Kathāvatthu 16.8: Rūpaṃvipākotikathā
Kathāvatthu 16.8
- Language
- Pāli
Contents
Rūpaṃvipākotikathā
16.8.1.1
Rūpaṃ vipākoti?
Is material form result?
Controverted Point: That material qualities are results of karma.
16.8.1.2
Āmantā.
Yes.
Controverted Point: That material qualities are results of karma.
16.8.1.3
Rūpaṃ sukhavedaniyaṃ dukkhavedaniyaṃ adukkhamasukhavedaniyaṃ, sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ, dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ, adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ, phassena sampayuttaṃ …pe…
Is material form to be felt as pleasant, to be felt as painful, to be felt as neither painful nor pleasant; associated with pleasant feeling, associated with painful feeling, associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling; associated with contact …pe…
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.4
cittena sampayuttaṃ, sārammaṇaṃ, atthi tassa āvaṭṭanā …pe… paṇidhīti?
associated with mind, having an object, does it have turning towards …pe… aspiration?
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.5
Na hevaṃ vattabbe …pe…
It should not be said thus …pe…
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.6
nanu na sukhavedaniyaṃ na dukkhavedaniyaṃ …pe…
Is it not neither to be felt as pleasant nor to be felt as painful …pe…
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.7
anārammaṇaṃ, natthi tassa āvaṭṭanā …pe… paṇidhīti?
without an object, does it not have turning towards …pe… aspiration?
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.8
Āmantā.
Yes.
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.9
Hañci na sukhavedaniyaṃ na dukkhavedaniyaṃ …pe…
If it is neither to be felt as pleasant nor to be felt as painful …pe…
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.10
anārammaṇaṃ, natthi tassa āvaṭṭanā …pe… paṇidhi, no ca vata re vattabbe—
without an object, and it does not have turning towards …pe… aspiration, then indeed you should not say:
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.1.11
“rūpaṃ vipāko”ti.
“Material form is result.”
Theravādin: Do you mean to imply that matter is of the nature of feeling, pleasurable, painful, or neutral, that it is conjoined with feeling, with mental reaction, and other phases of consciousness, that it has the properties of mental adverting, adjustment, etc.? Is not the contrary the case? If you assent, you cannot maintain your proposition.
16.8.2.1
Phasso vipāko, phasso sukhavedaniyo dukkhavedaniyo …pe…
Contact is result, and is contact to be felt as pleasant, to be felt as painful …pe…
All those things are mental characteristics, not material. But you wish to see in matter a “result” of karma, without the mental characters which are the properties of “result”… .
16.8.2.2
sārammaṇo, atthi tassa āvaṭṭanā …pe… paṇidhīti?
having an object, does it have turning towards …pe… aspiration?
16.8.2.3
Āmantā.
Yes.
16.8.2.4
Rūpaṃ vipāko, rūpaṃ sukhavedaniyaṃ dukkhavedaniyaṃ …pe…
Material form is result, and is material form to be felt as pleasant, to be felt as painful …pe…
16.8.2.5
sārammaṇaṃ, atthi tassa āvaṭṭanā …pe… paṇidhīti?
having an object, does it have turning towards …pe… aspiration?
16.8.2.6
Na hevaṃ vattabbe …pe….
It should not be said thus …pe…
16.8.3.1
Rūpaṃ vipāko, rūpaṃ na sukhavedaniyaṃ na dukkhavedaniyaṃ …pe…
Material form is result, and is material form neither to be felt as pleasant nor to be felt as painful …pe…
16.8.3.2
anārammaṇaṃ, natthi tassa āvaṭṭanā …pe… paṇidhīti?
without an object, does it not have turning towards …pe… aspiration?
16.8.3.3
Āmantā.
Yes.
16.8.3.4
Phasso vipāko, phasso na sukhavedaniyo na dukkhavedaniyo …pe…
Contact is result, and is contact neither to be felt as pleasant nor to be felt as painful …pe…
16.8.3.5
anārammaṇo, natthi tassa āvaṭṭanā …pe… paṇidhīti?
without an object, does it not have turning towards …pe… aspiration?
16.8.3.6
Na hevaṃ vattabbe …pe….
It should not be said thus …pe…
16.8.4.1
Na vattabbaṃ—
Should it not be said:
Andhaka, Sammitiya: But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, “result”? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally “result”?
16.8.4.2
“rūpaṃ vipāko”ti?
“Material form is result”?
Andhaka, Sammitiya: But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, “result”? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally “result”?
16.8.4.3
Āmantā.
Yes.
Andhaka, Sammitiya: But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, “result”? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally “result”?
16.8.4.4
Nanu kammassa katattā uppannā cittacetasikā dhammā vipākoti?
Are not states of mind and mental factors arisen because of having performed action result?
Andhaka, Sammitiya: But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, “result”? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally “result”?
16.8.4.5
Āmantā.
Yes.
Andhaka, Sammitiya: But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, “result”? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally “result”?
16.8.4.6
Hañci kammassa katattā uppannā cittacetasikā dhammā vipāko, tena vata re vattabbe—
If states of mind and mental factors arisen because of having performed action are result, then indeed you should say:
Andhaka, Sammitiya: But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, “result”? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally “result”?
16.8.4.7
“kammassa katattā uppannaṃ rūpaṃ vipāko”ti.
“Material form arisen because of having performed action is result.”
Andhaka, Sammitiya: But is not consciousness and its concomitant attributes, which arise through actions done, “result”? Surely then material qualities, which arise through actions done, are equally “result”?
16.8.4.8
Rūpaṃ vipākotikathā niṭṭhitā.
The discussion on whether material form is result is finished.
Translations (2)
- Points of Controversy, or Subjects of Discourse — Shwe Zan Aung & Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids 1915, English
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Commentaries (2)
- Mūlaṭīkā — Ānanda (Vanaratana), Pāli
- Pañcappakaraṇaṭṭhakathā — Buddhaghosa, Pāli
Discussed in (1)
- Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon — Keith 1923, English