Establishment of Brahman 2.37

2.37

nārthakriyābhedādbhāvānāṃ parasparāpekṣo rūpabhedaḥ pratīyate, nāpyanumātuṃ śakyate /
vyapadeśabhedamātraṃ tu syāt, ekasminnapi vahnau dāhapākādikāryabhedadṛṣṭeḥ /
atha matam ---
rūpādisamūho vahniḥ /
tatra rūpātprakāśaḥ, sparśāddāha iti /
kāmam, dāhapākau tu sparśādeva /
tau ca loke pratītibhedau satyapi saṃyogidravyavikriyāsāmānye /
karma caikaṃ saṃyogavibhāgasaṃskārāṇāṃ hetuḥ, ātmā cecchādīnām, sattvādayaśca pratyekamabhedāllāghavaprakāśādīnām, rūpādayo jñānaviśeṣāṇāṃ sajātīyakṣaṇānāṃ cetyutprekṣitavyam /
nanu nārthakriyābhedamātrādbhedaṃ brūmaḥ, api tu tatrāsaṃbhāvinyā adṛṣṭāyāḥ /
yathā cakṣuṣi satyapyadṛṣṭāyāśca badhire tatrāsaṃbhāvinyāḥ śabdabuddherindriyabhedaḥ /
parasparāsaṃbhavikāryāśca prāyeṇa bhāvāḥ, anyakāryasyānyatrādarśanāt /
atha kāryāsaṃbhavaḥ kathaṃ pratyetavyaḥ? nanūktaṃ tatrādarśanāt /
na tarhyasaṃbhavaḥ /
yasya khalvadvayaṃ jagattasya kāryajātamekatraiva dṛśyata iti kathamadarśanam? tatra siddhe bhede tatrādarśanam, tatrādarśanācca bhedasiddhiritītaretarāśrayānna bhedānumānam /
atha matam ---
adṛṣṭasya darśanāditi /
tadasat, ekasmādapi kramavatāṃ kāryāṇāṃ darśanāt /
syādetat ---
ekāntato 'bhede kāryadarśanādarśane na yukte, viśeṣābhāvāt /
na tarhi kāryabhedo 'bhedamapabādhate /
tadanupamardena viśeṣamātrānumānaṃ syāt /
tacca kalpanāviṣayaṃ naivāvajānīmahe, vastusatastasyāyogāt, tattvānyatvayorasaṃbhavāt /
yastu kṣaṇikavādī tattvameva viśeṣasya na manyate, tasyāsati kāraṇasvabhāvābhede kathaṃ tulyasvabhāvakāryotpādaḥ /
atha niranvayavināśānāmapi kalpanāviṣayādabhedātkāryasya tulyatā /
hanta! tarhi bhedādeva kalpanāviṣayātkāryabhedasiddhermudhā kāraṇabhedakalpanā /
atha kāryābhede na (atha na kāryābhedena -- edition) kāraṇasvabhāvābhedo 'pekṣyeta, bhinnasvabhāvebhyaḥ sahakāribhya ekakāryotpatteḥ, yathā cakṣurādibhyo rūpavijñānasya (rūpādijñānasya Ms A, Ms C; rūpādijñānasya -- edition) /
yathā tarhi kāryasvabhāvābhedāya na kāraṇasvabhāvābhedo 'pekṣyate, tathā
tadbhedāya kāraṇabhedo 'pi nāpekṣitavyaḥ /
api cānekakāraṇajanye 'pyekasmin kārye kāraṇavyāpāraviṣayabhedastenaiva varṇitaḥ, yathā rūpajñānasya ---
cakṣuṣo rūpagrahaṇaniyamaḥ, samanantarajñānādupalambhātmatā, viṣayāttadākārateti /
yadi ca kāryatulyatvaṃ na hetusāmyakṛtam, na kāryāddhetvanumānaṃ syāt, bhinnajātīyādapi tulyajātīyotpattisaṃbhavāt /
hetvabhedaścenna kāryābheda upayujyate, kastulyajātīyādvijātīyasya janma nivārayet? tatra yathā vyāvahārikādabhedātkāryābhedastathā vyāvahārikādbhedātkāryabheda iti na viśeṣaḥ /
syādetat ---
kalpitaścedbhedaḥ kāryabhedāya prabhuḥ, na tarhi kalpitaḥ /
na hyanyatparamārthasato lakṣaṇamarthakriyāsāmarthyāt /
tulyamidamabhede 'pi /

A reciprocal difference in intrinsic nature among entities is neither cognized through a difference in causal efficacy, nor can it be inferred.
Rather, it would only be a difference of verbal designation, because even in a single fire a difference of effects, such as burning and cooking, is observed.
Now, if it is thought:
Fire is a collection of form and the rest;
there, illumination is from form, and burning is from touch.
[We reply:] Granted. But burning and cooking are from touch alone;
and they are two distinct cognitions in worldly usage, even though the general alteration of the conjoined substance is the same.
And it should be conceived that a single action is the cause of conjunction, disjunction, and latent impression; the Self is the cause of desire and the like; sattva and the other [guṇas], being individually identical, are the causes of lightness, illumination, and so on; and form and the rest are the causes of particular cognitions and moments of their own kind.
If [the opponent says]: We do not state difference merely from a difference of causal efficacy, but rather from one that is impossible [and] unobserved therein;
just as there is a difference of sense organs for auditory cognition, which is unobserved in the eye though present, and is impossible in a deaf person;
and entities generally have effects mutually impossible [elsewhere], since the effect of one is not seen in another.
Now, how is the impossibility of the effect to be cognized? Was it not said: 'because it is not seen therein'?
Then it is not impossibility.
For one for whom the world is non-dual, the whole class of effects is seen in one alone; how then could there be non-observation? If difference were established therein, then there would be non-observation therein; and from non-observation therein arises the establishment of difference—thus, because of mutual dependence, there is no inference of difference.
Now, if it is thought:
'Because what was unobserved comes to be observed.'
That is incorrect, because even from a single [entity] successive effects are seen.
It may be said:
In absolute non-difference, the observation and non-observation of effects are not reasonable, because there is no particularity.
Then the difference of effects does not subvert non-difference.
Without subverting that, there would be an inference merely of a particularity;
and that, being an object of mental construction, we certainly do not reject, because it is impossible as a real entity, since it cannot be either identical or different.
As for the momentarist, who does not even admit the reality of the particularity: when there is no non-difference of intrinsic nature in the cause, how could there be the arising of an effect of like nature?
Now, if the likeness of the effect is due to non-difference as an object of mental construction, even for [causes that undergo] destruction without trace—
aha! Then, since the difference of effects is established merely from difference as an object of mental construction, the postulation of a difference of causes is useless.
Now, if non-difference of the cause's intrinsic nature were not required for non-difference of the effect, because a single effect arises from auxiliary factors of distinct natures, as a consciousness of form from the eye and the rest—
then, just as non-difference of the cause's intrinsic nature is not required for non-difference of the effect's intrinsic nature, so
a difference of causes should also not be required for a difference thereof.
Moreover, even in a single effect produced by multiple causes, the difference of scope of the operation of the causes has been described by that very [momentarist]; as in the case of the cognition of form:
from the eye is the restriction to grasping form; from the immediately preceding cognition is the nature of apprehension; from the object is its having that form.
And if the likeness of effects were not brought about by similarity of causes, there could be no inference of the cause from the effect, because the arising of a similar class would be possible even from a different class.
If non-difference of causes is not of use in the non-difference of effects, who could prevent the birth of a different class from a similar class? There, just as the non-difference of effects is from practical non-difference, so the difference of effects is from practical difference; hence there is no distinction.
It may be said:
If a mentally constructed difference is capable of [producing] a difference of effects, then it is not mentally constructed;
for there is no other definition of an ultimately real entity than the capacity for causal efficacy.
This is equal in the case of non-difference as well.