Establishment of Brahman 3.281

3.281

nanu tattvajñānapratihataścedutpanno 'pi prapañcāvabhāso nātmasaṃsparśī, na kiñcitkaraḥ, na bandhaḥ, śabdādeva tasyotpatteḥ kimarthamupāsanādi? ucyate ---
parokṣarūpaṃ śābdajñānam, pratyakṣarūpaḥ prapañcāvabhāsaḥ /
tena tayoravirodhena prapañcāvabhāso nātmāsaṃsparśī, nākiñcitkaraḥ, na na bandhaḥ, yathā pramāṇāntarādavasīyamānamādhurye 'pi dravye pratyakṣasarūpa
indriyadvārastiktāvabhāso 'dravyasaṃsparśī nābhāsamātratayāvatiṣṭhate, tathā ca taddravyaṃ paramārthatiktamivānavasitamādhuryamiva duḥkhāya bhavati /
upāsanādinā sākṣātkṛtātmatattvasya tu virodhātsannapi prapañcāvabhāso nātmasaṃsparśī, devadatta iva siṃhāvabhāsaḥ /
‘siṃho devadattaḥ'; iti samārope 'vabhāsamāno 'pi tadasaṃsparśī, akiñcitkaraḥ, na bhayahetuḥ /
nityaścātmatattvaprakāśaḥ, tatra na punarvipayaryāvakāśo 'sti /
śābdaṃ tu pramāṇādhīnaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ jñānam, tatra punarapi viparyayāvakāśaḥ /
dṛṣṭaṃ hi pramāṇānanusandhāne punaḥ sarpabhrāntyā rajjorbhayam /
athātrāpi satataṃ śābdaṃ jñānamanusaṃdadhīta /
kimanyadupāsanamasmāt? tasmādbandhahetucchedo 'pi vidyaiva, na tayā sādhyaḥ /
evamuttarāghāśleṣe 'pi vācyam, ‘yathā puṣkarapalāśa āpo na śliṣyanta evamevaṃvidi pāpaṃ karma na śliṣyate'iti kartṛkarmapravibhāgasya vidyayā pravilayāt /
evaṃ na vidyāyā anekaphalakalpanā bhaviṣyati, vartamānāpadeśānāṃ ca phalavidhitvena na vipariṇatiriti /
yaduktaṃ na śābdajñānaviṣayo brahmeti, tatrocyate ---

[Objection:] If the appearance of the world, even though arisen, does not touch the Self, produces no effect, and is not a bondage when suppressed by the knowledge of reality, and since that [knowledge] arises from verbal testimony alone, what is the purpose of meditation and the like? It is answered:
Knowledge derived from verbal testimony has an indirect nature, whereas the appearance of the world has an immediate perceptual nature.
Therefore, because there is no contradiction between the two, the appearance of the world is not without contact with the Self, is not ineffective, and is not non-bondage. Just as in the case of a substance whose sweetness is ascertained through another means of valid cognition, the appearance of bitterness arising through the sense organ in the form of perception does not remain as a mere appearance without contacting the substance, and thus that substance produces pain as if it were bitter in reality, as if its sweetness were unascertained;
but for one who has directly realized the reality of the Self through meditation and the like, the appearance of the world, though existing, does not touch the Self owing to contradiction, just like the appearance of a lion in Devadatta.
Even when appearing in the superimposition 'Devadatta is a lion', it does not touch him, produces no effect, and is not a cause of fear.
And the illumination of the reality of the Self is eternal; therein there is no room again for error.
Knowledge derived from verbal testimony, however, is dependent upon a means of valid cognition and is momentary; therein there is room again for error.
For it is observed that when the means of valid cognition is not kept in mind, fear of a rope arises again due to the error of a snake.
[Opponent:] Then here too one could continuously keep in mind the knowledge derived from verbal testimony.
What else is meditation than this? Therefore, the severance of the cause of bondage is itself knowledge; it is not to be produced by it.
In this way it should also be stated regarding the non-clinging of subsequent sins, as in: 'Just as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, even so evil action does not cling to one who knows thus', because the distinction of agent and action is dissolved by knowledge.
Thus, multiple results will not have to be assumed for knowledge, and descriptions of present facts will not be transformed into injunctions of results.
As for what was said that Brahman is not an object of knowledge derived from verbal testimony, regarding that it is said: