Establishment of Brahman 3.47

3.47

saṃbhavamātreṇa sāpekṣatve pratyakṣānumayorekasmin viṣaye saṃbhavādanyonyāpekṣatvādaprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ /
tathā sattāguṇatvadravyeṣvanekendriyagrāhyeṣvindriyāntarāṇāmindriyāntarasāpekṣatvaprasaṅgaḥ /
atha śabdasyaiva pramāṇāntarasaṃbhave sāpekṣatvam, viśeṣaheturvācyaḥ /
pramāṇāntarādhigatārthatvadarśanāditi cet, uktamatra ---
yadi śabdamātradharmo 'yamasaṃbhavādeva tadviṣaye pratyakṣāderbuddhādivākyavadaprāmāṇyaṃ prāpnoti, saṃbhave tvindriyaviṣaye pratyayitapuruṣavacovadyujyate prāmāṇyam /
yathoktam ---
‘taccetpratyayitātpuruṣādindriyaviṣayaṃ vā, avitathameva tat'; iti /
atha pauruṣeyadharmo 'yam, na saṃbhavatpramāṇāntaraviṣayasyāpyapauruṣeyasya śabdasya sāpekṣatvam /
api ca pratyakṣādhigataviṣayaṃ kiñcidanumānamiti na sāmānyatodṛṣṭasya tathā pratyakṣasāpekṣatā, yathā cāgamapūrvakaṃ ṣaḍjādivivekaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣamiti na sarvaṃ pratyakṣaṃ tathā, evaṃ puruṣavacasāṃ pramāṇāntarādhigataviṣayatvadarśane 'pi nāpauruṣeyasya tathābhāvo bhūtārthasyāpi /
anyathā sutarāṃ pramāṇāntarāsaṃbhavādaprāmāṇyaṃ syādityuktam /

If dependence resulted merely from the possibility [of another means of valid cognition], then because perception and inference are possible with respect to the same object, they would depend on one another, and invalidity would absurdly follow. Likewise, with regard to existence, qualityhood, and substances, which are graspable by multiple senses, the absurd consequence would follow that the other sense organs depend on another sense organ. If [it is argued that] verbal testimony alone is dependent when another means of valid cognition is possible, a distinguishing reason must be stated. If it is said: 'Because its object is observed to have been apprehended by another means of valid cognition'—it has already been replied on this point: If this is an intrinsic property of verbal testimony as such, then precisely because perception and the like are impossible with respect to its object, it would result in invalidity, like the utterances of the Buddha and others; whereas when they are possible, its validity is proper with respect to a sensory object, just like the utterance of a reliable person. As it has been said: 'If that [word] proceeds from a trustworthy person, or has a sensible object, it is certainly not false.' If, on the other hand, this is a property of human speech, then scripture, being authorless, is not dependent even if its object could be the object of another means of valid cognition. Furthermore, just because some inference has an object already apprehended by perception, inference based on general correlation is not thereby dependent on perception; and just as perception preceded by tradition regarding the distinction of musical notes like ṣaḍja does not mean that all perception is of that kind, so too, even though the utterances of human beings are observed to have objects apprehended by other means of valid cognition, authorless scripture—even regarding an already established entity—is not of that nature. Otherwise, as has been said, it would all the more be invalid because of the impossibility of another means of valid cognition.