Establishment of Brahman 3.66

3.66

svopalabdhikhyāpanāya puruṣasya gīḥ, tatastasyāṃ pramāṇāntarasaṃbhedaḥ, ‘mayopalabdho 'yamarthaḥ'ityarthaḥ /
tena tatropalabdhe saṃbhavāsaṃbhavāvevāpekṣyeyātām /
yatropalabdherniścayaḥ ‘saṃbhavatyasyopalabdhiḥ, na cānupalabhyāyaṃ bravīti'; iti tatra prāmāṇyam, yathāptapuruṣasya pramāṇaviṣaye /
yatra tūpalabdherasaṃbhava eva yathā dṛṣṭārthe buddhādivākye, yatra cānupalabhyāpi vacanapravṛttisaṃbhāvanā, tatrāprāmāṇyāt /
na tu pramāṇāntarasaṃbhavātpuruṣavacane 'pi tadapekṣā /

A person's utterance is for the sake of making known his own apprehension; hence, in it there is a connection with another means of valid cognition—the meaning being, 'This object has been apprehended by me.'
Therefore, in that case, only the possibility or impossibility of apprehension should be considered.
Where apprehension is determined, 'His apprehension is possible, and he is not speaking without having apprehended,' there validity exists, as in the case of a trustworthy person with respect to an object of a means of valid cognition.
Where, on the other hand, apprehension is wholly impossible, as with statements of the Buddha and others regarding seen matters, and where there is the possibility of speech proceeding even without having apprehended, there is invalidity;
not, however, that just because another means of valid cognition is possible, human speech also has a dependence on it.