thus the new treatise says: "awakening that thoughts and thoughtlessness are both without marks, one abandons medium discrimination."

3.6

Treatise: As bodhisattvas having reached the end of the stages [...] it is called ultimate awakening. Commentary: As for this fourth characteristic of awakening: "As bodhisattvas having reached the end of the stages" first clarifies the persons capable of awakening. In the text, the two paths are shown generally and specifically. The first phrase generally designates the stage capable of contemplation, which is the stage of the vajra-like equal awakening; it does not mean that the tenth stage is called the end of the stages, because the new treatise says "if one transcends the bodhisattva stages." The next two phrases specifically clarify the two paths: "satisfying expedient means" is the path of preparatory application, because it is the expedient means of satisfaction. The new treatise says "the ultimate path is satisfied," taking the specific by presenting the general, because the path of preparatory application is subsumed under this. "In one thought corresponding" is the uninterrupted path; because in that uninterrupted path, within a single kṣaṇa one tallies with the principle and cuts off subtle thoughts. As the Abhidharma[-samuccaya] says: "The ultimate path refers to the vajra-like samādhi; this has two kinds: namely, that subsumed under the path of expedient means, and that subsumed under the uninterrupted path." In "awakening to the mind's initial arising," this shows the characteristic of what is awakened to. Fundamental avidyā, relying on awakening, becomes deluded and stirs that calm mind, causing subtle thoughts to arise; this is precisely the "mind's initial arising" here. Only upon reaching this stage does one first awaken to and know it: apart from original awakening there is no non-awakening, which means the stirred mind is originally calm. Just as when one is truly lost, one considers east to be west; when one awakens, west is itself east—how could there still be a mark of west at the time of awakening? Thus one awakens to the mark of the initial mind. Therefore it says "awakening to the mind's initial arising, the mind is without the initial mark." Alternatively, the mind of initial awakening initially arising is called "awakening to the mind's initial arising." Thus the new treatise says: "awakening to the mind's initial arising is first called awakening, departing from the mark of awakening." The former explanation conforms to the old treatise and contradicts the new treatise; the latter explanation conforms to principle and does not contradict either treatise. This is the "dhyāna of the Tathāgatas" spoken of in the sūtra. Thus the Laṅkāvatāra says: "Entering the Buddha stage, abiding in the three kinds of joy of the noble cognition of self-realisation, and performing inconceivable deeds for sentient beings." Although in the previous three stages there were stirred thoughts, hence it said "thoughts are without abiding" and so forth, now in this stage stirred thoughts are entirely exhausted and only the one mind remains, hence it says "the mind is without the initial mark"; this means that the mind is without the mark of the initial thought. In "far departing from," this clarifies the benefit of awakening. The stirred thought of the characteristic of karma is the subtlest among thoughts, named the micro-subtle thought; that is the characteristic of arising. Alternatively, subtle discrimination is called micro-subtle thought, without distinguishing and matching it to avidyā and the characteristic of karma. In the third stage, one awakens that thought and thoughtlessness are both markless, abandoning medium discrimination; now in this stage, even the mark of awakening does not exist, and with nothing whatsoever to be attained, one departs from subtle thoughts. The new treatise only calls it "subtle discrimination." Because this thought is forever gone, it says "far departing from." Far departing from empty marks, the true mind-nature is then manifested, hence it says "attaining the vision of the mind-nature." The wind of avidyā ceases, the waves on the ocean of nature become calm, and there is forever no arising or ceasing; hence it says "the mind is immediately permanently abiding." Relying on these two meanings, the new treatise says: "The mind's fundamental nature permanently abides and is manifest before one." In the previous three stages, the marks of thought were not yet exhausted; therefore, it did not say "attaining the vision of the mind-nature." Because awakening had not reached the source, avidyā still remained, stirring that calm mind so that the karmic consciousness arose and ceased; therefore, it did not say "the mind is immediately permanently abiding." In "it is called ultimate awakening," this concludes the scope of contemplation. Before reaching the source of the mind, dream thoughts are not yet exhausted; beginning and end are not identical with the source, so it is not ultimate awakening. Seeking the cessation of this stirring, one hopes to reach the other shore; now that dream thoughts have ceased, one has awakened to the source of the mind—originally there was no transmigration, and now there is no beginning of calm; it is constantly of itself the one mind. When the beginning is not different from what was originally attained, one becomes a Tathāgata; this is called ultimate awakening. If so, since initial awakening becomes permanently abiding, does this not contradict what is taught in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: "Since the root is permanently abiding, the branches rely on the root and continuously persist forever," and so forth in detail? The two works have different intentions, so their principles do not conflict. This treatise intends to show that originally due to non-awakening the calm mind was stirred, and now having ceased non-awakening, it returns to original calm, thus becoming permanently abiding. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha intends to explain that relying on the permanent dharmakāya one gives rise to practices of merit and wisdom; since the resultant reward thus incurred arises from conditions, it speaks of continuity. The myriad virtues of initial awakening must possess both meanings: relying on the former meaning, it is permanently abiding; relying on the latter meaning, it is arising and ceasing. Arising and ceasing, and permanent abiding, do not obstruct each other. Because each and every thought penetrates the three times, although pervading the three times it does not exceed a single thought—just as a single pore pervades the ten directions, yet although pervading the ten directions it does not enlarge the pore. The Buddha's virtues are like this, unobstructed and unhindered; how could one cling one-sidedly between them? As the Avataṃsaka Sūtra praises this meaning in verse:

3.7

"The Sage is departed from the three times, / fully endowed with marks and signs;
abiding in non-abiding, / the dharmadhātu is completely pure. / Through causes and conditions dharmas arise,
through causes and conditions dharmas cease. / When one contemplates the Tathāgata thus, / one is ultimately free from delusion and confusion."

3.8

Therefore, the two treatises each set forth one meaning; they equally tally with the ultimate truth and do not contradict each other.

3.9

Treatise: Therefore [...] because it tends toward Buddha-wisdom. Commentary: Below, sūtras are cited as proof. In this there are four parts: first, citing a sūtra to establish proof; second, re-explaining the previous text; third, the fault of non-awakening; fourth, the virtues of the awakened one. This is the first. In these latter three stages, being able to contemplate the non-existence of thoughts is in all cases called awakening; therefore the sūtra, relying on this, speaks of being able to contemplate thoughtlessness as "tending toward Buddha-wisdom." That is, at the causal stage, although one has not yet departed from thoughts, one contemplates these thoughts as entirely without marks of thought; being able to contemplate such a principle of thoughtlessness, this ability to contemplate is described as "tending toward Buddha-wisdom." By this it is proven and known that the Buddha stage is without thoughts. "Tending toward Buddha-wisdom" has the meaning of realizing and attaining. Thus the new treatise says: "If there is one who can contemplate false thoughts as markless, they then realise and attain the wisdom of the Tathāgata." This is spoken by taking the cause to look toward the fruit. If spoken with reference to stages common to cause and fruit, as the second roll of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa says: "Relying on the paths of subduing, the mind that initiates phenomenal activity ceases; relying on the paths of severing, the mind relying on the fundamental ceases; relying on the supreme uprooting path, the fundamental mind is exhausted." The "paths of subduing" refers to the stages of the three grades of worthiness. "The mind that initiates phenomenal activity ceases" is identical to "abandoning the characteristics of coarse discrimination and grasping" in this treatise. The "paths of severing" are in the stage of the dharmakāya. "The mind relying on the fundamental ceases" is like "the characteristic of coarse thoughts of discrimination abandoned" in this treatise. The "supreme uprooting path" is the vajra-like samādhi. "The fundamental mind is exhausted" is like "far departing from micro-subtle thoughts" spoken of in this treatise.

3.10

Treatise: Furthermore, when the mind arises [...] it is said to be thoughtlessness. Commentary: This re-explains the previous text. This resolves a hidden doubt by re-citing the previous text. Since it [spoke of] "awakening to the mind's initial arising," it says "furthermore, when the mind arises." That is, if what was previously stated as "awakening to the mind's initial arising" meant awakening to that initially arisen mind, then it would not be called awakening, because there would be an initial mind. If there is no initial mind, what would be awakened to? Since what is awakened to does not exist, there would be no subject capable of awakening. If the mind of awakening initially arising is called awakening, then since there would be a mark of awakening, it should not be called awakening, because the arising of the initial mind of awakening is non-awakening. How could it previously be said that one "awakens to the mind's initial arising"? To demonstrate the resolution of this objection, this passage is cited. In the previous explanation of the characteristic of "awakening to the mind's initial arising," regarding the characteristic of what is awakened to, there are no marks to be known; and in saying "awakening to the characteristic of the mind's initial arising," one awakens to the fact that that initial mind is without thoughts arising. Just as when awakening from losing one's direction, one knows that west is itself east and there is no mark of west that can be perceived; knowing the mark of west means it is precisely east. When one awakens to the mind, one knows that the initial stirred thought is originally calm. Since the initial mind that is awakened to cannot be obtained, where could the initial mark capable of awakening remain? Therefore it says "it is said to be thoughtlessness." Thus the new treatise says: "The mind does not even exist, how much less could there be an initial [arising]?"

3.11

Treatise: Therefore all [...] beginningless avidyā. Commentary: This shows the fault of non-awakening. In the text there are three sections: designation, explanation, and conclusion. "Therefore" and so forth follows upon the previous to designate it: because the previous thoughtlessness is called awakening, all except the Buddha are not called awakening. In "because from [...]" and so forth, it explains the reason. If none except the Buddha are called awakening, why did it previously speak of "partial awakening" and so forth? Because from beginningless time until attaining Buddhahood, the thoughts of avidyā have continued thought after thought without ever having departed. The intention of the new treatise is the same: previously, in contrast to the differences among the dreams of the four characteristics, gradual awakening was taught; now, in terms of the non-difference of the sleep of avidyā, non-awakening is taught. As the Benevolent Kings Sūtra agrees with this meaning, saying: "From the forbearance of subduing up to the summit samādhi, illumining the ultimate truth is not called seeing; what is called seeing is sarvajñā." In "therefore it is called beginningless avidyā," it concludes the meaning of non-awakening. That is, from beginningless time there has been avidyā, and since all thoughts arise relying on avidyā, those who possess thoughts are all said to be in beginningless avidyā and are not called awakening. The new treatise lacks this sentence, but the meaning is also sufficient.

3.12

Treatise: If one attains non-thought, [one knows the arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing of the mind's characteristics, because they are equal to non-thought].

Commentary: This reveals the virtue of one who is awakened. What is meant here is that if delusion has not yet ceased, one does not know that the one mind is originally devoid of characteristics and thought. If one reaches the source of the mind and attains non-thought, one can know universally that because the minds of all sentient beings stir delusionally, [there appear] arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, whereas the mind is originally unmoved and truly without arising and the rest. Therefore, the New Treatise says: "If delusional thoughts cease, one then knows that the characteristics of the mind—arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing—are all devoid of characteristics." "Because they are equal to non-thought" resolves the meaning above: the Buddha has attained non-thought, while sentient beings have thought; with such an immense separation between presence and absence, how can he know? Because the substance of non-thought is altogether equal. Although sentient beings have thoughts, their substance is precisely non-thought. The Buddha's substance of non-thought is equal to that, and therefore he can know universally that all thoughts are non-thought. The New Treatise lacks this phrase, and its meaning seems deficient.

3.13

Treatise: Yet in truth there is no [diversity of initial awakening, because the four characteristics are simultaneous; each lacks independent existence, being originally equal and of the identical awakening].

Commentary: The preceding used the four characteristics metaphorically to explain and establish the doctrinal statements; this reveals that initial awakening is not different from original awakening. "Yet in truth" and so forth initially marks non-difference: although it is called the awakening of having initially attained non-thought, and only by awakening to the four characteristics is it named initial awakening, nevertheless the characterised objects awakened to are originally unarisen—what non-awakening could be awaited to distinguish initial awakening? "Because the four characteristics" below then explains and establishes this: because those four characteristics have no distinct self-nature whereby one could distinguish before and after, it says "are simultaneous". Based on the coarse and subtle thoughts of the one mind, it is said that the times of awakening have before and after; the word "yet" [indicates] precisely before and after. It does not mean that the four characteristics are all simultaneously existent. Since, apart from the mind, they all lack self-nature, there is no simultaneity or before-and-after that can be established. Therefore it says "each lacks independent existence". Since, fundamentally apart from the mind, they all lack self-nature, on this account they are not separate from the true substance of original awakening; hence it says "being originally equal and of the identical awakening". The overall meaning here is: since awakening to the four characteristics is spoken of as initial awakening, because what is awakened to is absent, what awakens is also absent; hence there is no initial awakening different from original awakening. Alternatively, this truly reveals that the initial is not different from the original: that is, the four kinds of awakening characteristics spoken of before, apart from original awakening, are all unattainable. Thus the New Treatise says: "Having known this, one then knows that initial awakening is unattainable." Because with respect to the one mind, before and after and simultaneity are all non-corresponding and devoid of self-nature, it is not different from original awakening. If explained in this way, it does not contravene principle, and makes the New and Old Treatises not contradict each other. Relying on this meaning, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: "The ten stages are just that the ten stages are non-existent; why?" and so forth.

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大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 — Classical Chinese