Establishment of Brahman 4.23

4.23

na tāvanniyogataḥ pramāṇasya puruṣārthaphalatā /
na khalu hitopādānāhitahāne eva pramāṇaphale; upekṣāmapi hi pramāṇaphalaṃ pramāṇavida ācakṣate /
na ca puruṣārthatā pramāṇalakṣaṇam, pramāhetutvaṃ tu /
tasmānna puruṣārthābhāvenāprāmāṇyam /
api ca ‘śokyaham'duḥkhyaham'; 'dhanādīni mama naṣṭāni'iti viśuddhabrahmātmano jīvasya mithyājñānam; etannivṛttirūpaṃ ca viśuddhānandaprakāśabrahmātmatatvajñānam /
tat svarūpeṇaiva puruṣārthaḥ; aniṣṭanivṛttirūpatvādiṣṭāvirbhāvācca /
yadyapi ca saṃskārāttasyānuvṛttistathāpi śābdajñānamanusaṃtanvato viduṣo na pūrvavadbhavati nivartate cātyantāya /
dṛṣṭā ca jñānotpattereva puruṣārthatā kvacit kutūhalākulitānāmajñāte'rthe /
na hi tajjñānāt paramanyadarthyate /
na ca pravṛttinivṛttiviṣayasyaiva puruṣārthateti niyamaḥ; pratyakṣādīni hi pramāṇāni; na ca tāvatpravṛttinivṛttiparāṇi siddhavastuviṣayāṇi; na ca puruṣārthatāṃ jahati /
yadi matam ---
pratyakṣādijñeyaṃ hi siddhaṃ vastu puruṣārthaḥ salilādiḥ, tadupakārāt; tataḥ pratyakṣādīnāṃ puruṣārthatā bhūtaniṣṭhānāmapi /
atrāpi ca śabdaprameyaṃ svayameva brahma puruṣārtho jarādivividhāśivopaśamāt paramānandaprakāśatvācca suprasannam /
ata eva 'tattvamasi'iti śvetaketumukhenāśāsanīyāya puruṣāya śrutyābhinnamupadiśyate; abhinnaṃ hi tadanuśāsanīyāt /
bhedena ca pratīyamānaṃ na puruṣārthaḥ /
tattve tādātmyajñāne ca tathābhāvāt viśvāśivopaśamāt paramaśivabhāvācca paripūrṇaḥ puruṣārtho āpto bhavati /
yadi matam ---
pratyakṣādīnyapi pravṛtyaṅgānyeva,
pramite 'rthe hānopādānādilakṣaṇāyāḥ pravṛttestanmūlatvāt;
īdṛśaṃ pravṛtyaṅgatvamatrāpyastyeva, śabdāt pramite brahmaṇi sākṣātkaraṇāya pravṛtteriṣṭatvāditi //

First of all, a means of valid cognition does not necessarily yield a human end as its fruit.
Indeed, the acquisition of the beneficial and the avoidance of the harmful are not the only fruits of a means of valid cognition; for those knowledgeable in the means of valid cognition state that indifference is also a fruit of a means of valid cognition.
Nor is conduciveness to a human end the defining characteristic of a means of valid cognition; rather, it is being the cause of a valid cognition.
Therefore, there is no invalidity [of a means of valid cognition] due to the absence of a human end.
Moreover, "I am grief-stricken", "I am in pain", "My wealth and the like are destroyed"—such is the false knowledge of the individual self, whose Self is purely Brahman; and the knowledge of reality that the Self is Brahman, which is the manifestation of pure bliss, consists in the cessation of this [false knowledge].
That is a human end essentially in its own right, because it consists in the cessation of the undesirable and the manifestation of the desirable.
And although there is a continuation of that [false knowledge] on account of latent impressions, nonetheless, for the wise person who continuously cultivates verbal knowledge, it does not remain as before, and it ceases completely.
Furthermore, the mere arising of knowledge is seen somewhere to be a human end for those perplexed by curiosity regarding an unknown matter;
for nothing else beyond the knowledge of that is sought.
Nor is there a rule that only the object of activity or withdrawal is a human end; for perception and the other [means of valid cognition] are indeed means of valid cognition; and they are not aimed at activity and withdrawal insofar as they have established entities as their objects; yet they do not abandon their conduciveness to a human end.
If it is thought:—
"The established entity known through perception and the like, such as water, is indeed a human end because of its utility; hence perception and the like are conducive to human ends even though they pertain to existing entities."—
Here too, Brahman itself, which is the object of valid cognition through verbal testimony, is a human end because of the pacification of various evils such as old age, and because it is the manifestation of supreme bliss, perfectly serene.
Precisely for this reason, through the persona of Śvetaketu, it is taught by scripture as non-different to the person who is to be instructed, with the words "That thou art"; for it is non-different from the one to be instructed.
And when cognised as different, it is not a human end.
When there is knowledge of identity with reality, because of being so, because of the pacification of all evil, and because of the state of supreme auspiciousness, the complete human end is attained.
If it is thought:—
"Perception and the like are also merely auxiliary to activity,
because activity characterised by avoidance, acquisition, and the like with respect to a cognised object has them as its root;"—
Such status as an auxiliary to activity exists here too, because activity toward direct realisation is accepted with respect to Brahman cognised from verbal testimony.