Establishment of Brahman 4.5

4.5

na tāvadbrahmāntaryāmyādipadaṃ pramāṇam, saṃbandhajñānāpekṣayā pūrvasiddhe pratyayahetutvena /
nāpi vākyam; na hi tatsākṣādvācakam; padārthadvārā tu tat pratipattiḥ; apadārthe jñānasyābhāvāt /
te hi saṃsargādguṇapradhānabhāvenetarapadārthaviśiṣṭamekaṃ padārthaṃ gamayanti /
tatra padārtha eva viśiṣṭo vākyārtho bhavati /
na cānadhigateṣu pramāṇāntareṇa padārthatvam; sambandhajñānāpekṣaṇāt ityuktam /
tatrāpadārthatve na vākyaviṣayatvam; anavabodhakaṃ teṣāṃ vākyam /
padārthatve pramāṇāntarādhigateranuvādakam /
tatrātyantāparidṛṣṭabrahmādyarthapramāṇābhimateṣu vākyeṣu tadvācīni padāni syuḥ, na vā /
yadi na santi na ta itaraiḥ saṃsṛjyeran na bhidyeranniti na teṣāṃ prameyāḥ loṣṭādivat /
atha tu santi, tathāpi tairadhigatasaṃbandhairna pratipādyeran apratipannāśca na viśiṣṭavākyārthapratipattihetavaḥ; tatra yathā 'vanātpika ānīyatam'; iti pikapadārthajñāne 'vabodhakatvaṃ tathā teṣāmapi /
tasmānna codanāto 'pūrvapadārthāvagamaḥ; sā hi vidhipratiṣedhābhyāṃ kriyāsu puruṣamadhikaroti; traividhyavṛddhaparigrahastu japopayogāt, upaniṣado vedāntāḥ; ---
iti tatra viniyogāt /

First, a word such as "Brahman" or "inner controller" is not a means of valid cognition, because, requiring knowledge of the relation [between word and meaning], it is a cause of cognition only with respect to what is previously established.
Nor is a sentence [such a means], for it does not denote directly; rather, cognition of that [sentence-meaning] occurs through word-meanings, because there is no cognition regarding what is not a word-meaning.
For, through syntactic connection in the relation of qualifier and qualified, they convey a single word-meaning qualified by the other word-meanings.
There, the qualified word-meaning itself becomes the sentence-meaning.
And what is not understood through another means of valid cognition cannot be a word-meaning, because, as stated, it requires knowledge of the relation [between word and meaning].
In that case, if it is not a word-meaning, it is not the object of a sentence; the sentence would fail to convey [it] to them.
If it is a word-meaning, it would be merely reiterative because it is understood through another means of valid cognition.
There, in sentences assumed to be means of valid cognition for an object such as Brahman that is completely unperceived, would there be words denoting it, or not?
If there are not, they could not be syntactically connected with the others, nor distinguished [from them]; thus they are not their objects of valid cognition, like a clod of earth, etc.
If, on the other hand, there are, even so, with their relations [of word and meaning] ungrasped, they would not convey [it], and what is not understood cannot be a cause of cognising the qualified sentence-meaning; in that respect, just as with "let a pika be brought from the forest," [a sentence] is informative only when the meaning of the word pika is known, so it is with them as well.
Therefore, there is no cognition of an unprecedented word-meaning from an injunction; for that empowers a person to actions through injunctions and prohibitions; as for its acceptance by those learned in the three Vedas, that is due to its usefulness for muttering prayers; [and as for] the Upaniṣads, the Vedāntas—
because they are applied there.