Samannaphalasutta 0: Introduction (Rhys Davids)
Samannaphala Sutta (Dialogues of the Buddha) 0
- Language
- English
Introduction (Rhys Davids)
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THE first Dialogue deals with the most fundamental conceptions that lay at the root of the Buddha’s doctrine, his Dharma, his ethical and philosophical view of life—the second puts forth his justification for the foundation of the Order, for the enunciation of the Vinaya, the practical rules of canon law by which life in the Order is regulated. The Rules themselves are not discussed. It is only certain ethical precepts that are referred to in so many words. The question is a larger and wider one than the desirability of any particular injunction. It is as to the advantage, as to the use, of having any Order at all.
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King Ajātasattu of Magadha, after pointing out the advantages derived from their occupations by a long list of ordinary people in the world, asks whether the members of the Order, who have given up the world, derive any corresponding advantage, visible in this life, from theirs. The answer is a list of such advantages, arranged in an ascending scale of importance, each one mentioned being said to be better and sweeter than the one just before described.
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The list of ordinary occupations given in the question is interesting evidence, especially as compared with the later lists of a similar kind referred to in the notes, of social conditions in the Ganges valley at the time when this Dialogue was composed. And the introductory story, in which the king explains how he had put a similar question to the founders of six other orders, and gives the six replies he received, is interesting evidence of the views held by the authors of the Dialogue as to beliefs current at the time.
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The replies are no less interesting from the fact, pointed out by the king, that they are not to the point. Each of the six teachers goes off into a general statement of his theory instead of answering the question put. But as the works, if any, of all these teachers save one—Nigaṇṭha Nāta-putta have been irretrievably lost, the summary here given of their doctrines is of great importance as evidence of the sort of speculation they favoured. The six paragraphs are short and obscure, and this is just what we should expect. As is the case with the accounts given by early Catholic writers of opinions they held to be heretical, the versions of these six sets of belief are neither adequate nor clear. But a number of other references to these six theories are found, as pointed out in the notes, both in the Buddhist and in the Jain records. And it would be premature to discuss our six paragraphs until the whole of the available evidence is made accessible to scholars. It is noteworthy that in at least two of these answers some of the expressions used seem to be in a Prākrit differing in dialect from the Pāli of the Piṭakas. And these are not the only instances of the preservation in the Piṭakas of ancient dialectical varieties.
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The answer which the Buddha is represented to have given, in his turn, to the question raised by the king, takes (as is so often the case) the form of a counter-question. ‘The very man whom, under ordinary circumstances, you would treat as slave or servant—what treatment would you mete out to him after he had joined an Order?’ The king confesses that he. would treat him as a person worthy of honour and respect. And neither in question nor answer is there any reference specially to the Buddhist Order. It is taken for granted, alike by the Buddha and the king, that any one who had devoted himself to the religious life, whatever the views or opinions he held, or the association he had joined, would, in accordance with the remarkable tolerance of that age and country, be treated with equal respect and courtesy. And the same note runs all through the Dialogue. The Buddha shows the advantages of the ‘life of a recluse,’ not necessarily of a follower of his own. And most of what he says would apply as much to his strongest opponents as to the members of his own Order.
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The following, in a constantly ascending order of merit, are the advantages, visible in this life, which he claims for such a recluse:
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1. The honour and respect shown to a member of a religious order.
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2. The training in all those lower kinds of mere morality set out in the very ancient document called ‘The Sīlas.’ The importance of this document has been discussed above, in the Introduction to the Brahmajāla. The details of it may be summarised here as follows:
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a. Mercy and kindness to all living things; Section 43 b. Honesty. c. Chastity. d. Truthfulness, peacefulness, courtesy, and good sense in speech; Section44. e. Abstinence from luxury of twelve different kinds, and freedom from trickery and violence;, Section 45. f. Not injuring plants; Section 46. g. Not laying up treasure, of seven kinds; Section 47. h. Not frequenting shows, of twenty-six specified kinds; Section48. i Not playing games, eighteen being mentioned by name; Section 49. j Not using luxurious rugs, &c., of twenty different kinds; Section 50. k. Not using toilet luxuries, of which twenty-two are specified; Section 51. l. Not talking vain things, of which twenty-seven instances are given; Section 52. m. Not using sophistical and rude phrases when talking of higher things; Section 53. n. Not acting as go-between; Section 54. o. Not practising trickery and mystery under the guise of religion; Section 55 p Not gaining a living by low arts, such as auguries (Section 56); advising as to the best sorts of various things (Section 57); prophesying as to war and its results (Section 58); astrology (Section 59); foretelling famine or plague or the reverse (Section 6o); arranging marriages, using spells, or worshipping gods (Section 61); various sorts of medical trickery (Section 62).
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3. The confidence of heart, absence of fear, resulting from the consciousness of right doing; Section 63.
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4 The habit of keeping guarded the door of his senses; Section 64.
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5 The constant self-possession he thus gains; Section 65.
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6. The power of being content with little, with simplicity of life; Section 66.
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7. The emancipation of heart from the Five Hindrances to self-mastery—covetousness, ill-temper, laziness, worry and flurry, and perplexity; Section 68-74.
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8. The joy and peace that, as a result of the sense of this emancipation, fills his whole being; Section 75.
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9. The practice of the Four Jhānas; Section 75-82.
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10. The Insight arising from knowledge (ñāṇa-dassana); Section 83, 84.
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11. The power of projecting mental images; Section 85, 86.
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12. The five modes of mystic Insight (abhiññā); Section 87-96
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a. The practice of iddhi. b. The Heavenly Ear—hearing heavenly sounds. c. Knowledge of others’ thoughts. d. Memory of his own previous births. e. Knowledge of other people’s previous births (the Heavenly Eye).
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13. The realisation of the Four Truths, the destruction of the Āsavas, and attainment of Arahatship; Section 97, 98.
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Now it is perfectly true that of these thirteen consecutive propositions, or groups of propositions, it is only the last, No. 13, which is exclusively Buddhist. But the things omitted, the union of the whole of those included into one system, the order in which the ideas are arranged, the way in which they are treated as so many steps of a ladder whose chief value depends on the fact that it leads up to the culminating point of Nirvāṇa in Arahatship—all this is also distinctively Buddhist. And further, the whole statement, the details of it, the order of it, must have soaked very thoroughly into the minds of the early Buddhists. For we find the whole, or nearly the whole, of it repeated (with direct reference by name to our Sutta as the oldest and most complete enumeration of it) not only in all the subsequent dialogues translated in this volume, but also in many others.
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In these repetitions the order is always the same, and the details (so far as they occur) are the same. But one or other of the thirteen groups is often omitted, and the application of those of them that remain is always different—that is to say,, they are enumerated in support, or in illustration, of a different proposition.
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A comparison of some of these other applications of the list is full of suggestion as to its real meaning here.
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In the Ambaṭṭha the point is as to caste. The Kshatriya caste is the most honourable, but wisdom and conduct are higher still. What then is the right conduct, what the right wisdom? The conduct (caraṇa) is all the above paragraphs from 2-9 inclusive; the wisdom (vijjā) is the rest, 10-13.
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In the Soṇadaṇḍa the question is: What is the true Brahman?’ After, by his usual Socratic method, leading Soṇadaṇḍa to acknowledge that the only two essential requisites are goodness and intelligence, these last are explained as above (2-9 and 10-13).
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In the Kūṭadanta the question is as to the right sort of sacrifice. After rejecting animal sacrifice we have generosity (of various kinds, each better than the last), faith, training in the precepts, and 2-13, set forth as each of them a better sacrifice than the last.
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In the Jāliya the question is whether the soul is the same as, or is other than, the body. The answer is a counter question. Repeating our sections 2-13 (omitting 11 and 12) the Buddha asks, at the end of each subdivision, whether men who do that would be likely to trouble themselves as to speculations about the soul? And the answer being, of course, ‘No,’ rejoins that neither does he.
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In the Poṭṭhapāda the question is as to the way in which various recluses attain to mystic trance. The Buddha’s answer is that it is by training; and the training should be first in morals (our groups 2 and 3) then in the things mentioned in our groups 4-9, and then in the Four Arūpa Vimokkhas. The Dialogue then takes up other questions, omitting our groups 10-13.
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In the Kevaḍḍha the talk is on miracles, mystic powers. And the Buddha, disparaging all others, calls attention to our groups 2-13.
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In the Lohicca the question is as to who is the right sort of teacher; and the answer is that it is the one whose pupil carries out our groups 2-13.
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In the Tevijja the question is as to the way by which one can attain to union with God (brahmā-sahavyatā). The answer gives our groups 1-8, and then adds the four brahma-vihāras.
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In the shorter of the two Hatthipadopama Suttas (No. 27 in the Majjhima), the question discussed between a Brahman and an ascetic is as to the ascendancy of the Buddha over the other teachers of the time. The Buddha himself giving afterwards the full reason, repeats our group 2 (omitting however clauses f to p inclusive ), then repeats our groups 6, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9) then omitting groups 10 and 11, quotes two only, the last two (omitting the first three) of the five Abhiññās in group 12, and concludes with group 13 in full.
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In the Mahā Taṇhā-saṅkhaya Sutta (NO. 38 in the Majjhima), we have the same sequence—our group 2 (omitting f to p), then 6, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9. The rest is omitted.
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In the next Sutta, the longer of the Assapuras, after a summary in different words of most of the contents of our group 2, we have our group 45 then two paragraphs not in our Sutta, then our groups 5, 7, 8, 9, and the last two only out of group 12, and then (as a climax) our group 13—all enumerated to show what is the true Brahman, the true samaṇa.
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Then again in the Sakuludāyi, NO. 79 of the Majjhima, it is declared to be not for the sake of realising happiness that recluses take up the celibate life in the Order under the Buddha, but for the sake of those matters set forth in our groups 2-9 inclusive , of the two last of the Abhiññās, and above all for the sake of the attainment of Arahatship.
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Besides the differences pointed out above between the Suttas preserved in the Dīgha, and in the Majjhima, respectively—differences due, I think, solely to the difference in the subjects under discussion—there are also a few verbal differences, amounting to scarcely more than ‘various readings,’ due, perhaps, to the divergent traditions of the Dīgha bhāṇakā and the Majjhima-bhāṇakā (the students and repeaters of the two collections in which the Dialogues are handed down to us).
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However this may be, it is clear that the sum and the sequence of the paragraphs in our Sutta is regarded as of great importance, not as a statement of Buddhist ethics, or of Buddhist philosophy, or of the Buddhist religion, but as a statement of the advantages that may be looked for as the result of life in an Order. And further that the statement has to be slightly modified and shortened when the question is the narrower one of life in the particular community which we call the Buddhist Order.
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The difference is interesting—in the scheme for the Buddhist Order the ñāṇa-dassana, the power of projecting a mental image (apparently of oneself, which seems like the earliest germ of the modern Yoga ideas about, the astral body), the powers of iddhi, the power of hearing heavenly sounds (something like hearing the music of the spheres), and the power of knowing the thoughts of others, are all omitted.
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In the abstract given above, I have called these last three, together with the power of calling to mind one’s own, and other peoples’, previous births, the Five Abhiññās, or Intuitions. And this is in accord with the passages on which Childers’s article sub voce is based. But these powers are not so called either in our text, or in any other Dialogue yet published. The use of the word abhiññā in this technical sense would seem therefore (to judge from the published texts) to be a sign of the later date of the book in which it occurs. In the oldest portions of the Piṭakas the word is always used in the general sense of insight, and if any special limitation is hinted at, it is simply the insight of Arahatship that is emphasised (as in Dhammapada 423, which is a quotation from Itivuttaka, No. 99, and is quoted also at Aṅguttara I, 165).
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The Eightfold Path is not mentioned in our Sutta. This is not merely because it is not possible always to mention everything. The Path does not come within the special advantages of life in the Order. To enter upon the Path to Arahatship, to walk along it, is not peculiar to members of the Order. A bhikshu might reach the goal either along that path, open also to laymen , or by the process set out in our Sutta. They are two quite distinct methods of training, of which our Sutta deals only with one
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It is essential, in order to understand Buddhist ethics. to bear in mind that there are (and must be in such a system) several different lines along which both speculation and edifying teaching run. These are:
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1. The course of conduct laid down for the ordinary Buddhist layman, contained in the Gahapati-vaggas found in the various nikāyas
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2. The rules as to the outward conduct of the members of the Order, laid down in the Pāṭimokkha and in the Khandhakas
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3. The system of self-training in higher things prescribed for members of the Order. Of this our present Sutta is a striking example.
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4. The method of self-training laid down for those who have entered upon the Path to Arahatship. (The Four Truths, the Eightfold Path, and the Āsavas.)
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In the first of these Buddhism goes very little beyond the current ethics of the day. In the second a very great deal has been simply incorporated from the rules found expedient by previous recluses, both Brahman and non-Brahman, though there are numerous differences, both of the positive regulations included, and also of things deliberately omitted. Even the third, as we have seen, cannot be considered, except in a very limited sense, as exclusively Buddhist. It is in the fourth that the essential doctrines of Buddhism are to be found. All four have, no doubt, become welded together into a more or less consistent whole. But to understand the whole, the relation of its various parts has to be kept constantly in view.
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This will explain an apparent contradiction. The last Sutta quoted, the Sakuludāyi, states that the aim of the religious or celibate life as led in the Buddha’s Order, is the attainment, in order, of the various things set out in our Sutta (groups 2-9, 12 and 13).
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Now in other passages other things are stated to be the aim.
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Thus in the Saṃyutta (IV, 51) the Buddha himself is represented as explaining that the celibate life (the brahmacariyā) is led by his followers for the sake of the complete understanding of pain (dukkha-pariññā). Further on in the same book (VI, 253 = V, 6, 27) this is three times repeated, with the suggestive addition that there is one way to this, to wit, the Noble Eightfold Path.
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Again, in the Aṅguttara (IV, 7) the higher life is said to be for the sake of getting rid of, of cutting, through, seven Bonds which prevent one from attaining Arahatship. The argument on pp. 88, 99 (though the word brahma-carinyā does not occur) comes to much the same thing. And further on in the same book (IV, 272) the object is stated to be for the sake of getting rid of five particular sorts of envy.
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Nāgasena is therefore quite right when he says that the object of renouncing the world to live in the Order is for the sake of righteousness and peace ; and in. another place that it is to the end that sorrow may pass away . All these explanations belong to the Path, not to the rules of the Order. They are not really inconsistent with the other aim that our Sutta sets out. And they are only additional proof, if such were needed, that it is no more possible to sum up in a single phrase (as some writers have tried to do) the aim of Buddhism, or the object of life in the Order, than it would be to sum up in a similar way the aim of Christianity, or the object for which men enter a Christian Order. The aims are necessarily as various as the character and circumstances of the various individuals who take them up. And Nāgasena does not hesitate to add—and to add in speaking to a king—that some had joined the Order in terror at the tyranny of kings, some in fear of robbers, some because they were harassed by debt, and some perhaps merely to gain a livelihood.
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This also would apply to other Orders both in India and elsewhere, and is quite consistent with our Sutta, which only purports to set forth the advantages the early Buddhists held to be the likely results of joining, from whatever motive, such an Order as their own.
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SĀMAÑÑA-PHALA SUTTA - [THE FRUITS OF THE LIFE OF A RECLUSE]