Establishment of Brahman 3.100

3.100

syādetat ---
bhinnā evārthasvabhāvāḥ pramāṇaṃ prati yogyāḥ sacchabdavācyāḥ santu, naikā sattā /
mā bhūt, naitatsādhyam /
sarvathārthasvabhāvābhidhāyyastiśabdo na pramāṇayoganimitta iti /
pramāṇasaṃsparśe hi sāpekṣatā syāt /
anekatā tu na kañciddoṣamāvahati /
api ca yadi tasyānekatvam, kathamabhinnaśabdapravṛttiḥ? tathā hi ---
bhinneṣvabhinnaṃ viśeṣaṇamupalakṣaṇaṃ vāśrityaikaḥ śabdo varteta, bhinnanimitto vā sādhāraṇaśabdaḥ syādakṣādivat /
tatra na tāvadanantārthasvabhāveṣu sādhāraṇatvamupapadyate, saṃbandhagrahaṇasāmarthyāt /
parimitajātiviṣayā hyakṣādiśabdāḥ parimitopalakṣaṇalakṣitā vā syuḥ /
syādetat ---
dravyatvādisāmānyatrayopalakṣitānāmarthānāṃ sacchabdaḥ sādhāraṇa iti /
tanna /
yo hi sattāmavajānīte sa dravyatvādīnyapyavajānīta eva /
na kila tejo dṛṣṭavato 'psu tadavamarśo bhavati /
api ca sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā api santa eva /
na teṣvaupacārikaḥ sacchabdaḥ pratyayasyāvailakṣaṇyāt /
na ca sāmānyādvinopacāraḥ /
sati vā sāmānye tadeva sacchabdārthaḥ /
tadeva ca sattā, tulyatvātpratyayasya /
atha matam ---
sarvapravādeṣu sarvapadārthāḥ parimitaiḥ kaiściddharmairupasaṃgṛhītāḥ /
tadupalakṣaṇānāmanantānāmapyarthānāṃ ‘sat'; iti sādhāraṇaḥ śabdaḥ /
tadayuktam /
saṃgraho hi naikamantareṇa /
tatra yadi sacchabdārthatayā (sacchabdatāyāṃ -- edition) saṃgrahaḥ ‘etāvatprabhedaḥ sacchabdārthaḥ'iti, nārthāntaranivṛttiḥ syāt /
tatra na sarvārthasaṃgrahaḥ syāt, yathā ‘navavidho gośabdārthaḥ'iti nānyeṣāmabhāva eva /
tatra na pravādebhyaḥ kācidarthatattvāvagatiḥ syāt /
nanu na pravādānāmarthavattā sādhyā /
na brūmaḥ pravādānāmarthavattā sādhyeti /
kiṃ tu pratipadyante pravādinaḥ kañcidarthasvabhāvamekam, yasyāyaṃ ‘pañca, ṣaṭ'ityādi prabhedasaṃgrahaḥ /
yato naikamantareṇopasaṃgrāhakamavāntarasaṃkhyānāṃ niveśaḥ /
athaitāvān pramāṇayogyo 'rthakriyāsāmarthyo veti pramāṇayogyatve 'rthakriyāsāmarthye vā saṃgrahaḥ, tābhyāmeva sacchabdārtha upalakṣyatām, vyarthaḥ parimitadharmopanyāsaḥ /
tatra sāmānyaśabdataiva syāt, na sādhāraṇaśabdatā /
bhinnanimittatve cākṣādiśabdebhya iva nimittabhedātsaṃśayaḥ syāt, na viśeṣapratītiḥ /
na hi ‘san ghaṭaḥ'; iti nimittabhedeṣu pratipattāraḥ saṃśerate /
yathaiva ‘śuklaḥ paṭaḥ'iti nirākāṅkṣaḥ, tathā ‘san ghaṭaḥ'; ityapi /
yastu dravyaṃ guṇaḥ karma rūpaṃ vijñānamiti vā saṃśayaḥ, na sa laukikānām /
laukikāstvabhinnameva nimittaṃ pratipadyante /
arthācca saṃdehaḥ, na śabdāt /
kutaḥ? viśeṣapratītimantareṇāpi pratipatturnairākāṅkṣyāt /
yatra hyarthasāmarthyena saṃśayaḥ, yathā ‘vṛkṣaśchidyatām'; iti paraśukuṭhārādiṣu, tatrānyataraviśeṣānavagame 'pi nairākāṅkṣam, yasya kasyacidupādānāt, anyathānavasthānāt /
yatra tu śabdāt, tatra viśeṣāvagamahetorvinā sākāṅkṣatvameva /
tadevaṃ na nānānimittaḥ sādhāraṇaśabdaḥ /
viśeṣaṇamapyekaṃ pramāṇaṃ syāt /
tacca prāgapi tataḥ sacchabdānuviddhabuddhyutpādādanupapannamityuktam ---
‘mānādeva yato buddhiḥ'; iti prapañcena /
api ca kāryādapi vṛttameva pramāṇamavasīyate /
tatra kutastadviśiṣṭatā /
na khalvartho 'sannihitaviśeṣaguṇo viśiṣṭo bhavati /
na ca niścite viśeṣaṇābhāve viśiṣṭābhidhānānuviddhaḥ saṃśayo bhavati daṇḍābhāvaniścaya iva ‘daṇḍī na vā'; iti /
bhavati ca śūnyanagarādiṣu ciranikhātanidhiṣu pramāṇābhāvaniścaye 'pi ‘santi na'iti saṃśayaḥ /
tasmādanyaḥ pramāṇayogātsadarthaḥ, yatraiṣa saṃśayaḥ /
nāpyupalakṣaṇaṃ pramāṇam, pramitadhvasteṣu sacchabdāprayogātsmaryamāṇe ca sacchabdānuviddhātsaṃdehāt /

It may be said:
'Let distinct intrinsic natures of objects, which are fit with respect to a means of valid cognition, be the referents of the word “existent”; let there not be a single being.'—
Let it not be; this is not what is to be established [by us].
In any case, the word 'exists' denotes the intrinsic nature of the object and does not have connection with a means of valid cognition as its cause.
For only if there were contact with a means of valid cognition would there be dependence.
Multiplicity, however, brings no fault whatsoever.
Moreover, if it has multiplicity, how can there be the application of an undivided word? To explain:
One word could apply to distinct things by resorting to an undivided qualifier or an indicator, or there could be an equivocal word having distinct causes [of application], like the word akṣa, etc.
Among these, first of all, equivocality cannot be maintained across infinite intrinsic natures of objects, because of [the limits on] the capacity to grasp relations [of denotation].
For words like akṣa have as their scope a limited number of universals, or they are indicated by a limited number of indicators.
It may be said:
'The word “existent” is equivocal with respect to things indicated by the triad of universals, substancehood, and the like.'—
That is not so.
For whoever denies being also denies substancehood and the like as well.
Surely, one who has seen fire does not have the reflective awareness of it in water.
Moreover, universal, particularity, and inherence are also existent indeed.
The word 'existent' is not metaphorical with respect to them, because the cognition is non-different.
And there is no metaphor without a universal.
Or, if a universal exists, that alone is the meaning of the word 'existent'.
And that alone is being, because the cognition is equal.
Now, if it is thought:
'In all philosophical doctrines, all categories are subsumed under certain limited properties.
The word “existent” is equivocal with respect to things, infinite though they are, that have those [properties] as indicators.'—
That is improper.
For a subsumption cannot occur without a single [unifying factor].
There, if the subsumption is made in the capacity of being the meaning of the word 'existent', [saying:] 'The meaning of the word “existent” has just this many divisions', there would be no exclusion of other things.
There, there would not be a subsumption of all things—just as [saying] 'the meaning of the word “cow” is of nine kinds' does not imply the non-existence of other things.
There, no comprehension of the reality of things could arise from the philosophical doctrines.
[Objection:] Surely, the meaningfulness of philosophical doctrines is not what is to be established!
We do not say that the meaningfulness of philosophical doctrines is to be established.
Rather, the proponents of doctrines acknowledge a certain single intrinsic nature of an object, of which this is the subsumption of divisions such as 'five, six', etc.,
because without a single subsuming factor, there can be no placement of subordinate numbers.
If [it is said that] the subsumption is based on fitness for a means of valid cognition or on capacity for causal efficacy, [saying:] 'It is this much which is fit for a means of valid cognition, or has capacity for causal efficacy'—then let the meaning of the word 'existent' be indicated by those very two; the presentation of limited properties is useless.
In that case, it would be a word signifying a universal, not an equivocal word.
And if it had distinct causes [of application], doubt would arise due to the diversity of causes, just as from words like akṣa, etc., and not the cognition of a specific thing.
For hearers do not doubt among diverse causes when they hear: 'The pot is existent.'
Just as one has no expectancy when hearing: 'The cloth is white', so too when hearing: 'The pot is existent.'
As for the doubt whether it is a substance, a quality, an action, a visible form, or consciousness—that does not belong to ordinary people.
Ordinary people, however, cognize a single, undivided cause [of application].
And the doubt arises from the thing, not from the word.
Why? Because the hearer is free from expectancy even without cognizing the specific [entity].
For where doubt arises from the nature of the thing—as in 'let the tree be cut', with respect to an axe, hatchet, etc.—there, even though neither specific item is known, there is freedom from expectancy because any one whatever is taken, as otherwise there would be infinite regress.
Where, however, [doubt arises] from the word, there expectancy remains without a cause for knowing the specific item.
Therefore, thus, it is not an equivocal word having multiple causes [of application].
Nor could a single means of valid cognition be a qualifier.
And it has been stated at length in [the verse beginning:] 'Since cognition arises from the means of valid cognition itself...' that that is impossible because the cognition permeated by the word 'existent' arises even prior to that.
Moreover, a means of valid cognition is determined as having operated only from [its] effect.
Then whence could there be the state of being qualified by that?
Indeed, an object is not qualified when the specific quality is not present.
And when the absence of a qualifier is ascertained, there is no doubt permeated by the expression of the qualified, just as when the absence of a staff is ascertained, there is no [doubt]: 'Is he a staff-bearer or not?'
And in deserted cities and the like, or in the case of treasures buried long ago, even when the absence of a means of valid cognition is ascertained, there is the doubt: 'Do they exist or not?'
Therefore, the meaning of 'existent' in which this doubt occurs is different from connection with a means of valid cognition.
Nor is a means of valid cognition an indicator, because the word 'existent' is not used for things that are cognized by a means of valid cognition and then destroyed, and because with respect to what is remembered, there is a doubt permeated by the word 'existent'.