Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Brahmajalasutta 2.27

Brahmajala Sutta (Dialogues of the Buddha) 2.27

Language
English

2.27

‘In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is dull, stupid. And it is by reason of his dullness, his stupidity, that when a question on this or that is put to him, he resorts to equivocation, to wriggling, like an eel: “If you ask me whether there is another world,—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don’t say so. And I don’t think it is thus or thus. And I don’t think it is otherwise. And I don’t deny it. And I don’t say there neither is, nor is not, another world.” Thus does he equivocate, and in like manner about each of such propositions as the following:
a.
(2) There is not another world. (3) There both is, and is not, another world. (4) There neither is, nor is not, another world.
b.
(1) There are Chance Beings (so called because they spring into existence, either here or in another world, without the intervention of parents, and seem therefore to come without a cause). (2) There are no such beings. (3) There both are, and are not, such beings. (4) There neither are, nor are not, such beings.
c
(1) There is fruit, result, of good and bad actions. (2) There is not. (3) There both is, and is not. (4) There neither is, nor is not.
d.
(1) A man who has penetrated to the truth continues to exist after death. (2) He does not. (3) H e both does, and does not. (4) He neither does, nor does not.
‘This, brethren, is the fourth case.

2.27.n1

Such questions are called elsewhere the common basis of discussions among Brahmans.

Linked texts (1)