Establishment of Brahman 2.27

2.27

nāpekṣā nāma kaścidvastudharmaḥ, yena vastūni vyavasthāpyeran, na khalu svahetuprāpitodayeṣu svabhāvavyavasthiteṣu vastuṣu svabhāvasthitaye vastvantarāpekṣā yujyate /
tatra puruṣapratyayadharmo 'yam /
na ca puruṣapratyayānuvidhāyīni vastūni, svahetubhyaḥ svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ /
ato na tadanusāreṇa vasturūpaṃ vyavatiṣṭhate /
vyavasthitavastusvarūpānusāreṇaiva tasya vyavasthā nyāyyā, tatpūrvakatvāt /
parasparāpekṣāyāṃ ca vastusvabhāvasthitāvitaretarāśrayaprasaṅgāt /
athavā yaduktam ---
ekasmādbhedādavyatiredādvastuno bhedābhāvaprasaṅga iti, tatrāhuḥ ---
na bheda ekaḥ, rūpavirodhāt, ekatve ca tannimittaṃ vastūnāmekatvaṃ syāt, tasmātpratibhāvaṃ bhedo bhidyate, kathaṃ tarhyanekāśrayatvam? apekṣātaḥ, tathā hi pratiyogyapekṣaṃ tasya svarūpaṃ vyavasthitam, tathā ca yathāyathaṃ bhedaiḥ pratiyogyapekṣairātmabhūtairbhinnāḥ sarve bhāvā iti /
tatrocyate ---
pauruṣeyīmiti /
puruṣo hyekamarthaṃ gṛhītvā paramapekṣate kāryārtham, svahetubhyastu pratilabdhāvikalasvabhāvānāṃ bhāvānāṃ bhāvāntareṣu kimarthāpekṣā? nanu svabhāvasthitaye, nānāvidhā hi bhāvasvabhāvāḥ, tatra kaścitpratiyogyapekṣayaiva vyavatiṣṭhate vastutattve, yathāyameva bhedaḥ /
na tarhi hetubhyo bhāvasyāvikalātmalābhaḥ, bhedākhyasya rūpasya pratiyogyapekṣatvāt /
hetvantarācca pratiyoginaḥ saṃpadyamānaḥ paścādbhedo na svabhāvaḥ syāt /

Indeed, dependence is not some property of an entity by which entities could be established; for once entities have arisen from their own causes and are settled in their own nature, a dependence on another entity is not tenable for the maintenance of their own nature.
In that regard, this [dependence] is a property of human cognition.
And entities do not conform to human cognition, because they are settled in their own nature from their own causes.
Therefore, the form of an entity is not established in accordance with it.
Its establishment is justified only in accordance with the form of an already established entity, since it is preceded by that.
And if there were mutual dependence for the establishment of the nature of entities, it would entail a mutual dependence [fallacy].
Or, as for what was said—that because an entity is not distinct from one single difference, there would follow the absence of difference—to that they reply:
Difference is not one, because of contradiction in its form; and if it were one, the oneness of entities would result from that cause; therefore, difference differs per each existing thing. How then does it have manifold loci? By dependence; for indeed, its nature is established as depending on a counterpositive, and thus all entities are differentiated respectively by differences that depend on counterpositives and are identical with their nature.
To that, it is said:
‘[Nor does an entity follow human] [dependence]’.
For a person, having grasped one thing, depends on another for the sake of some purpose; but for entities that have obtained their complete nature from their own causes, for what purpose is there dependence on other entities? If [you say], ‘For the establishment of their own nature, since the natures of entities are manifold, and among them some [nature] is established in reality only through dependence on a counterpositive, just as this very difference is’,
then the entity does not acquire its complete nature from its causes, because the form called difference depends on a counterpositive.
And difference, arising later from another cause—namely, the counterpositive—could not be [the entity's own] nature.