Dighanikaya 15.124

15.124

Yattha panāvusoti yattha suddharūpakkhandhe sabbaso vedayitaṃ natthi. Api nu kho tatthāti api nu kho tasmiṃ vedanāvirahite tālavaṇṭe vā vātapāne vā asmīti evaṃ ahaṃkāro uppajjeyyāti attho. Tasmātihānandāti yasmā suddharūpakkhandho uṭṭhāya ahamasmīti na vadati, tasmā etenapi etaṃ nakkhamatīti attho. Api nu kho tattha ayamahamasmīti siyāti api nu kho tesu vedanādhammesu tīsu khandhesu ekadhammopi ayaṃ nāma ahamasmīti evaṃ vattabbo siyā. Atha vā vedanānirodhā saheva vedanāya niruddhesu tesu tīsu khandhesu api nu kho ayamahamasmīti vā ahamasmīti vā uppajjeyyāti attho. Athāyasmā ānando sasavisāṇassa tikhiṇabhāvaṃ viya taṃ asampaṭicchanto no hetaṃ bhanteti āha.

‘Where, however, venerable friend’: where, in the pure aggregate of material form, there is entirely no experience of feeling. ‘Could there be therein’: could the conceit of ‘I am’, the making of an ‘I’, arise in that which is devoid of feeling, such as a palm-leaf fan or a window? This is the meaning. ‘Therefore, Ānanda’: because the pure aggregate of material form does not rise up and say ‘I am’, therefore on this ground too it is not fitting; this is the meaning. ‘Could there be therein [the thought]: “This I am”?’: could even a single state among those three aggregates having the nature of feeling be spoken of in this way: ‘This is what I am’? Or rather, when those three aggregates have ceased along with feeling upon the cessation of feeling, could [the thought] ‘This I am’ or ‘I am’ arise? This is the meaning. Then the venerable Ānanda, rejecting it as one would reject the sharpness of a rabbit's horn, said: ‘No indeed, venerable sir.’