Establishment of Brahman 3.43

3.43

dvayorekaviṣayasaṃbhave kuta etat ---
śabdastadapekṣaḥ, na punastatpramāṇāntaraṃ śabdāpekṣaṃ syāditi? yadi śabdaḥ pramāṇāntarādhigataviṣayo loke dṛṣṭa iti, pramāṇāntarasyāviṣaye tarhi natarāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ tasya bhavati /
pramāṇāntaraviṣaye hi pramāṇāntarasaṃbhavādapi tāvatsyāt, anyatra tadabhāvād durlabhaṃ tat /
atha pauruṣeyatvakāritā lokavacasāṃ pramāṇāntarādhigatārthatā, na śabdasāmarthyakāritā /
śabdasya pramāṇāntarāsaṃbhinna evārthe sāmarthyam /
na tarhi pramāṇāntarasaṃbhavācchabda eva sāpekṣaḥ, tadapi śabdasaṃbhavācchabdāpekṣaṃ syāt /
kimatastasya sāpekṣatvena? apramāṇaṃ syāt /
na śabdasya tatrāpekṣā yujyate /
sati hi tasya prāmāṇye tatsaṃvādavisaṃvādāvapekṣyeyātām /
atha śabdasyāprāmāṇyānna tat śabdāpekṣayā pramāṇam /
pramāṇameva, anapekṣatvāt /
śabdasyāprāmāṇyaṃ kutaḥ? pramāṇāntarāpekṣatvāt /
tasya ca prāmāṇyamanapekṣatvāt, anapekṣatvaṃ ca śabdasyāprāmāṇyāditaretarāśrayam /
pramāṇe hi śabde tadviṣaye saṃbhavati tadapi sāpekṣaṃ syāttatsaṃbhava iva śabdaḥ, viśeṣābhāvāt /
atha śabdasaṃbhave 'pi na tatsāpekṣam /
tatsaṃbhave 'pi na śabdasya sāpekṣatā, viśeṣābhāvāt /

When two [means of cognition] are possible regarding a single object, whence is it that
verbal testimony is dependent on it, but that other means of valid cognition is not dependent on verbal testimony? If [it is said] that verbal testimony is observed in worldly experience to have an object apprehended by another means of valid cognition, then it would all the less have validity regarding what is not an object of another means of valid cognition.
For regarding an object of another means of valid cognition, [validity] might at least exist due to the possibility of another means of valid cognition; elsewhere, due to its absence, that [validity] would be hard to find.
If [it is said] that the fact that worldly utterances have objects apprehended by another means of valid cognition is caused by human authorship, not caused by the intrinsic capacity of the word;
[and that] the word has capacity only regarding an object uncommingled with another means of valid cognition;
then verbal testimony alone is not dependent merely because of the possibility of another means of valid cognition: that [other means] too would be dependent on verbal testimony because of the possibility of verbal testimony.
What of it if it were dependent? It would be invalid.
[Opponent:] Dependence on verbal testimony is not appropriate there;
for only if it had validity would correspondence or conflict with it be expected.
[Maṇḍana:] If it is argued that because verbal testimony is invalid, that [other means] is not a means of valid cognition with dependence on verbal testimony;
[we reply:] it is indeed a means of valid cognition, because of independence.
Whence is the invalidity of verbal testimony? Because of dependence on another means of valid cognition.
And its validity is due to independence, while its independence is due to the invalidity of verbal testimony: this is mutual dependence.
For if verbal testimony were a means of valid cognition, when possible regarding that object, that [other means] too would be dependent, just like verbal testimony upon its possibility, since there is no difference.
If, even when verbal testimony is possible, it is not dependent on it,
[then] even when that [other means] is possible, verbal testimony is not dependent, since there is no difference.