Establishment of Brahman 3.74

3.74

atrāhuḥ ---
na pramāṇāvagamyatāyā anyā kācana sattā /
tathā hi ---
yat pramāṇenāvagamyate tatra ‘asti'; iti vyavahāro laukikānām viparyaye ‘nāsti'; iti /
na khalvanyaḥ sadasadvibhāgaheturlakṣyate /
arthakriyābhāvābhāvau cet /
na tayorapi pramāṇabhāvābhāvādhīnatvāt /
tathā hi ---
kārye 'pi sadvyavahāro yadi kāryāntaranibandhanaḥ anavasthā /
tasmādante 'pi pramāṇādeva sadvyavahāraḥ tadviparyayāccāsadvyavahāraḥ /
evaṃ cedādāveva pramāṇābhāvābhāvanibandhanau sadasadvyavahārau stām /
tathā cāstyarthaniṣṭhaṃ vākyaṃ pramāṇāntarāpekṣamevārthaṃ bodhayati pramāṇaviṣayatāyā astyarthatvāt /

On this [the opponents] say:
Existence is nothing other than being cognised by a means of valid cognition.
For instance:
When an object is cognised by a means of valid cognition, ordinary people use the linguistic expression “it exists” (asti) with regard to it; in the opposite case, [they use] “it does not exist” (nāsti).
Indeed, no other ground for distinguishing between the existent and non-existent is perceived.
If it is argued that it is the presence or absence of causal efficacy,
no, because those two also depend on the presence or absence of a means of valid cognition.
For instance:
If the linguistic and practical usage of “existent” even regarding an effect were grounded on a further effect, there would be an infinite regress.
Therefore, in the final analysis as well, the linguistic and practical usage of “existent” comes only from a means of valid cognition, and the linguistic and practical usage of “non-existent” from its opposite.
If so, right at the beginning, let the linguistic and practical usages of “existent” and “non-existent” be grounded on the presence and absence of a means of valid cognition.
And thus, a statement devoted to the meaning of [the verb] “is” (asti) conveys an object only by depending on another means of valid cognition, because being the object of a means of valid cognition is the meaning of [the verb] “is”.