Establishment of Brahman 2.21

2.21

naikapratiniyamo 'nyābhāvaniścayanimittam, upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptyasyetarasya cāviśeṣeṇa vyavacchedaprasaṅgāt, tatpratiniyamo hi tato 'nyasyāsaṃsargaḥ /
tathā cāsaṃsargādvyavacchede tasya dṛśyādṛśyayoraviśeṣādubhayorvyavacchedaḥ syāt /
atha matam ---
bhavatyeva, tathā hi ---
yāvanto 'syānātmānastānaviśeṣeṇa tadātmaniyamāddarśanamapākaroti, tathā ca nāsyānya ātmānaḥ, taddeśakālāstu bhaveyuḥ, rūpādivadavirodhāt, tatropalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptirviśeṣastaddeśakālavyavacchedāvadhāraṇāya, saṃbhavati hyanupalabhyastaddeśakālo 'nātmānupalabhyamāno 'pyanyopalabdhau, itaravat, anyathā na tulyopalambhayogyataḥ syāt /
satyamastyayaṃ vibhāgaḥ, na tvidānīṃ darśanapratiniyamasya sāmarthyam, tathā hi ---
pratiniyatamapi tatra deśe kāle ca rūpe darśanaṃ tayoryathā rūpavidhimātropakṣayānna rasaṃ vyavacchinatti, tathā bhūbhāgadarśananiyamo 'pi bhūbhāgavidhimātravyāpāratvānna ghaṭadṛśyamapi vyavacchindyāt, vyavacchede vā sarvasya vyavacchedaḥ /
tasmād dṛśyavyavacchede 'pi hetvantaramupāsyam, na darśanapratiniyamamātram /
tathā cātmāntaravyavacchedo 'pi na tataḥ siddhimupāśnute /
kāmaṃ vidhervidheyāsattvavyavacchedarūpatvāttadabhāvo vyavacchidyeta, nātmāntarasattā, taddeśakālayorivānupalabhyasattā /
naikasya bahava ātmāna iti cet, anyatastarhi virodhādvyavacchedaḥ /
na darśananiyamāt /
asati ca vyavacchede kuto bahutvam, kuto vā virodha itaretarāśrayaṃ vā? tasmānnaikavidhiranyavyavacchedaḥ /
api ca ekaniyamādanyavyavacchede citrādiṣu nīlādīnāmekadarśanabhājāṃ bhedo na sidhyet, ekajñānasaṃsargādekatra jñānasyāniyamāt /

Restriction to one [object] is not the cause for ascertaining the absence of another, because that would entail the exclusion without distinction of both what meets the condition for apprehension and what does not. For restriction to it is non-association with anything other than it.
And thus, if exclusion were due to non-association, since that [non-association] is the same toward both the perceptible and the imperceptible, there would be an exclusion of both.
Now, if it is thought:
'It certainly does happen. For this reason:
Because [the perception] is restricted to its own nature, it eliminates without distinction all non-selves of this [object]; and so, it has no other selves. Its space and time, however, would still be there, like [its] colour and so on, because there is no contradiction. In that case, meeting the condition for apprehension is the distinguishing factor for determining the exclusion of its space and time; for it is possible that, although the non-self [i.e., a pot] capable of being apprehended is not apprehended when another [i.e., the floor] is apprehended, its space and time are unapprehended, like the other [imperceptible properties]; otherwise it would not possess an equal capability of apprehension.'
True, this distinction exists, but the capacity does not belong at this point to the restriction of perception. To explain:
Just as perception, even though restricted in that space and time to the colour of the two, does not exclude the taste because its operation is exhausted merely in positing the colour, so too the restriction of the perception of a patch of ground, having its function confined merely to positing the patch of ground, would not exclude even a perceptible pot; or, if there is exclusion, there would be the exclusion of everything.
Therefore, even in the exclusion of a perceptible object, another cause must be sought, not the mere restriction of perception.
And so, the exclusion of another self [or nature] also does not attain establishment from that.
Granted, because positing has the nature of excluding the non-existence of the thing posited, its absence might be excluded, but not the existence of another self, just like the existence of unapprehended [qualities] in that space and time.
If it is said that one entity does not have many selves, then the exclusion comes from elsewhere, due to contradiction;
not from the restriction of perception.
And when exclusion has not taken place, whence multiplicity, or whence contradiction, or else mutual dependence? Therefore, positing one is not the exclusion of another.
Moreover, if the exclusion of another followed from the restriction to one, difference could not be established among blue and other [colours] sharing a single perception in a variegated picture and the like, because, due to association with a single cognition, there is no restriction of the cognition to any one [colour].