Establishment of Brahman 1

English (machine translation) (mt) 1

Language: English

1.25 — 3 parts

1.1

Bliss, one, immortal, unborn, consciousness, imperishable,
non-all, all, fearless—we bow to Prajāpati.

Learned scholars disagree regarding the Vedāntas:
some consider [them] to have invalidity—if the Self is established through another means of valid cognition, they are restatements; if it is not established, because a relation is not grasped; if it is not the referent of a word, because it is not an object of a sentence; and, when activity and cessation are not taught, because it is not a human end.
Others, however, under the pretext of [admitting] validity with respect to the duty of comprehension, assert merely invalidity.
Others still, because of contradiction with injunctions to ritual action and contradiction with perception and the rest if the literal meaning of revelation were accepted, consider [them] to have figurative meanings.
To refute them, it is said: "Bliss..."
And he honors the supreme deity through praise characterized by the declaration of qualities and through prostration characterized by humble submission of body, speech, and mind.
And he introduces the topic of the treatise—
because by means of refuting misconceptions, the establishment of the validity of the Vedāntas with respect to an entity of such a nature is achieved, this also constitutes the topic of the treatise.

1.3

On this point, some [argue]:
if Brahman has the nature of bliss, the activity of a seeker of liberation would proceed from attachment to bliss.
And activity based on attachment is the seed of transmigratory existence, so it would not lead to liberation.
The vision in the Self is stated of one who is tranquil and self-restrained.
And one who acts out of attachment to bliss does not become tranquil.
Therefore, someone who is distressed by suffering and free from attachment to pleasure, acting towards the reality of Brahman which transcends all suffering, is liberated.
And the revelations regarding bliss speak only of the transcendence of all suffering.
For the word "pleasure" is seen to apply to the cessation of the suffering of hunger and the like.
And others [hold] that that [cessation] alone is pleasure.
Nor does an undesirable consequence apply to stones and the like, because inward-facing consciousness as experienced is pleasure, or because the experience of the Self qualified by that [is pleasure].
To them, he says: "Bliss..."
First of all, pleasure is not merely the cessation of suffering, because pleasure and suffering are observed simultaneously in a burning person whose half-body is submerged in a cold pool.
If [it is said that], even though there is suffering in the unsubmerged half-body, there is pleasure due to the absence of the other [suffering], there would follow the undesirable consequence that one cooking in the Kumbhīpāka hell would be pleased due to the absence of the suffering of another hell;
and [likewise] for one suffering through one sense-organ due to the absence of suffering through another sense-organ.
For this reason too: because even in one who is free from suffering, an experienced delight arises from contact with a particular sense object.
Even where there is a departure of suffering, even there it is not merely that which is pleasure, because of the acquisition of particular food and drink.
For the departure of suffering is achieved by whatever food and drink.
And that [departure of suffering] does not possess distinction, such that for its distinction a distinction among its means would be required.
With pleasure, however, because it possesses gradations of excellence, a requirement for an excellence among its means is proper.

1.4

As for what they also think:
even when no other suffering is to be removed, even then, because desire has the nature of suffering, pleasure has the form of its eradication;
even in that case, there would be no feeling of pleasure for one without desire when enjoying a particular object.
And even an indifferent person experiences delight upon contact with a delightful object.
It might be said:
only the object toward which there is desire produces pleasure, not another.
Therefore, objects are pleasers solely through the cessation of desire.
Otherwise, what is pleasurable to one would be so to all.
If, however, pleasure consists in the cessation of desire, it is fitting that only that towards which one has desire and preference is pleasurable to him;
so, even for one without desire, upon the manifestation of desire from the enjoyment of a particular object, there is his feeling of pleasure upon its cessation.
That too is without substance, because enjoyments of objects do not necessarily eradicate desire.
For it is said: "Desire is never pacified by the enjoyment of desired things";
likewise: "Attachment grows following repeated enjoyment, as does the skill of the senses."
Moreover, the cessation of desire also occurs from seeing the defects of objects; in that case, there would have to be delight equal to [that of] enjoyment.
And when the desired object attained is identical, there would be no difference in joy, because there is no difference in the cessation of desire.
It might be said:
when desire is intense, upon its cessation there is a presumption of greater pleasure, and in the other case it is otherwise.
And that is not so:
an object attained by one who strives because of intense desire does not please as much as that which, being undesired, presented itself without effort.
To explain:
he is not pleased by that which is obtained through hardship as much as by that which presents itself unhoped for.
And if pleasure were merely the absence of desire, when enjoying an undesired object, the states prior and subsequent would not differ from the state of enjoyment.
Or, upon the destruction of desire, the subsequent state would not be different [from enjoyment].
If it is said that in the state of enjoyment desire is merely awakened and not destroyed, then one would be pleased in the prior and subsequent states and suffering in the other [state of enjoyment], which would contradict experience.
Furthermore, an unattained object hovering in memory is the awakener of desire, and once attained it is the dispeller.
If what is attained were the awakener, there would be no cessation from it.

1.5

Nor is pleasure present wherever there is desire, since some are seen to suffer from the enjoyment of even that which was wished for in a hundred daydreams.
Desire, rather, is preceded by pleasure, because it is observed in one who has experienced the presence of that [pleasure].
Even the activation of desire that occurs in members of a particular species towards something not [yet] experienced in this life is also rooted in experience from a prior birth.
And just as someone's desire for something is caused by distinction of species and the like, so something is pleasurable to someone; hence there is no lack of order.
Moreover, some are afflicted even by the cessation of desire, because in its absence there is an absence of the capacity to enjoy objects.
[Objection:] Then they are not those whose desires have ceased.
[Reply:] Their desires have ceased with respect to the object, because it is unenjoyable due to some cause.
Why then are they afflicted? Because of not obtaining the previously experienced pleasure born from it.
Just as those whose sense organs are impaired by bile and the like have ceased to desire exquisite food and drink, so indeed are they tormented by the cessation of desire.
In that case, there is no other reason than the interruption of the previously experienced delight born from it.
Therefore, the rejection of pleasure experienced in each individual Self is incorrect.
We observe, however, that it was described [in that way] by the venerable authors in order to coax those attached to pleasure.
Thus, in this way, pleasure is different from the cessation of suffering.
And that is the primary meaning of the word "bliss".
And in that which has verbal testimony as its means of valid cognition, understanding according to the words is appropriate.

1.6

Nor is activity towards that rooted in attachment.
For attachment is not merely desire.
They define attachment as an insistence on unreal qualities, projected by ignorance.
But because of the purity of the vision of reality, the mind's clarity, taste, and aspiration towards reality are not classified under attachment, just as the revulsion arising from seeing the reality of transmigratory existence as essenceless is not [classified] under aversion.
Otherwise, even towards the reality beyond all suffering, activity would be rooted in aversion towards it, and so an entanglement with transmigratory existence would ensue.
Furthermore, mastery over the senses—consisting of the abandonment of desire and the like—is taught as a means even to those who have attachment to the visible supremacy of another; so too will it be here.
And how could there be a prohibition of clinging to objects other than that which is sought? Because if everything were prohibited, no activity would be observed.
Similarly, there is cessation even from what has presented itself other than that, out of attachment to the supreme pleasure.
And so it has been said:
'Being motivated by desire is not praiseworthy, nor is there any state of desirelessness in this world.' [Manu 2.2]

1.7

It might be said:
If bliss is cognized in Brahman, the object is different from the agent, and duality would follow.
For the relation of agent and object does not exist without action and instrument.
From that, it would also follow that 'Brahman is bliss' is impossible.
If it is designated as possessing it, [the designation] 'without a second' is not tenable.
If it is not cognized, though existent, it is as good as non-existent, so mentioning it is useless.
For it is mentioned because it is a human end, and if uncognized, how can it be a human end? To this it is said:
This should be viewed like the result and like the agent.
To explain:
All investigators assert and know the result of a means of valid cognition to be either a distinct entity or not a distinct entity.
And that is not uncognized, because if it were uncognized, the uncognizability of everything would follow, since the state of entities being cognized is brought about by that.
Nor is it cognized, because no further result is perceived and an infinite regress would follow.
Therefore, it is cognized because it is self-luminous;
and it is uncognized because it lacks the status of an object, like an external object.
And just as, if the agent, the Self, were uncognized, consciousness itself would not exist;
for then there would not be [the cognition]:
'This has been known by me';
for the uncognized Self cannot be connected with the result and the object;
and without such connection, what would be the distinction between what is cognized by oneself and what is cognized by another? Nor is it cognized [as an object], for if it were an object, it would follow that it is different from the agent and that it is not the Self.
Therefore, its being cognized is just its self-luminosity.
Likewise, the nature of bliss belonging to Brahman, which is self-luminous, is not cognized [as an object], because it lacks the status of an object;
nor is it uncognized, because it is self-luminous.
The prohibition, 'Then by what should one see whom?' [Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.14], also pertains to an object [of action].
For it is declared to have as its cause the setting of all objects: 'When to him everything has become the Self indeed' [Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.15].

1.8

Others think:
Properties are of two kinds:
positive in nature and negative in nature.
Among them, those negative in nature do not contradict non-duality, as in:
'one, immortal, unborn.'
For the cessation of difference, origination, and destruction is not some positive entity, such that it would introduce duality.
And if bliss is a positive entity, if it were the property-bearer, consciousness would be the property;
or if consciousness were the nature of the property-bearer, bliss would be the property.
For two forms are not possible for a single entity, because of contradiction.
There, in 'Brahman is consciousness and bliss', non-duality is undermined because of the difference between the property and property-bearer, both bliss and Brahman being positive in nature.
It might be said:
The property also is not different from the property-bearer, because if there were difference, the relation of property and property-bearer would be untenable, as with a cow and a horse.
That is false, because even if there were non-difference, it would be untenable, just as in the case of the form of the property-bearer.
Therefore, the property is somehow different.
And thus the revelation of the absolute absence of difference, 'one only, without a second' [Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1], would not be tenable.
Likewise for one who accepts two forms for a single entity.
Therefore, for Brahman whose nature is consciousness, the word 'bliss' is merely a limiter consisting in the absence of suffering, just as
the words 'not coarse, not fine, not short' [Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.8.8] and the like are limiters consisting in the absence of coarseness and so forth.
Nor is there absolute oneness of consciousness and bliss, because the use of two words would be redundant.
And how can there be oneness in what is expressed by non-synonymous words? Therefore, the cessation of suffering alone is the meaning of the word 'bliss' with respect to Brahman.

1.9

To this it is said:
There is no flaw, because by two words a qualified entity is conveyed, just as with the luminous delight of the moon;
and as in [the statement]:
"The sun is excellent light."
Nor are the words "excellent" and "light" synonyms;
and yet, by these two, only one particular entity is conveyed—a particular light.
For in the sun, excellence is not something different from the nature of light, nor is the nature of light different from excellence; rather, a particular light is understood by means of the two words.
Likewise, from the statement "Brahman is consciousness, bliss", that Brahman's nature is a particular bliss or a particular consciousness is understood by the two words.
Some hold that its supremacy too is due to the absence of suffering characterised by dependence on means and characterised by perishability.
That too they do not accept, because in a matter whose means of valid cognition is verbal testimony, comprehension must accord with the word.
For when supremacy is possible by intrinsic nature, it is not proper that it be figurative because of non-contact with its opposite.
Therefore, it is proper that Brahman has just an intrinsic nature that is luminous as the Self and excellent as the Self.
And thus it is fitting that worldly bliss is a mere fraction of this, because of delimitation;
but in the case of cessation of suffering, this [notion of a fraction] is difficult to apply.
For this reason also the Self has the intrinsic nature of bliss: because it is the locus of supreme love.
For its being the locus of supreme love is heard in revelation: "That this [Self] is dearer than a son";
and it is experienced [in common life].
For thus:
Every being, even a worm, has this self-directed prayer: "May I not cease to be; may I be!"
And that [prayer] makes sense with regard to what is dear;
and love is directed toward what has the nature of pleasure,
not toward suffering, nor toward what is devoid of both forms, because of aversion and indifference [toward those two].
Others, however, say that in deep sleep there is an experience of pleasure in the Self because of the recollection: "I slept pleasantly."
For without an experience, there could not be such a recollection and the acceptance of [having been in] deep sleep;
nor, when the experience is otherwise, is there the recollection "pleasantly";
and there, there is nothing to be experienced other than the Self.
And thus, the attainment of the world of Brahman day after day is heard in revelation.
On that point, others say:
Because such a recollection can also be accounted for by the cessation of suffering, possessing pleasure is not established with absolute certainty.
In reply to them, they say:
Only when an alternative state of affairs is known is it fitting that the word "pleasure" has the cessation of suffering as its occasion; otherwise, only its primary meaning is appropriate.
On that, they say:
Because the designation is seen both ways and is logically possible [both ways], an entity is not established merely from a designation. So enough of excess elaboration.

1.10

On this point, some say:
Because of the fixed distribution of experiences, because the distinction between the liberated and the transmigrating is reasonable, because the capacity of vision is meaningful, because an operation upon oneself is contradictory, because the seer is inferred from the seen, and because of the perception of division in the seen like sound and so forth accompanied by distinctions of pleasure, suffering, and delusion, the revelation of oneness is considered figurative, being based on the absence of division in genus, space, and time.
And [statements such as] 'All this is verily the Self' are figurative on the grounds of subservience to that end.
In response to them, it is said:
[The Self is] one.
By 'Indra moves multiform through māyās', the grasp of varied forms is explicitly shown to be grounded in māyā.
Under these circumstances, how can it be said that oneness is figurative? Likewise, the negation of multiplicity is explicit:
'There is no multiplicity here whatsoever.'
And there is condemnation of seeing multiplicity:
'He goes from death to death.'
And the absence of the seeing of difference is expressed by the word 'as if' (iva)—as an apparent vision of difference due to error—in:
'He who sees here as if there were multiplicity'; this does not make sense if oneness were figurative.
Granted, let oneness be due to figurative usage; however, there can be no cessation of multiplicity if it is real.
If it is said that this [cessation] too is stated only figuratively, no; for there is an absence of purpose.
Figurative usage occurs when there is an occasioning condition and a purpose.
And we see no purpose in a figurative statement of the cessation of multiplicity;
and also because it would be contradictory.
A figurative statement of the cessation of multiplicity would be for the sake of worldly prosperity or the highest good.
For that [cessation], eliminating the distinction between ends, means, and so forth, and manifesting the notion of Self everywhere, would be opposed to that [prosperity].
Likewise, there is no dispute that for one who has ceased from everything, there is the highest good.
Likewise, by the restriction 'one only, without a second' through the two words 'without a second' and the restatement of that very meaning again and again, revelation is indicated to be intent upon the cessation of difference of every kind.
For through repetition an amplification of meaning occurs, as in 'Oh, she is lovely, oh, she is lovely!'
Nor is there any diminution [of meaning].
Figurativeness is far removed.
As for what was said: 'Because of the fixed distribution of experiences,' to that it is replied:
This is worthless, because a fixed distribution of experiences is established even from imagined difference.
For indeed:
Even in a single Self—whether all-pervading, of the size of the body, or of atomic size—a fixed distribution of experiences based on imagined difference is observed, as in:
'Pain is in my foot, pain is in my head.'
For neither the foot nor the head has a connection with pain, since they are insentient.
Even for the proponent of the Self having the size of the body, the limbs themselves are not the possessors of pain, because the Self would then be deprived of it.
It might be said:
If there were oneness of the Self, there would just as well be recollection of experiences in another body.
This is now a different issue.
First of all, the fixed distribution of experiences exists.
Moreover, there too a region does not recollect the pain of another region; just so here too, an individual self does not recollect the pain of another individual self; hence it is the same.
Likewise, among rubies, swords, mirrors, and so on, a fixed distribution of distinct colors and shapes of faces and so forth is perceived even in the absence of difference.
And thus the distinction between the liberated and the transmigrating is also established.
For indeed:
Even though the Self is one, being associated with regions of pleasure, suffering, and so on, it is understood to be bound, as it were, there, and liberated, as it were, elsewhere;
just as in a dirty mirror surface a dirty face is understood, in a pure [mirror surface] a pure face, and when free of a mirror, it is understood as untouched by the defects of that limiting adjunct.
It might be said:
Imagination is a property of the cognizer's thought, and is not capable of establishing a real entity.
Entities certainly do not turn about in accordance with the cognizer's thought.
Nor does an effect arise from a figurative entity;
for a boy who is figuratively fire does not burn.
Yet the fixed distribution has been cited.
True;
for that is an error.
Here too, its being an error cannot be averted by force.
And an imagined snakebite is capable of producing the effect of death, and a phantom sun produces the effect of light.

1.11

As for what was also said: that from the inference of the seer solely through the seen there is difference between the seer and the seen, and because of the perception of distinctions like pleasure in the seen, there is multiplicity—that too is incorrect.
For it has been stated that there is no establishment of the seen when the seer does not shine.
And there is no perception of difference in the seen, since the means of valid cognition does not delimit, as will be explained.
And the capacity of vision is meaningful through its efficacy for itself.
Nor is an operation upon oneself contradictory;
it has been explained that it is like a lamp and like the result of a means of valid cognition.
Moreover, this relation of seer and seen is intelligible only in oneness, through the transformation or illusory modification in various ways of the seer itself, whose nature is consciousness.
In multiplicity, however, between two entities of isolated nature, whose mutual essences are unmixed, and which are unconnected, what kind of relation of seer and seen could there be?
For it is not tenable that what is unconnected with consciousness should be made an object of consciousness.
If it is said that there is indeed a connection when both are impressed upon a single internal organ, no; because consciousness is pure, non-transforming, and non-transiting.
If it is said that the visible intellect, because of proximity to consciousness, undergoes illusory modification through its reflection—then what is this reflection-ness? It is the appearance of that in what is not that.
Then the seen is not seen in ultimate truth;
and what is not seen in ultimate truth cannot be said to exist distinct from the seer.
As for one who also thinks:
The seen is established purely by its being seen, not by a relation;
and vision has an objective form as its object, as 'this'—
he must be told:
True, it has an objective form as its object;
but in truth that is through the transformation or illusory modification in various ways of the one Self itself, as in the case of oneself in a mirror surface.
For indeed, one cognizes oneself located in a mirror surface as if divided from oneself;
but that something divided from consciousness and unconnected with it should be cognized by it is unintelligible.
And thus non-difference of the seen from the seer is taught in revelation:
'When the Self is known, all this becomes known.'
Therefore, it is rightly said that [the Self is] one.

1.12

Those, however, who maintain that the self consists of momentary cognitions assert that attaining Brahman is characterized precisely by the cessation of cognition due to the radical elimination of afflictions along with latent impressions. / And thus it is heard in revelation: / ‘There is no consciousness after passing away.’ / Others, however, [maintain that it is] characterized by the arising of pure cognition in which the affliction of the forms of objects has been shaken off, because of having completely eradicated all latent impressions. / For if [Brahman] is without beginning and end, there would be nothing to be removed nor anything to be attained, so the scriptures intended for that purpose and the activities intended for that purpose would be useless. / To explain: if it has the intrinsic nature of knowledge, nothing would need to be eliminated or attained, because of the absence of ignorance and the presence of knowledge. / If it has the intrinsic nature of ignorance, then, since it is eternal, there could be no abandonment of its prior intrinsic nature nor assumption of another intrinsic nature. / Similarly, even if it had the intrinsic nature of both, knowledge would already be attained, and ignorance could not be eradicated. / In reply to them, he says: / ‘Immortal, unborn …’ / Nor is there any uselessness of the scriptures or of the activities intended for liberation, because ignorance is that which is to be eliminated. / And in all doctrines, ignorance, even though beginningless, is accepted to be destructible. / We do not say that what is beginningless cannot be destroyed, but rather what is an eternal intrinsic nature of Brahman. / If ignorance is not an intrinsic nature of Brahman, it would follow that it is a distinct entity from Brahman. / If it does not exist at all, what is to be eliminated there? If it is thought: / ignorance is non-apprehension; how could that be a distinct entity? Nor is it non-eliminable, since the operations of all means of valid cognition have as their purpose the cessation of non-apprehension; / that too is incorrect. / It is eliminated by knowledge whose nature is non-apprehension of reality; / and that [knowledge] is eternal in Brahman. / And there is none other than Brahman whose non-apprehension of reality could be eliminated in Brahman by knowledge to be acquired through effort. / But in Brahman, apprehension and non-apprehension simultaneously are contradictory. / Or, if there is no contradiction, ignorance would never be eliminated. / But for one for whom ignorance is erroneous apprehension: if that were the intrinsic nature of Brahman, being eternal, how could it be eliminated? If it is not its intrinsic nature, it would follow that it is a distinct entity. / And it must be stated whose it is, since there is none other than Brahman. / If it is of Brahman alone, there is a contradiction, since it is of the nature of knowledge. / Or, if there is no contradiction, by what could there be cessation?

1.13

To this it is said: / Ignorance is neither the intrinsic nature of Brahman nor a distinct entity; it is neither absolutely non-existent nor existent. / Thus indeed is this ignorance called māyā, false appearance. / If it were the intrinsic nature of something, whether different or non-different, it would be ultimate reality itself, and hence not ignorance. / If it were absolutely non-existent, like a sky-flower, it could not be a component of conventional practice. / Therefore, it is inexplicable. / And it must be accepted in this way by all theorists. / To explain: / For the Śūnyavādin, if it were real, it would be perception of reality, not ignorance. / If it were equal to a sky-flower, it could not be a component of conventional practice. / For the Vijñānavādin too, if there were existence of cognition as it appears, there could be no denial of the external object, because the external appearance of the cognizable forms such as blue and yellow is undeniable; if it were absolutely non-existent, external appearance would be impossible, like a sky-flower. / Even for the theorists of external objects, cognitions of permanence in the impermanent and errors such as [perceiving] silver [in mother-of-pearl] could not possess the status of ignorance if the form that appears were real. / If it were absolutely non-existent, no conventional practice whatsoever could be grounded upon it. / It might be said: / ‘Let the form that appears not exist, but the appearance itself is certainly existent, and that is called ignorance.’ / This has no substance. / When what appears is non-existent, the appearance of it also cannot be truly determined. / There would be merely an appearance; / that it is an appearance of that is itself merely an error. / Therefore, ignorance is neither existent nor non-existent. / For this very reason, its cessation is possible because its intrinsic nature is unstable, since it is mere māyā. / If it were firmly established in another intrinsic nature, how could there be alteration, since that would involve the loss of its intrinsic nature? / If it were void, it would already have ceased on its own. / And thus there is neither the loss of non-duality nor the absence of that which is to be eliminated.

1.14

As for [the question]: whose is ignorance? / We say: of the individual selves. / Objection: Are not the individual selves non-different from Brahman? / For thus revelation says: / ‘Having entered along with this living individual self …’ / True, from the perspective of ultimate reality; / but through conceptual construction they are differentiated. / But whose conceptual construction is the differentiator? Certainly not Brahman’s, since it is of the nature of knowledge and devoid of conceptual construction. / Nor of the individual selves, since they do not exist prior to conceptual construction, which would lead to the undesirable consequence of mutual dependence: / for the division of individual selves is dependent on conceptual construction, and conceptual construction is based on the individual selves.

1.15

On this point, some say:
The defect [of mutual dependence applies] only when establishing a real entity:
an unestablished real entity is not sufficient to produce another real entity, but not in mere illusion.
For there is no inconsistency whatsoever in illusion.
Indeed, illusion has an inexplicable content by its very nature;
if it had an explicable content, it would not be an illusion, because of being a real thing.
Others, however, explain as follows:
since both ignorance and the individual self are beginningless, like the series of seed and sprout, mutual dependence does not result in impossibility.
And so it has been stated by the proponents of ignorance as the material cause:
‘Ignorance is beginningless and devoid of purpose.’
There, because it is beginningless, there is no defect of mutual dependence; and because it is devoid of purpose, there is no scope for objecting to the purpose of the creation of the differentiated world.
As for what some object:
‘Without aiming at a purpose, not even a fool acts,’ so in that case the purpose of the supreme Brahman for the creation of the world must be stated;
it cannot be grace to others,
because prior to creation there are no recipients of grace, and because creation is predominantly painful;
nor can it be play etc. for its own sake, because its desires are already attained—
this [objection] has no scope when creation has ignorance as its cause.
For ignorance does not act with regard to a purpose;
illusions such as a city of gandharvas indeed do not have an intended purpose.
Likewise, [the objection] ‘A pure person cannot have an impure transformation’ is also refuted when the division of creation has ignorance as its cause.
Furthermore, activity such as play belongs precisely to those who have achieved their goals and whose desires are attained, out of exuberance;
but for those whose minds are distracted by wanting and who are devoid of joy, play is completely undesirable.
Nor is there the defect of partiality and cruelty.
For a magician who displays a manifold world does not have divisions of attachment and aversion based on whether the parts are complete or defective;
or just as makers of paintings, clay figures, and so forth, who create those various images with distinctions of deformed and undeformed, and children playing with various distinct figures made of clay and the like, have no partiality or cruelty toward them whatsoever;
and the teachers say that there is no defect in an agent who arranges diversity in accordance with the repository of karma.
Nor is there the defect of not being the Lord;
for a master who bestows different fruits in accordance with differences in service does not cease to be a master.
Likewise, an impure effect can belong even to what is pure;
for there is no total absence of dissimilarity between material cause and modification;
otherwise, the very relation of material cause and modification would not exist.
And water, which is liquid, has a hard modification such as hail; likewise, from insentient cow dung comes a sentient scorpion—many such dissimilarities between material cause and modification can be observed, so enough of this digression.

1.16

[Objection:] Are not individual selves also of a purely pure nature, because they are non-different from the reality of Brahman?
Then how is there room for ignorance in them? This is meaningless.
For the reflection in swords and the like is not distinct from the spotless original;
yet darkness and other impurities find room there.
If it is said that this is an error, the same applies here: the impurity of individual selves is also an error;
otherwise, it has been said that purity would be impossible to attain.
It might be said:
swords and the like are causes of error regarding the face; similarly, here too a cause of error must be stated.
Seeking a cause in an error that is beginningless is improper, as it were.
And thus [the question] ‘By what was the activity of his ignorance caused, like a dream etc.?’ is answered.
[Objection:] Ignorance is innate, beginningless, and causeless; how then could it be eliminated? All sacred teachings are set forth precisely for the eradication of innate ignorance.
Moreover, the beginningless dark color of earthy atoms is removed by a color produced by baking.
[Objection:] Even what is innate may be removed by the advent of a contrary cognition;
but for the advocate of the solitary Self, whose reality admits no adventitious factor, whence could its cessation come in the absence of that? For the nature of the Self itself is not knowledge that removes ignorance, because there is no contradiction in ignorance coexisting with it;
or if there were contradiction, the world would be eternally liberated through eternal cessation.
Nor is there another adventitious knowledge that contradicts and removes it, because in the doctrine of the solitary Self something distinct is impossible, and because what is adventitious cannot be the nature of Brahman.
Thus it has been said:

1.17

‘No one can eradicate innate ignorance;
for only upon the advent of something contrary does what is innate perish in some cases.

1.18

But for those who maintain the solitary Self, there is no contrary cause.’

1.19

To this it is said:
It has been stated that this being tainted by ignorance belongs to individual selves, not to Brahman.
For that [Brahman] is ever pure, eternally illuminating, and possesses no adventitious object.
Otherwise, even for one who has attained the state of Brahman, ignorance would not cease.
In that case, there would be no liberation.
If, on the other hand, Brahman alone transmigrates and Brahman alone is liberated, the liberation of one would entail the liberation of all.
Because Brahman alone would transmigrate through the vision of difference, and be liberated through the vision of non-difference.
And for those [individual selves] who are tainted by innate ignorance, the cessation of ignorance is possible through the arising of knowledge, an unlike cognition.
For innate knowledge does not exist in individual selves;
indeed, ignorance alone is innate.
Its dissolution occurs through adventitious knowledge.
And even though individual selves are not distinct from Brahman, the division between knowledge and ignorance is explained just like [that between] an original object and its reflection.
By what means, then, does ignorance cease? Through the practice of hearing, reflection, and meditation, and through various means taught in scripture, such as celibacy.
How? This practice of meditation preceded by hearing and reflection upon the Self which is described as 'not this, not this', in which the entire manifold of difference is denied, being evidently the counterpart of the vision of difference, brings about its cessation.
And this [practice], dissolving the vision of difference in general, dissolves of itself too.
Nor do hearing and the rest have for their object the cessation of another division by abandoning the division into hearer, hearing, what is to be heard, and so forth; rather, [they dissolve it] in general.
And likewise, when that too has dissolved, this Self shines forth, clear and utterly pure.
Just as water tainted by contact with dirt, when the powder-dust of a specific substance is thrown into it, removes the other dirt and, itself also being removed, restores [the water] to its clear, intrinsic state—just so, as the vision of difference is dissolved by hearing and the rest, and because of the absence of a particular [object], difference pertaining to them also [dissolves], the individual self remains in its clear, utterly pure intrinsic nature.
It is through ignorance alone that the individual self is divided from Brahman; upon its cessation, it becomes Brahman's intrinsic nature itself.
Just as when jars and the like are broken, the space in them becomes purely the great space itself.
It might be said:
How can difference be dissolved by difference itself? Because it is the adversary of difference, just as dirt [is destroyed] by dirt—thus it was said.
Evidently, the practice of hearing, reflection, and meditation directed upon Brahman who transcends difference is the adversary of the vision of difference, even though it is attended by ignorance.
Just as milk digests milk and itself is digested, and just as poison neutralises another poison and itself is neutralised.
As it is said:

1.20

‘He who knows both together, knowledge and ignorance,
having crossed over death by ignorance, attains immortality through knowledge.’

1.21

This is what is meant:
Both knowledge and ignorance are accompanied [by each other] because of the relation of means and end.
There is no arising of knowledge without ignorance.
If [one objects]: ‘Then it is produced; and likewise, being made, it would be non-eternal,’ hence he says:
‘By ignorance, death.’
This is the meaning:
Ignorance is not the producer of knowledge.
Rather, by ignorance—even though characterised by hearing and the like—ignorance alone is brought to cessation.
It is ignorance alone that is called ‘death’.
When that has ceased, one attains immortality characterised by the nature of knowledge, which is abiding in one's intrinsic nature, just as a crystal gem [returns to its intrinsic clarity] by shedding the tint caused by resting on an adjunct.
Without any further effort, one abides in the intrinsic nature of knowledge.
Another meaning is:
Ignorance is not devoid of knowledge.
To explain:
Even the vision of difference is not devoid of illumination.
In its absence, difference would not be illuminated.
Therefore, the supreme illumination itself illuminates in this and that way.
As it is said:
‘Everything shines following Him as He shines; by His light all this shines.’
However, it is attended by ignorance.
As it is said:
‘All perception is undivided and non-conceptual, but this inner person thinks of it as if it were conceptualised.’
Likewise, knowledge characterised by the hearing of the one Self and so forth does not occur without ignorance, because it is attended by the division into hearer, hearing, and so forth.
In that regard, having crossed over ignorance which is the vision of division, by means of ignorance itself which is closely proximate to knowledge, one abides in the eternal intrinsic nature characterised by knowledge, just as water tainted by a reflection [clears] upon its cessation.
It might be said:
Since division is unreal in the one Self, how can hearing and the rest, which have that [division] as their basis, being themselves unreal, be conducive to any effect? And an apprehension of reality arising from unreality is false indeed, just as [fire inferred] from steam falsely grasped as smoke.
It is said in reply:
There is no such invariable rule that the unreal is not conducive to any effect.
For an illusion is indeed the cause of joy and fear; and the unreal is [a cause] of the apprehension of reality, as in the case of a painted gavaya and written characters.
It might be said:
This [drawn line] is real in its own form, not a void.

1.22

‘For the advocate of the one Self, however, the means are unreal even in their own form.’
It is said in reply:
Let them be real in their own form.
However, the form in which they convey [meaning] is unreal.
Reality of own form devoid of utility for an effect is useless.
Moreover, the means for the vision of non-difference are not false in their own form either, because their own form is Brahman alone.
There, Brahman alone, attended by ignorance, is the means for the attainment of Brahman, just as lines and the like convey phonemes and so on solely through a non-existent form, as in ‘this is the letter ka’, ‘this is a gavaya’.
As for him who thinks:
‘The painted gavaya is not the cause of the apprehension of other gavayas in its capacity as a gavaya, nor is a line [the cause of apprehension] in its capacity as a phoneme;
rather, [it acts] through similarity—"a gavaya is similar to this"; and a line [acts] through convention—"having seen such a line, this phoneme should be remembered"’—
he contradicts common experience.
To explain:
For in common experience, children are instructed in lines precisely as phonemes, and designation is made non-differently: ‘This is a gavaya,’ says the speaker, and the comprehender says: ‘This gavaya was seen by me.’
Likewise, an inference of an unseen cause of a reflection situated in a particular place from an unreal reflection is not false.
And from an eternal sound bearing unreal distinctions such as long, the apprehension of different meanings is not false.
Likewise, an illusory snakebite is the cause of death.
And from that, the inference of death, fainting, and so forth is not untrue, just as from a real snakebite associated with distinctions of time and the like.

1.23

For whoever holds that the Self is momentary consciousness, moreover, there is no possibility of anything to be gained or discarded, and so liberation treatises and activities undertaken for the sake of liberation are futile; / for the momentary [consciousness] is extinguished entirely by its own nature, and because it cannot receive any excellence; / because in a single moment there is no division between qualified and unqualified, since a moment cannot be divided. / If it is thought: / "In the series, there exists both what is to be gained and what is to be discarded," that is false. / The agent and the experiencer is the transmigrating soul; / and the series, being a non-entity, is neither agent nor experiencer. / Or how can there be liberation and bondage for a non-entity? Now, if it is thought: / "The series is not entirely non-existent, nor is it existent; rather, it is existent by conceptual construction, and treatises and activities are for its liberation"— / then it is a conceptually constructed [entity] that transmigrates and is liberated, / and transmigratory existence and liberation, having a conceptually constructed object, are themselves merely conceptually constructed. / Is this not the very position stated by us and accepted by you? It has been said: / "Transmigratory existence and liberation have merely conceptually constructed objects; they do not pertain to the supreme, ultimate reality." / Moreover, even granting momentary consciousness, liberation and transmigratory existence are accepted only for a series that is without beginning or end. / To explain: / Since the series is beginningless and transmigratory existence is a non-entity, there is no origination [of it]. / Nor is there cessation, because it is a non-entity and because a final moment is impossible. / For would that final moment initiate some effect, or not? / If it initiates [an effect], it is not the final one, and so, in the absence of that, there is no cessation. / If it does not initiate [an effect], it lacks all causal efficiency, and by definition of a non-entity, it is non-existent. / That being non-existent, all members of the series would likewise, by this very reasoning, be non-existent. / In their absence, the series itself does not exist; of what, then, is there cessation? If [it is argued that] the final moment does indeed initiate an effect in another series—namely omniscience—how can there be another series when there is the relation of cause and effect? For nothing other than the relation of cause and effect determines a single series. / [Opponent:] "A single series is not determined by the relation of cause and effect alone, but rather by the relation of material cause and effect. / And the final moment is not the material cause of the omniscient cognition, / for it is the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya), / and the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) is the material cause. / And the omniscient cognition is produced by the immediately preceding condition belonging to its own series; / the final moment of this [previous series] is merely its objective condition." / [Reply:] If the material cause must be of the same class, it is not the case that there is no likeness of class between the liberated mind and the omniscient cognition. / As for the one who thinks: / "When a dissimilar effect arises, the series ceases," for him, in a continuous stream of cognitions of color-form, extinction would result from the cognition of another object. / How could there be no extinction when the mental states are similar? Enough with this overextension.

1.24

Some, however, desiring the reality of the Self to have consciousness as a quality while having non-consciousness as its intrinsic nature, say that its abiding in its own form, with all specific qualities eradicated, is the attainment of Brahman. / For that state of it, free from delimitation by limiting adjuncts such as the body and sense organs, is great and is sung of as "Brahman". / And if its intrinsic nature were knowledge, since it is all-pervasive, independent of body and sense organs, eternal, consists of the nature of knowledge, and has diverse manifold objects of knowledge present near it, its transmigratory existence would be far greater. / Now, if it knows nothing, then it does not consist of the nature of knowledge; / for the meaning of "to know" is transitive and cannot apply in the absence of a relation to an object. / To them [the author] replies: / "Consciousness..." / Why? For revelation declares: / "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite"; "Consciousness, bliss"; and so forth. / And the stated flaw does not apply. / Just as fire, although a burner, burns flammable matter brought near, not what is unbrought or non-flammable; / and just as crystals, mirrors, and the like, though transparent and of the nature of illumination, reveal only that which is placed near and is suitable, through receiving its reflection; / so this person, dwelling in the body which is the seat of experience, experiences sound and other objects brought near by the sense organs which are instruments of experience, by receiving their reflection, even though it is eternal consciousness. / And for this reason, there is no undesirable consequence of all [selves] seeing everything. / Nor is there experience of external objects in liberation. / It may be argued: / "For the all-pervasive [Self], everything exists as an object. / What, then, is to be brought near?" It is answered: / Even for the one according to whom the Self is non-conscious and knowledge is produced by contact with the mind and the like, since all Selves are in contact with all minds, how is experience regulated? For through contact with the mind, all those objects exist as its objects. / If [it is held that] because its experience is dependent on karma, the regulation is caused by karma, that is not barred by a stick even for the proponent of the Self as consciousness. / Furthermore, when by the perfection of the vision of non-difference everything has attained the nature of the Self, in the very absence of an object to be seen there is no seeing, even for that whose intrinsic nature is sight—just as fire, the burner, does not burn in the absence of flammable matter, and light does not illuminate in the absence of something to be illuminated. / Thus it is said: / "For there is no cessation of the vision of the seer, because of imperishability; / but there is not that second thing, other and separate from it, which it might see"; "Where, however, all has become the Self alone for him"; and so on. / Moreover, liberation characterized by the cessation of specific qualities like consciousness does not differ from the nihilistic position (ucchedapakṣa). / For even for an existent, absolute absence of seeing is not distinguished from non-existence. / And who would desire the non-existence of the Self, which is dearer than all? Thus liberation would become a non-human end. / It may be argued: / "Because it is the cessation of manifold suffering, even the destruction of the Self is sought by a person; / for those seized by severe and evil diseases are seen striving for their own destruction." / True, those bearing, as it were, a form composed of suffering, whose entire pleasure has been uprooted by advanced illness [may do so]; / but not so the transmigrating souls who partake of diverse and manifold blisses of gods and the like. / There, just as it is a human end because of being the cessation of manifold suffering, so also it is a non-human end because of being the cessation of manifold pleasure. / For the one, however, who has the state of experiencing supreme bliss free from all contact with suffering, there alone is an absolute human end. Enough with this overextension.

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Establishment of Brahman 1

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