Jivanmuktiviveka 1.55

In that regard, the person of steady wisdom is twofold according to difference in time: absorbed and emerged [from absorption]. He inquires about the characteristics of both of them with the first and second halves [of the verse]: “What is the description of the person of steady wisdom who is absorbed in absorption?” By what words expressing characteristics is he described by all? What kind of verbal behavior does the person of steady wisdom who has emerged from absorption engage in? What are his sitting and moving like, being distinct from those of dull persons?
The Blessed Lord said:
“When he casts off all desires that have entered the mind, O Pārtha, / satisfied in the Self alone by the Self, then he is called a person of steady wisdom.”

— (in the Śrīmadbhagavadgītā 2.55)

Desires are threefold: external, internal, and consisting merely of latent impressions. Sweets and the like that have been acquired are external; sweets of wishful longing and the like are internal; and those perceived casually, like grass fallen on the path, consist of latent impressions. One who is absorbed in absorption completely abandons all [desires] through the complete destruction of all mental modifications. And there is in him satisfaction recognizable by the mark of a serene face. And that [satisfaction] is not in desires, but in the Self alone, because desires have been abandoned, and because the intellect is turned toward the reality of the Self whose nature is supreme bliss. Nor is the bliss of the Self delineated here by a mental modification, as in cognitive absorption; rather, [it is revealed] by the Self whose nature is self-luminous consciousness. And the satisfaction is not in the form of a mental modification, but in the form of its residual impression. One who is absorbed in absorption is described by words expressing characteristics of this kind:
“He whose mind is not agitated in sorrows, who is free from longing in pleasures, / from whom passion, fear, and anger have departed, is called a silent sage of steady mind.”

— (ibid. 2.56)

Pain is an adverse mental modification consisting of distress, which is a transformation of the quality of rajas and is produced by causes such as attachment. When such pain has occurred, agitation is a mental modification that consists of remorse, taking the form of an error because it is a transformation of the quality of tamas, [thinking:] "I am a sinner; woe to me, an evil-souled person!" Although this appears like discrimination, nonetheless it is purposeful if occurring in a past life, because it obstructs inclination toward that sin; but now it is without purpose, and so its status as an error should be understood. Pleasure is a favorable mental modification consisting of joy, which is of the nature of sattva and is produced by causes such as obtaining a kingdom or a son. When that pleasure exists, longing is a mental modification of the nature of tamas—a futile expectation of future pleasure of that kind without having performed merit, which is its cause. And in that regard, since pleasure and pain are brought about by prārabdha karma and their occurrence as mental modifications is possible for a mind that has returned to normal consciousness, both of them are intelligible. But agitation and longing cannot occur in a person of discrimination. Likewise, attachment, fear, and anger do not exist for him, because they are of the nature of tamas and are not brought about by karma. Characterized by such marks, he speaks words indicating freedom from agitation, freedom from longing, and the like, in order to instruct his pupils through manifesting his own experience—this is the meaning: / "He who is free from affection everywhere, having encountered this or that agreeable or disagreeable [experience], / neither rejoices nor hates—his wisdom is firmly established." (in that very place, 2.57)

Affection is a particular modification of the nature of tamas directed toward another, wherein another's loss and gain are superimposed upon oneself. An agreeable object is one that causes pleasure, such as one's own wife. Rejoicing is a mental modification that prompts speaking of that [object's] virtues and the like. Here, since speaking of virtues is useless because it does not serve to persuade another, the rejoicing that causes it is of the nature of tamas. A disagreeable object toward him is another's learning and the like, which causes pain by producing envy. Hatred is a mental modification that prompts the censure of that. That too is of the nature of tamas, because censure of that is useless, since it does not serve to remove [the object]. How could these attributes of the nature of tamas occur in a person of discrimination? / "And when this one completely withdraws / the senses from sense objects, as a tortoise its limbs, his wisdom is firmly established."

— (in that very place, 2.58)